

ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF PALESTINIAN HOUSEHOLDS IN AREA C OF THE WEST BANK

Findings of the First Comprehensive Household Survey
January 2019



OXFAM



Institute of Women's Studies

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Cover: Children playing in the Bedouin community of Ma'azi Jaba, in the Central West Bank. The electricity line that runs above their heads and the water networks that are piped underneath only benefit the nearby illegal Israeli settlements. Photo credit: Simon Trépanier/Oxfam 2016

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A joint project of the
Institute of Women's Studies &
the Development Studies Center
at Birzeit University
on behalf of Oxfam



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
ABBREVIATIONS

HH	Household
ICA	Israeli Civil Administration
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs
oPt	Occupied Palestinian Territory
PCBS	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
STL	Standard of Living Scale
UNRWA	United Nations Relief & Works Agency



A farmer irrigates his fields in Saqout village in Area C. Photo credit: Oxfam

MAP OF AREA C COMMUNITIES



PREFACE: AREA C CONTEXT & AIMS OF THE REPORT

Geopolitical Context

The “Oslo II” agreement, signed in 1995 by the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel, divided the occupied West Bank into three juridical zones – A, B and C. Palestinian urban centers (Area A) and villages (Area B) came under the jurisdictions of the newly-created Palestinian Authority. The surrounding territory (comprising more than 60% of the West Bank and encompassing the majority of its farmland and water resources) was designated Area C and left under complete Israeli control. The existing Israeli military infrastructure there (including numerous army installations, training areas and firing zones) and 120 Israeli settlements¹ were also left untouched. This artificial division of the occupied West Bank was supposed to last for a five-year interim period at the end of which Area C would no longer exist as a separate entity outside Palestinian jurisdiction. But more than 25 years later this situation has hardened into a seemingly permanent condition of ever-tightening Israeli control over Palestinian life and development in Area C, and ever-worsening policies aimed at dispossessing Palestinian households and communities located there. As myriad human rights and humanitarian reports over the years have documented, Israel’s ongoing control of all critical aspects of security and civil affairs in Area C (including: zoning and population movement, planning and infrastructure, natural resource use, construction and development) has been guided by the intertwined goals of minimizing the Palestinian population while facilitating the expansion of its illegal settlements and settler population in the same territory.²

“Years of neglect, especially after the Oslo (Peace) Accords, have left the people living in Area C in a desperate situation, isolated from other areas in the West Bank and highly vulnerable to forcible displacement,” says the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. OCHA and other agencies have highlighted the range of destructive mechanisms used to undermine the wellbeing and sustainability of Palestinian communities located in Area C.

¹At that time (1995) they were populated by 135,000 settlers. By 2017, the settler population in Area C had more than tripled reaching 413,400. Settlement and settler data are from Israeli Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) according to Peace Now Settlements Watch. See <http://peacenow.org.il/en/settlements-watch/settlements-data/population>, last accessed February 19, 2019

²See B’tselem 2013, “Acting the Landlord: Israel’s Policy in Area C, West Bank,” available online at https://www.btselem.org/download/201306_area_c_report_eng.pdf, last accessed February 19, 2019

Restrictive Israeli planning and zoning policies have effectively allowed Palestinian construction in only 1% of Area C. Israel's policy of severely limiting and outright refusing planning permission condemns Palestinian households to perpetual cycles of home demolitions, overcrowding, and lack of infrastructure. This, in turn, leads to coerced transfer as residents are simply unable to remain any longer in their communities. In Area C, planning authority rests exclusively with the Israeli Civil Administration (ICA), Israel's military government. This means that only the ICA is authorized to issue building permits. The ICA regulates the construction and rehabilitation of Palestinian infrastructure such as water cisterns, wells, sewage and water treatment/purification plants, waste disposal sites, electricity utilities and roads, public buildings such as schools and medical clinics, and houses and agricultural structures. In areas that are unplanned or under-planned, thousands of Palestinian residents cannot apply for building permits and are therefore compelled to build their homes and other structures without a permit, risking demolition. The vast majority of Area C, then – 99.5 percent – is off limits for Palestinian development. In the remaining area, less than one percent of Palestinian permit applications are approved. Donor funded development projects are also limited. Israel has approved only six percent of construction permits for development projects in Area C, despite existing donor pledges for those projects.



An Israeli military watchtower overlooks a Palestinian hamlet in Area C. Photo credit: R. Hammami

Demolitions and displacement are features of Palestinian life in Area C, with 270 structures seized or demolished in 2017 alone, according to OCHA. In September 2015, official data released by the Israeli authorities indicates that over 11,000 demolition orders – affecting an estimated 13,000 Palestinian owned structures, including homes – are currently “outstanding” in Area C of the West Bank. These orders heighten the vulnerability of thousands of already-poor Palestinian households, some of whom are at imminent risk of forced displacement. With more than 33% of Area C designated a closed military zone, 59 communities are particularly vulnerable to summary demolition.

Donor projects, too, are subject to demolition. In 2018, 56 donor-funded structures were demolished or seized in the West Bank, many of them in Area C. Over the years, such destruction has cost Palestinians and their donors millions of dollars. Moreover, 42 schools in Area C have pending demolition orders against all or part of their facilities.

Access restrictions prevent the movement of as many as 300,000 Palestinians living in Area C into areas A and B, but also inside Area C, which is sliced up by illegal Israeli settlements and their individual security regimes. A July 2018 survey by OCHA found 705 permanent obstacles across the West Bank, many of them placed to limit access of people and goods in and out of Area C, as well as to limit movement within Area C itself. The number of barriers was up by

three percent since the previous 2016 study.³ Settlements and outposts regularly fence off large tracts of land to enable expansion, preventing herders and farmers from accessing what are often their own lands. Herders and farmers also face access restrictions where their lands are located within “firing zones” and state-designated “Green Areas.” Firing zones make up nearly 30% of Area C and are home to 6,200 Palestinians in small herding and Bedouin communities.⁴ The erection of fences around settlements, land confiscation, agricultural trespassing (where settlers take over and begin to cultivate Palestinian-owned land), destruction of trees and other property, pollution hazards and violence, and other intimidation tactics by Israeli settlers/civilians prevent Palestinian access, often with the indifference or active assistance of the Israeli military. These tactics have been used to exploit archaic land laws governing the West Bank, according to which private lands can over time become eligible to be “state land,” i.e. that claimed by settlements, if left untended.

Settler violence primarily takes place inside Area C, where Israeli civilians are usually protected by the military. 2018 saw a continuing rise in attacks by settlers against Palestinians, with 265 incidents recorded by OCHA in which Israeli settlers killed or injured Palestinians or damaged Palestinian property. This was a 69% increase from the year before. One Palestinian woman was killed and 115 Palestinians injured. As of October 2018, some 7,200 Palestinian-owned trees and more than 300 vehicles were damaged or destroyed in settler attacks. Data regarding law enforcement on criminal offenses committed by Israeli civilians (“settler violence”) as well as Israeli military and security forces against Palestinian residents shows a strong connection between the failure of law enforcement and the dispossession of Palestinians from their land. Only three percent of investigations opened since 2005 into ideologically motivated crimes have resulted in a conviction. The inability of Palestinian landowners and farming communities to access their lands due to settler violence facilitates the extension of settlements (enabling settlers to create or expand settler outposts) into large swaths of Palestinian agricultural land in areas C.

Water scarcity is created and perpetuated for Palestinians in Area C by the severe limits established by the ICA on the construction and rehabilitation of Palestinian infrastructure such as water cisterns, wells, sewage and water treatment/purification plants, waste disposal sites, electricity utilities and roads, public buildings such as schools and medical clinics as well as houses and agricultural structures. Families living in the area often spend more than 50% of their income buying water brought in by truck.

³OCHA, “Over 700 road obstacles control Palestinian movement within the West Bank,” Monthly Humanitarian Bulletin, Sept. 2018, <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/over-700-road-obstacles-control-palestinian-movement-within-west-bank>, accessed January 23, 2018.

⁴A recent example of the impact of IDF firing zones was a June 2018 training session in Tel Khashabeh community, Israeli soldiers ordered two families to leave their homes for three days, during which tanks and soldiers rode roughshod over cultivated lands, damaging the livelihood of the village’s 250 residents, and trained in the village streets during the night. See: OCHA, “Palestinian communities at risk of forcible transfer: the case of eastern Nablus ‘firing zone’,” Monthly Humanitarian Bulletin, July 2018 <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/palestinian-communities-risk-forcible-transfer-case-eastern-nablus-firing-zone#ftn1>, accessed January 23, 2018

Given these well-documented findings, at a recent public hearing on Area C, a representative of the UN's Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights concluded that these conditions create pressure upon Palestinians in Area C to move to urban areas (A & B). Israeli policy in Area C creates a “highly coercive environment that forces [Palestinians] to leave,” she said.⁵ This imposed new geopolitical map favors Israeli hegemony, control and even annexation.

Aims of This Report

Palestinian and international organizations and activists have a long history of activism and advocacy in and behalf of Palestinian communities in Area C, but only over the past decade or so have international humanitarian and development agencies (including duty bearers) and the Palestinian Authority begun to develop programs and interventions specifically focused on Area C communities. However, initiatives and interventions by these actors have had to rely on the parameters of the specific types of data produced thus far, the majority of which are concerned with the crucial work of detailing macro-level Israeli policies, and documenting their range of humanitarian and human rights impacts, primarily at the community level.

This study aims to round out the existing human rights evidence base on community level circumstances with household level data from the first base-line social survey of the Palestinian population in Area C. The base-line survey (which forms the core of this report) provides in-depth data showing how various aspects of the protracted protection crisis and destructive mechanisms outlined above have translated into different circumstances and dynamics at the household level in Area C. It provides a range of evidence showing how macro-level policies (over more than two decades) have shaped the livelihoods, wellbeing and future life chances of men, women and children in Area C households. It also points to variations in circumstances, highlighting significant patterns of greater household distress and deprivation in specific regions of Area C and among specific community types, as well as gendered differences in their impacts and experiences.

Ultimately, by providing a more comprehensive and in-depth picture of how women and men in different communities across Area C experience their circumstances, respond to them, as well as perceive their needs and options, the report hopes to contribute to the development of more effective and better targeted strategies for intervention and advocacy on their behalf.

⁵See Jerusalem Post, “UN: Israeli policies forcing Palestinians to Leave Area C,” <https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/UN-Israel-policies-forcing-Palestinians-to-leave-Area-C-of-the-West-Bank-462569>, last accessed February 19, 2019

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report on households in Area C – the territory comprising more than 60% of the occupied West Bank and which is heavily restricted by Israeli military control – describes in quantitative and qualitative detail the lives of the approximately 300,000 Palestinians who live there.¹

Area C households, especially those most deprived, have been locked out of the socio-economic and related demographic transitions underway in the West Bank for over 20 years.

It is based on the first and only comprehensive and representative statistical survey of Palestinian households located in Area C,² offering a detailed overview of their demographic, socio-economic, and human security situation while providing a statistical baseline for future surveys. The 2014 baseline survey of 1,600 households had a very low margin of error, less than 2%. It is augmented by a second smaller survey of 400 households conducted in 2017 in order to assess stability and change in trends identified three years prior, as well as by findings from focus groups and individual interviews carried out in four different Area C communities that represent regional and other main characteristics of the survey sample design.³

1 There are large disparities in the estimated Palestinian population of Area C due to definitional variations, as well as difficulties in counting individuals in the field. The most recent estimate by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) based on their 2017 population census of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is 393,163. UNOCHA estimated the Area C population at approximately 300,000 in 2013; Bimkom estimated it at 180,000 in 2011; and PCBS estimated it at 117,000 in 2012. The sample for the 2014 survey on which this report is based used the PCBS 2012 estimates – at the time the most reliable because, unlike the other two sources, they were based on population projections from the 2007 Palestinian National Census (i.e. based on an actual household survey in the field). As well, the PCBS definition of Area C communities most closely reflected that used by this survey.

2 Only two previous statistical studies exist on households in Area C communities: one by the PCBS, and the other by UNICEF (in partnership with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency and the World Food Programme). The PCBS study was not a dedicated Area C-focused survey, instead it was a special statistical report (published in 2012) that amalgamated preexisting data on Area C households from previous surveys of the wider West Bank and Gaza undertaken by the bureau. That data is useful in providing a broad overview in comparison to the population in the wider West Bank but, not being a dedicated survey, it sheds no light on issues of specific relevance to Area C. In addition, its 932-household sample size allows only the most general level of analysis. The 2010 survey undertaken jointly by UNICEF, UNRWA and the WFP only surveyed households in herder communities in Area C. By excluding village and urban communities, that survey is not representative of all of Area C households.

3 These were: Imreiha (herding community in the North); Walajeh (village in the South); al Za'im (urban community in the Middle) and al-Fasayil in the Jordan Valley.



Profile of Surveyed Communities

The base-line survey used a sample of 40 households from each one of 40 selected communities distributed across four main regions of Area C: North, South, Middle and the Jordan Valley. The distribution by type of community (as an outcome of the sample design) was that 61% of surveyed households were located in Area C village communities; 31% were in Area C hamlet or encampments (20.5% encampments/10.5 hamlets) and 8% were in urban Area C communities.

According to data from the United Nations Office for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) one-third of the selected communities were entirely in Area C, almost four-tenths had greater than or equal to half their land area in Area C, and slightly over one-fourth had less than half of their land in Area C.⁴ Also according to OCHA, 3.5% lie in an Israeli designated nature reserve, 16% are affected by an Israeli military zone, and 6.3% are located within a closed Israeli military zone. One quarter of the communities are located 0-500 meters away from an Israeli settlement, slightly over one quarter are about 500 meters away, almost another quarter are at 500-1,000 meters away, and less than one fifth are 1,000-1,500 meters away.



Demography in Area C

Overall family size, marriage ages and patterns, as well as family structures in Area C households, particularly those in the Jordan Valley, South West Bank and in hamlet/encampments, tend to mirror those that were the norm across the West Bank two decades ago. Larger families, early marriage, and polygamous marriage are more prevalent in those regions and community types of Area C. For example, families in Area C were larger on average than those in the overall West Bank, with the largest families found in the most deprived communities and regions: hamlet/encampments had an average of 5.9 household members, and the Jordan Valley and South West Bank both averaged 5.8 persons per household (compared to an overall of 4.9 in the entire West Bank). This suggests that **households in Area C, especially the most deprived communities, have been locked out of many of the socio-economic and related demographic transitions that have taken place in the wider West Bank over the past two decades.**

Only 8% of all Area C households surveyed were female-headed, significantly fewer than the 12% of female-headed households in the entire West Bank in the same year. **Fewer female-headed households, higher incidence of female early marriage and increased incidence of polygamy in certain community types and regions of Area C may be linked to greater levels of violence and insecurity.** The finding that these demographic patterns are more prevalent in Area C contexts with higher levels of human insecurity and vulnerability to Israeli state violence suggests linkages to heightened concerns around female bodily integrity rather than simply being due to longstanding social norms. Similarly, higher levels of polygamous marriage were found in household contexts highly dependent on herding or agriculture and where women's

⁴ Although all *households* surveyed were themselves completely located in Area C.

domestic/productive labor burdens were their most acute. As attested to by focus group findings, in such contexts a co-wife mitigates other women's heavy labor responsibilities. Approximately 5% of married women in Area C households were in polygamous marriages—significantly higher than the 1% found in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.⁵ Polygamy was highest in hamlet/encampments (at more than 9% of married women), followed by households in the Jordan Valley (8%) and the South West Bank (5%).

Also more common were women married to first-degree relatives (at 33% of married women compared to 26% in the overall West Bank, both in 2014). This phenomenon was significantly higher (at 38%) in hamlet/encampments.



Education

Educational attainment levels in Area C households are significantly lower than those across the West Bank and are at their lowest in households located where Israeli obstacles to education are at their most acute. Moreover, the data shows that these disadvantages have a relatively higher impact on female access to education in Area C.

Overall, educational attainment was low, with nearly 60% of Area C households reporting male and/or female members who had left school before completing compulsory education (10th grade), compared to a significantly lower 45% among West Bank households in the same year. One-third (32%) of individuals in Area C have only the lowest levels of a primary education (four years) or less, in comparison to one-fifth (22%) among individuals across the West Bank. **The lowest levels of educational attainment among respondents of both sexes were found in contexts in which Israeli obstacles to educational access are most acute:** in hamlets/encampments 50% of individuals have less than 5 years of education; in the Jordan Valley the rate is 52% and among individuals in communities completely located in Area C, 47% have attained less than 5 years of education.

In contrast to the wider West Bank, where female educational attainment now surpasses that of males, in Area C females continue to face relatively greater educational disadvantage compared to male counterparts. More than a third (36%) of females in Area C have less than five years of education compared to 28% of males there, and this climbs to 53% among women in hamlets/encampments compared to 48% among males in these community types. Similarly, only 13% of females and 16% of males in Area C have attained higher education (compared to 22% of females and 20% of males in the wider West Bank); in hamlet/encampments, higher educational achievement drops dramatically to only 5% of females and 6% of males.

Lack of access to education is often linked to female early marriage, found in the study to be higher in Area C. **One-third (31%) of surveyed women had been married before age 18, compared with one-fifth (20%) across the West Bank,⁶ with no notable decline in rates of early marriage among younger**

⁵ See “Understanding Masculinities: Results from the International Men and Gender Equality Survey (IMAGES)—Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

⁶ West Bank data is for 2015.

women in Area C. Highest rates of female early marriage were found in contexts where overall educational access was most constrained: in hamlets/ encampments (40%) and in the Jordan Valley (38%).



Housing, Living Conditions and Standards of Living

More than one-fourth of households in Area C live in inadequate housing lacking basic infrastructure such as piped water and sanitation facilities. Households with the worst housing conditions were located in contexts where the Israeli planning regime is most restrictive: in hamlets/encampments, in communities completely located in Area C, and in the Jordan Valley. Most strikingly, one-fourth of households entirely in Area C were dependent on firewood for cooking fuel, and one-third had no access to piped water. These were also the locations where crowding in homes was most common, and where more households had the lowest standards of living.

Area C families are much more likely to live in independent houses (at 68%) in comparison to those living in the wider West Bank (56%), but their homes tend to be smaller (more than two-thirds of homes have three rooms or less) and more crowded (with 16% suffering from crowded living conditions versus 10% across the West Bank). Notably, **16% of households in Area C live in tents, sheds, or caves, while almost half of households in hamlets/encampments live in these types of dwellings.**

Basic household infrastructure is absent for many households in Area C. Almost half of households in the Jordan Valley and in hamlets/encampments are not linked to water networks, resulting in high numbers of households relying on more expensive tanked water (at 41% in the former and 31% in the latter) while a full one-fourth of homes in hamlets/encampments and one-fifth of Area C households in the Jordan Valley have no access to electricity.

Almost a quarter (23%) of Area C households have a poor standard of living, rising to 53% of households in hamlets/encampments, 41% in the Jordan Valley, and 36% among households in communities completely located in Area C.

Area C households are more likely to own only the land on which their home is built. Around two-thirds (65%) of the surveyed households only own the land on which their dwellings are situated (41% stated they own other land), dropping to less than one-third among Jordan Valley households (32%) – a significant finding given these communities' high dependence on agriculture. **Households in hamlets/encampments reported the greatest ownership of land in insecure locations, in other words, of land that falls outside municipal boundaries.**

Women in Area C communities own minimal personal assets, usually gold jewelry (43%), mirroring low asset ownership among females across the OPT. Other assets reported (8% having a bank account, 3% owning land, 2.5% owning a home or portion, etc.) were even lower in incidence than elsewhere in the OPT. Otherwise, like elsewhere in the OPT, immovable and productive assets such as livestock or a home are most likely to be held by widowed rather than married or single women. Despite the high numbers of women engaged

in productive work in Area C, this does not translate into greater asset ownership; indeed, no correlation was found between women's asset ownership and labor force activity.



Livelihood & Employment Activities

The main sources of income for the majority of households in Area C are unstable and insecure. For their primary source of income, almost one-fourth of households rely on herding or agriculture and another approximately 40% rely on irregular daily wages. Less than one-fourth of households in Area C can rely on the stability of a regular salary for their primary income. Households in hamlets/encampments and the Jordan Valley present the least stability in their primary sources of income. Half of the households surveyed said they also relied on secondary sources of income, primarily social assistance, at 28% of households.

57% of women in Area C households were engaged in one or more productive activity, mostly craft/food processing

More than half (51%) of the surveyed households depend on irregular wages for some part of their household income (with 38% depending on them as the primary source, and 16% as the secondary source). Most irregular wages (53%) came from Palestinian private sector employers while 38% said they came from working in Israel or Israeli settlements. The main source of regular salaries (for the 28% of households who reported receiving them) was from the Palestinian Authority (at 54%), followed by the Palestinian private sector and local NGOs.

More than three-fourths of Area C households depend on agriculture and animal husbandry for some part of their household income, with the greatest dependence on farm activities found among households in hamlet/encampments and the Jordan Valley. The majority (78%) of households who depend to any degree on agriculture or herding are self-employed and work on family farms. Another 27% report being agricultural workers on Israeli settlements or in Israel, and 18% do agricultural labor for a Palestinian employer.⁷

Area C households in the Jordan Valley are those most dependent on agriculture and/or herding for their livelihoods by region, but under the worst set of conditions. Jordan Valley agricultural households tend to be agricultural wage laborers versus the norm across other regions of Area C where households are predominantly self-employed family farmers. More than half of the households that depend primarily on agriculture wage labor in settlements, as well as half of those who depend primarily on agricultural wage labor in Israel are from the Jordan Valley. In addition, poorer forms of land tenure dominate in the Jordan Valley, with 30% of agriculture-dependent households there renting or share-cropping land (compared to 8% in the Middle West Bank and 4% in the South).

⁷The total exceeds 100% given some households engage in agriculture under multiple circumstances of employment.



A Palestinian woman tends a zucchini patch made possible with donor support. Photo credit: Oxfam

More than one-fourth of households in Area C rely on social assistance, but it is overwhelmingly a secondary source of income. Reliance on income from social assistance is highest in hamlet/encampments and the Jordan Valley. The two main providers of social assistance cited by respondents are UNRWA at 45% and the Palestinian Ministry of Social affairs (MOSA) at 40%.

In Area C, while more men, women and individuals in the same household are engaged in work than is found across the West Bank, they are also less likely to be fully employed. As such, in Area C, the greater levels of multiple individuals in the same household engaged in work activities represents a livelihood strategy to compensate for poor and unstable work and inadequate income. This is borne out by the fact that these patterns are most apparent in hamlet/encampments and in the Jordan Valley, i.e. in the most vulnerable and deprived community contexts. Both male and female labor force participants in Area C are much less likely to have stable full employment than their counterparts across the West Bank. Sixty-nine percent of males 15 years and above in Area C, compared to 62% of males across the West Bank, were in some form of employment. But they were four times as likely to be only partially employed (28%), in comparison to males across the West Bank (at 7%). These findings on the poor employment profiles of men in Area C dovetail with those on main and secondary sources of household income, marked by high dependence on irregular salaries added to the dependence on agriculture and herding (that are often seasonal, as well as vulnerable to the vagaries of Israeli military restrictions and environmental impacts such as drought). **Unemployment among males (and as shown below, among females) is primarily an issue for university-educated youth in Area C.** While this is a phenomenon across the OPT, it is exacerbated in Area C because of the lack of semi-professional work opportunities within these communities, as well as their distance and isolation from urban centers where jobs for the highly educated are more available.

Women and girls age 15 and above in Area C are more likely to be in the labor force than are their female counterparts across the West Bank (at 26% versus 19%). Similarly, their unemployment levels are much lower at 11% than the 27% unemployment among women across the West Bank in the same year.

The very low levels of educational attainment of working women in Area C is markedly different than among employed women across the West Bank, where the vast majority have higher education. The survey found that 22% of females in Area C households were working full-time or part-time, a significantly greater proportion than the 14% female employment across the West Bank in the same year (2014). Employment was higher among married women (29%) than among single (23%), separated, widowed, or divorced women (20%). **However, employment opportunities for women in Area C are characterized by unwaged/low waged work (most likely in herding/agricultural activities, including in Israeli settlements),** while employment opportunities for the highly educated are far more limited than is the case for women in areas A and B.

Women in the surveyed communities have heavy productive work burdens along with domestic ones, yet few of them earn any direct income. **While 22% of women had some level of employment, only 7% said they worked for pay.** This is congruent with wider findings on women in agricultural households

across the OPT, in which the majority work under the category of “unpaid family labor.” A total of 57% of surveyed women in Area C households engage in one or more productive activities such as handicrafts and food processing, animal husbandry or agricultural production, reaching a high of 72% among women in hamlet/encampments. Women in hamlets/ encampments showed the greatest gap between high productive workloads and the percent of them who receive pay. **In total, 69% of women in the Jordan Valley and 60% in the South West Bank were engaged in one or more productive activity, mostly craft/food processing.** Women’s level of engagement in agricultural and herding activities was significantly higher (91%) in households that depend on these for income, attesting to the fact that women’s engagement in these activities are critical to agricultural and herding livelihoods.

Along with undertaking multiple – and usually unpaid productive activities – women in Area C also have high domestic workloads.

In the course of an ordinary day, 96% of women reported doing cleaning, 96% reported cooking, and 22% spent time collecting wood or water. A majority also undertook childcare, and caring for elderly, ill or disabled family members on a daily basis. **More than half of women in hamlets/encampments (57%) spent time in a normal day gathering water or wood for fuel, as did 44% of women whose communities were completely in Area C** (in contrast to only 7% of women in villages and less than 1% in urban areas). The only task that a significant number of women (24%) undertake outside their immediate home environment is shopping, while another 11% said they undertake tasks of dealing with official institutions on behalf of the family. The 6% of women who undertake paid work also usually do so outside their immediate home environment.

More than 1/5 of women in Area C spend time collecting wood or water.

More than half (52%) of women surveyed said that they felt stressed from having too many daily duties. Higher levels of stress were expressed by women in encampments (58%) as well as among women whose households rely on herding (65%), agriculture (57%), and poultry farming (59%) for any portion of their income.

Women in Area C households report having little decision-making power, particularly in relation to economic decisions. Approximately half of surveyed women said they were free to decide whether to visit friends or relatives (49%) or to seek medical treatment for themselves (52%), but only 40% said they had the power to decide on daily household spending. **Women in hamlets/encampments and in the Jordan Valley express the most limited household decision-making power in comparison to other women across Area C.** Of all three community types, women in village Area C households had the relatively highest household decision-making power.

Married women were also asked about whether they had the final say on a number of important life decisions, and if not, who did. Only on the issue of selecting whom they married did a substantial number (51%) of women say they, not their fathers, made the final decision. Final decision-making on women’s work outside the home, a daughters’ education, or buying an expensive household item was overwhelmingly in the hands of husbands. Married

women in hamlets/ encampments also had the least decision-making power on these significant life issues.

Area C women’s involvement in the labor force does not seem to impact their decision-making power. Women in the Jordan Valley, who were the most economically active women by region in Area C, had the least decision-making power in terms of choosing to work outside the home (with only 9% having the final say on this decision versus 22% for all women). Similar to the findings on women’s freedom of movement, greater decision-making power on daily issues increased with women’s age – especially among women over 50.



Human Insecurity & Distress

There are strong correlations between living in households located in the most vulnerable, precarious contexts of Area C and exhibiting high levels of human insecurity. Almost half of respondents in Area C households exhibit high levels of human insecurity⁸, and these levels are even higher among respondents living in households in the Jordan Valley (66% highly insecure) or in hamlet/encampments (70% highly insecure). In all, 47% of the respondents exhibited high levels of insecurity, 42% showed moderate insecurity, and 11% had low levels of insecurity. When broken down by individual indicators, respondents’ most common fears and worries were for the family’s future including its economic well-being, followed by fears of direct forms of Israeli state violence.

Higher levels of insecurity were also found among households in communities entirely located in Area C, at 63%, compared to 35% in those communities that are halfway in Area C. In addition, 70% of households located in a nature reserve exhibited high insecurity levels, compared to 45% among those not located in reserves. Finally, 83% of households located in military zones expressed high levels of insecurity compared to 67% living in communities affected by military zones, and only 39% among those not affected by military zones. Households with low living standards also expressed higher levels of human insecurity.

More than two-thirds of respondents whose homes are in communities most exposed or vulnerable to Israeli military violence express high levels of uncertainty about their households’ ability to continue living in its present location. This included 68% of respondents whose homes had been exposed to at least one incidence of Israeli military violence over the past three years, 80% of those whose households are located in Israeli firing/military zones, 70% whose households are located in Israeli nature reserves, 70% of respondents living in hamlet/encampments, and 66% in the Jordan Valley.

⁸ The concept of “human security” was developed to address the fact that impacts of violent conflict and insecurity are not limited to material loss and bodily harm. The survey used a Human Security scale developed by the Institute of Community and Public Health (ICPH) at Birzeit University to assess the impacts of long-term conflict and insecurity on respondents’ emotional security and sense of wellbeing in the present and towards the future. The ICPH scale contains ten questions about individuals’ level of fear about threats to personal safety; the safety of their families and their ability to support their families; fear about loss of income, homes and land; and fear about their future and the future of their families (see appendix).

Levels of individual distress were measured using a scale comprised of 12 questions that assessed individuals' fears, frustration, and anxieties about incapacitation and displacement, as well as fears of not being in control over their lives (see appendix).⁹ **Among the women surveyed, 32% exhibited low levels of individual distress, 45% moderate levels, and 24% high levels.** Greater incidence of high distress was found in the Jordan Valley (33%), hamlets/encampments (at 38%, more than double other types of communities), among women in inadequate housing (41%), and those in low standard of living (45%, nearly double the rate among those with medium and low standards of living).¹⁰



Exposure to Israeli State & Settler Violence

The survey assessed exposure by Area C households and their members to various types and levels of Israeli military and settler violence. **Almost a third (29%) of Area C households had experienced exposure of the home to Israeli military (such as full or partial demolition, expulsion, or an expulsion order) and settler violence over the preceding five years.** Women's individual experiences of moderate forms of military violence over the preceding three years was similar, while one-fifth of households reported that family members had experienced more severe forms of state violence over a five-year period. **Among the respondents who experienced violence against the home, almost two-thirds (61%) had experienced multiple incidents.**

- The highest levels of home exposure to political violence were found in military zones, with 63% of women in these communities reporting that their homes were exposed to at least one of six types of such violence in the past five years.
- Among households located in hamlets/encampments, a high of 46% reported at least one incident over the past five years (compared to 18% among village and only 2% in urban Area C locations). Incident levels were also high in the Jordan Valley at 41%.
- Households in communities completely located in Area C also reported greater levels of violence against their homes, with 41% reporting one or more incidents over the preceding five years.

There are also clear links between homes' greater vulnerability to military violence, and households' economic and structural deprivation. More than two-thirds (64%) of households living in inadequate housing experienced at least one of six types of incidents of state violence against their home, compared to only 16% of those with adequate housing. Likewise, 57% of respondents with a low standard of living (using an STL index) reported incidents of violence against their home. **Human insecurity and a home's exposure to state or settler violence were highly correlated, with more than two-thirds (68%) of those who were exposed to at least one incidence of this type of violence against the home expressing high degrees of human insecurity.**

⁹ The scale has also been used and validated in multiple studies of the West Bank and Gaza Strip by Institute of Community and Public Health/Birzeit University.

¹⁰ The findings of the 2017 resurvey show a significant decline in overall levels of distress, but it is unclear if this is related to conditions or to limitations posed by the small sample size.

Twenty percent of respondents reported that individual household members had been exposed to at least one incidence of direct political violence from the military or settlers over the preceding five years. Specifically, 15% of women reported that a family member had been arrested (with 3% reporting more than one person arrested); another 8% reported a family member's injury by the Israeli military; 7% reported that a family member was injured by Israeli settlers; and 7% reported that a family member was killed.¹¹

1/3 of households reliant on agriculture or herding for their livelihoods reported destruction of crops in the three years preceding the survey.

Nine variables assessed women's individual and direct exposure to moderate political violence by the Israeli army or settlers over the preceding three years. **More than a quarter of women in Area C (29%) reported experiencing at least one type of moderate political violence.** Of these, 22% reported being held for a long time at an Israeli army checkpoint; 13% had undergone a body search by military personnel; 18% had been exposed to tear gas/sound bombs; 7% were interrogated by the military; and 3% were under a travel ban. In terms of settler violence, 6% had been detained by settlers; 4% searched by settlers; and 3% physically attacked by settlers.

Almost half (44%) of households dependent on agriculture or herding for their livelihoods in Area C experienced one or more attacks on or impediments to their livelihood activities over the previous three years due to Israeli policies or direct Israeli violence; nearly half said this was a continual problem. A third of households dependent on agriculture or herding for their livelihoods (30%) had experienced destruction of crops; 24% had experienced confiscation of agricultural lands; 21% had faced forced eviction from productive lands; 22% experienced destruction of crops; 24% experienced confiscation/theft of livestock or agricultural infrastructure; and 15% had experienced poisoning of livestock. Lack of access to water for agriculture/livestock emerged as a dominant obstacle, faced by 38% of these households over the previous three years. An overwhelming majority (92%) of households who had faced any of these obstacles over the previous three years said that a decline in productivity had resulted, with more than half (56%) saying the decline was substantial.

The majority of women who said they faced restrictions on their freedom of movement in/to most locations tended to cite social reasons (family constraints/ norms) as the cause. However, **fear of military/settler violence was the primary reason women cited for their lack of freedom to move in or to family fields/herding areas, with two-thirds (67%) of women citing this as the reason they were restricted in accessing productive lands.** In the Jordan Valley, as many as three-quarters of women cited fear of military/settler violence as the reason they could not go freely to family herding/farming lands. A notable 59% of women in hamlets/encampments and 45% of women in the South West Bank also stated this as the reason they could not go to farming/herding lands.

¹¹ Respondents used the term "martyred" rather than killed – in line with Palestinian terminology for deaths due to Israeli military or settlers.



Experiences of Humanitarian Aid

The uneven patterning of “soft” versus “hard” humanitarian aid across community types in Area C, suggests that aid is distributed in ways that conform with Israeli restrictions rather than by prioritizing the specific needs of communities.

Food aid was cited as the dominant form of humanitarian aid received by Area C communities, with one-third of respondents saying their community had received it the previous year in both 2014 and 2017. Food aid was even more often cited by respondents in hamlets/encampments, with 46% saying their community had received aid in this form in 2014. Other forms of aid received by communities included water and road projects (each cited by 26% of respondents), followed by health and agriculture projects (each cited by 19% of respondents). Legal aid and income generation projects (cited by 4% and 0% of respondents consecutively) were the least likely forms of aid to be received by communities.

Findings suggest that hamlet/encampments had received the least variegated array of aid with responses on types of aid received overwhelmingly grouped around four types of aid (food aid cited by almost half of respondents; health, agricultural and water projects cited by less than 20% of them) and all other types of aid (roads, electricity, education, legal, etc.) cited by less than 10% of respondents. In contrast, responses in Area C villages reflect a pattern of greater aid diversity: five types of aid cited by more than 20% of respondents and three types of aid cited by another 10% to 20%. It is notable that infrastructure projects (such as roads and electricity, as well as housing) were almost completely absent in the aid respondents said their community received in hamlet/encampments. In contrast, 42% of urban Area C households and 32% of village households said their community had received aid in the form of road infrastructure the previous year.

Women in Area C communities had high levels of knowledge about forms of aid distributed in their communities, but very few of them had been consulted about their aid priorities.





INTRODUCTION

This report is a product of two surveys of households located in communities across Area C of the West Bank. Both were designed and undertaken by the Institute of Women's Studies and the Development Studies Center at Birzeit University in partnership with Oxfam. The first survey, undertaken in June 2014, was the most comprehensive and representative, based on a large sample of 1,600 households, in 40 randomly selected communities distributed across the four regions of Area C. It stands as the first and only comprehensive representative statistical survey of households and their members located in Area C of the West Bank.¹² Its significance is two-fold: it provides the first detailed overview of the demographic, socio-economic, and human security situation of Palestinian households located in Area C; simultaneously it constitutes a statistical baseline for future surveys measuring trends in Area C households over time.

The second survey, a 2017 resurvey that implemented the original survey instrument with a 25% sub-sample of 400 households in 10 communities, is used at the end of each thematic section of the report to provide a general assessment of stability and change in major trends identified in 2014. Given its much smaller (and thus less reliable) sample size, the 2017 data is used throughout the report only very generally.

As such, this report relies centrally on the 2014 data, given its much greater reliability resulting from a large sample size. When no date is mentioned in the narrative analysis, it should be assumed that findings refer to the 2014 survey.

The report also integrates findings from systematic qualitative research undertaken in four Area C communities in early 2018 that were selected as representing the two main dimensions of the Area C survey sample framework: the four regions of Area C (North, Middle, South West Bank and the Jordan Valley), as well as three main community types (Urban, Village and Hamlet/encampments).

¹² In terms of statistical data, only two previous studies exist on Area C communities: one by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) and the other by UNICEF (in partnership with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency and the World Food Programme). The PCBS study was not a dedicated Area C-focused survey, instead it was special statistical report (published in 2012) that amalgamated pre-existing data on Area C households from previous surveys of the wider West Bank and Gaza undertaken by the Bureau. That data is useful in providing a broad overview in comparison to the population in the wider West Bank but, not being a dedicated survey, it sheds no light on issues of specific relevance to Area C. In addition, its 932-household sample size allows only the most general level of analysis. The 2010 survey undertaken jointly by UNICEF, UNRWA and the WFP only surveyed households in herder communities in Area C. By excluding village and urban communities, that survey is not representative of all of Area C.



Survey Methodology

The following section provides a brief overview of the main parameters of the 2014 baseline survey in order to properly contextualize the report findings. (An in-depth discussion of the methodology for both surveys and the qualitative research can be found in Appendix A.)

The 2014 study had a sample size of 1,600 households, selected to give equal weight to the four main regions of the West Bank (400 households per region). Ten Area C communities/localities were randomly selected in each of the North, Middle, and South West Bank, and the Jordan Valley regions, for a total of 40 communities. Within each community, 40 households were randomly selected for a total of sample of 1,600 households (ultimately encompassing a total of 8,813 persons living in the selected households). As per the sample frame, 23.8% of the surveyed households were located in Area C in the North of the West Bank, 23.5% in the Middle, 26.3% in the South and 26.4% in the Jordan Valley. By community type, 61% of the surveyed households were in Area C villages; 20.5% in Bedouin encampments, 10.5% in hamlets, 5.7% in urban areas, and 2.3% in refugee camps. For the purposes of this report, hamlets and encampments have been combined, as have urban and refugee communities.

Only households located in Area C were selected for the survey, even when the communities they are in are only partially located in Area C. The respondents were randomly selected females from these households ages 18 and above (where more than one female household member fit this criteria, field researchers used a kish table to randomly select from among them). Female respondents were asked about their households, as well as their own experiences and circumstances. The 2014 survey had a very low margin of error of $E=0.06$ at the district/ regional level.

Profile of Surveyed Communities

As just discussed, according to data from the Office of the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), not all of the 40 West Bank communities selected are entirely in Area C (although all *households* surveyed in each community are completely located in Area C). One-third of the 40 communities are entirely in Area C, almost four-tenths had greater than or equal to half their land area in Area C, and slightly more than one-fourth had less than half of their land in Area C. Also according to OCHA, 3.5% lie in a nature reserve designated by Israel, 16% are affected by an Israeli military zone, and 6.3% are located within a closed Israeli military zone. One quarter of these communities are 0-500 meters away from an Israeli settlement, slightly over one quarter are about 500 meters away, almost another quarter are at 500-1,000 meters away, and less than one fifth are 1,000-1,500 meters away.

Also according to OCHA, about one-fifth of the communities in the sample rely on herding as their primary source of livelihood, another one-fourth rely on work in Israel and another one-fourth on farming. One in ten depend on employment with the Palestinian Authority, one in ten on employment in Palestinian industry or commerce, or the private sector. Less than one-fifth has local services as their primary source of livelihood.



Profile of Communities in the Qualitative Research

Four communities out of those included in the 2014 and 2017 survey samples were selected for further in-depth qualitative research undertaken in 2018. The table below describes them according to their representation in the over-all sample framework, and details their differing circumstances in relation to the presence of Israeli military/ settler infrastructures and violence.

Main Characteristics and Selected Indicators of Four Area C Communities				
Community	Imreiha	Al Zaim	Al Walajeh	Fasayil
Main Sample Characteristics				
Region	North West Bank	Middle West Bank	South West Bank	Jordan Valley
Community type	Hamlet/Encampment	Urban	Village	Village+Hamlet/Encampment
Internal land zones	Completely C	B & C	B & C	B & C
External zone	Enclaved by Area C	Enclaved by Area C	Enclaved by Area C	Enclaved by Area C
Presence / Impact of Occupation Infrastructure				
Separation Wall	--	High Impact	High Impact	--
Proximity of settlements	1.5 kilometers	More than 5 kilometers	Less than 500 meters	Less than 500 meters
Penned in by more than 1 settlement	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Community specific checkpoint	High Impact	High Impact	High Impact	Medium Impact
Lands affected by firing zone/ military area	No	Low impact nearby firing zone	High impact nature reserve	High impact closed military zones
Israeli military presence inside community	Recurrent	No	No	Recurrent
Settler violence	Low	No	Low	No

The type of community, its location within Area C, and different degrees and types of military restrictions, settler or military infrastructure, and/or violence offer linkages with the different patterning of demographic and socio-economic indicators across the communities.



Type of Communities

	Imreiha	Al Zaim	Al Walajeh	Al Fasayil
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Demographic Characteristics

Family size	Large	Average	Average	Large
Early marriage	High	Average	Low	High
Educational attainment	Low	Average	High	Low
Polygamy	Yes	No	No	Yes

Livelihoods

Primary & secondary source income	Daily wages Israel/ Herding	Daily wages Israel/ Salaries from Israel	Daily wages Israel/ Salaries from PA	Daily wages settle- ments/ Herding
Youth unemployment	Low	High	High	Low
Female unemployment	Low	High	High	Low

Housing Conditions/ Standard of Living

% live in inadequate housing	15%	0%	0%	40%
Standard of Living	23% poor 70% medium	5% poor 57% high	70% medium 30% high	52% poor 48% medium
% households own car	42%	60%	25%	2%
% households own computer	30%	70%	62%	2%
Human Security				
% expressing high level human insecurity	75%	10%	40%	73%
% uncertain about future of family home	48%	40%	35%	96%

The qualitative data on the four communities confirms a strong trend found in the quantitative data whereby Area C households in the Jordan Valley (per region) and households located in hamlet/encampments (per community type) have the highest levels of infrastructural and socio-economic deprivation as well as the lowest levels of human security.





CHAPTER 1: DEMOGRAPHY

Overall family size, marriage ages and patterns, as well as family structures in Area C households, particularly those in the Jordan Valley, South West Bank and in hamlet/ encampments, tend to mirror those that were the norm across the West Bank two decades ago. Larger families, early marriage, and polygamous marriage are more prevalent in these regions and community types of Area C. This suggests that households in these communities have been locked out of many of the socio-economic and related demographic transitions that have taken place in the wider West Bank over the past two decades.

Family Size

In 2014, the PCBS found average family size in the West Bank stood at 4.9 persons. This survey found that, in Area C households, average family size was significantly larger at 5.5 persons in 2014 (and 5.1 in the 2017 subsample).

Average Family Size by Selected Regions and Community Types, 2014

All West Bank	4.9
All Area C	5.5
Urban	5.1
Village	5.3
Encampment/ Hamlet	5.9
South West Bank	5.8
Jordan Valley	5.8

Among all Area C regions and community types, families were larger than those in the overall West Bank. However, the largest average family sizes were found in the most deprived communities and regions: hamlet/encampments at 5.9 household members, and the Jordan Valley and South West Bank (both with an average of 5.8 persons per household).




The vast majority of surveyed Area C households (92.8%) were nuclear families, not extended families (only accounting for 8.3% with no significant differences by region). As such, the reason households in Area C are larger on average than the West Bank population is primarily due to greater numbers of children in these households. In 2014, a high proportion of children under 14 years of age was found among households in hamlets/encampments (45%), South West Bank (43%) and the Jordan Valley (40%) – all locations with significantly higher family size.¹³

Marital Status & Age at First Marriage

The ages of the women interviewed in the surveys ranged between 16 and 90 years with a mean of 36.8¹⁴ years. The age distribution was as follows: 36.9% were 16–29 years old; 44.4% were 30–49 years old; and 18.7% were 50 years or older. Most of the women interviewed were married at the time of the interview (12.2% were single or engaged, 79.8% were married, 7% were widowed and 1% divorced or separated)¹⁵. The very low proportion of divorced/separated women found in Area C households, and the 7% who are widowed is congruent with findings on females across the West Bank.

Age of Women Surveyed



Approximately 5% of married women in Area C households were in polygamous marriages – significantly higher than the 1% of such marriages among women found in a recent survey of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.¹⁶ Polygamy

¹³ In the 2017 resurvey even higher numbers of children under 14 years of age were found in these locations: 70% of households in South West Bank; 80% of households in Jordan Valley and 77% of households in hamlet/encampments. However, this was likely due to the smaller unrepresentative survey sample.

¹⁴ In the 2017 resurvey, there was a slightly higher mean of 38.1 years old.

¹⁵ In the 2017 resurvey, a slightly higher proportion (82%) of interviewed women were currently married; 11% were single and 7% were widowed with divorces/separated accounting for less than 1%.

¹⁶ See “Understanding Masculinities: Results from the International Men and Gender Equality Survey (IMAGES) – Middle East and North Africa (MENA)



was highest in hamlet/encampments (at more than 9% of married women), followed by households in the Jordan Valley (8%) and South West Bank (5%).

Area C households are also less likely to be female-headed than in the West Bank overall. The 2014 survey found that a female headed 8% of Area C households surveyed, significantly fewer households than the 12% found by the PCBS for the entire West Bank in the same year. Here, urban Area C households had the highest proportion of female-headed households (at almost 12%) while in line with findings on larger family size and polygamy. Female-headed households were proportionally fewer in Jericho, South West Bank, and in hamlet/encampments.

Taken together, low levels of female-headed households and higher levels of polygamy in these community types and regions of Area C may be linked to greater levels of insecurity as well as to the heavy labor conducted by women in agricultural and herding households (particularly where basic household infrastructure such as running water and electricity are absent). In areas vulnerable to military and settler violence, it is likely that communities do not want women living without male protectors. And polygamy, though perceived by most women as undesirable, can in isolated herding communities be a coping method, meaning that two adult women in the household share agricultural labor and household burdens.

Qualitative Research Links: Polygamy

Polygamous marriages were found in **Imreiha** and **al Fasayil**, two Bedouin communities, but not in **al Walajeh** or **al Zaim**. This appears to demonstrate that incidence of polygamy is linked to Bedouin social norms, as well as dependence on herding and to a lesser extent, agricultural activities. These were also communities where marriage ages for women and male and female educational attainment levels were significantly lower. In Fasayil, women commented that polygamy was “*aadi*” or “normal” and they did not view it negatively. A woman in her mid-30s in the focus group, herself in a polygamous marriage, said that she and her co-wife worked cooperatively to deal with their duties related to the family’s sheep herd, but kept separate households. For women with heavy productive work burdens in herding households, a co-wife can be a source of labor support.



Female Early Marriage

Female age at first marriage continues at significantly higher levels in Area C communities than across the West Bank generally. In 2015, the PCBS found 20% of married women across the West Bank had married before 18 years of age (defined as “early marriage”). The Area C survey (in both 2014 and 2017) found a significantly higher proportion, 31% of women, had been married before 18 years of age. This rose to 40% of married women in hamlet/encampments, followed by 27% of married women in Area C villages.

Percent of Females Married before Age 18 by Selected Indicators, 2014

All West Bank	20.0%
Total Area C	31.1%
Community Totally in Area C	34.0%
Urban	25.6%
Village	27.4%
Encampment/ Hamlet	40.2%
Jordan Valley	38.0%
South West Bank	35.0%

Compared by region, female early marriage was highest in the Jordan Valley at 38%, followed by South West Bank at 35% of married women. These are both locations where households have larger families, lower female education and relatively higher polygamy. Also, looking at median age at marriage by age cohorts, there is no regular pattern of declining levels of female early marriage in Area C communities, unlike the greater West Bank population.

Female Median Age at First Marriage by Current Age, 2014

Current Age	Median age at first marriage
18-28	19.23
29-39	19.51
40-49	20.35
50+	19.23
Total	19.54

Instead, women currently in the oldest age group (50+ years) and the youngest age group (18 to 28 years old) were married at similarly earlier ages (50% of them by 19.2 years old) while women between the ages of 29 to 49 married at relatively later ages compared to those younger or older than them (at a median age of 19.5 and 20.4 respectively). The 2017 resurvey data found exactly the same age pattern.

This is in stark contrast with the OPT overall, where PCBS surveys have consistently identified a trend of rising marriage ages for females in the West Bank and Gaza Strip over the past 20 years. What explains this countertrend in Area C is that factors associated with specific community contexts (i.e. hamlet/encampments) or locations (Jordan Valley, South West Bank) are more determinant than age/generation of women's marriage ages. Globally, female early



marriage is often linked to lack of female access to education. This explanation is clearly relevant to these Area C locations and community types where early marriage continues to be the norm given that they suffer from difficulty accessing schools. Lack of physical security for girls as they attend school and fears for their bodily integrity in the context of real or potential settler or military violence emerged as a strong explanatory factor for continued early marriage in the qualitative research.

Qualitative Research Links: Early Marriage

In a focus group discussion with women and girls of different generations in **al Walajeh**, the decline in early marriage over generations was very apparent. Women over 65 years of age in the group had been married before they were 16, while marriage ages among middle-aged women in the group had crept up to 17/ 18 years of age. Most of the women in their mid-thirties and younger had married at 20 or older, all had finished secondary school, and many gone on to college or university. The link between rising marriage age and women's greater educational attainment (linked to ease of access to educational facilities) was a very clear pattern in the community.

In **Imreiha**, many women commented that the difficulties of accessing schools created by the checkpoint meant that more conservative families continued to simply pull their girls out of school and turn to "early marriage instead." The generational distribution of rising education and rising marriage ages in Imreiha significantly lagged behind that among women in al Walajeh; a number of women in the group aged between 30 and 40 had no schooling at all or only a few years of primary school and had been married as young as 14. Two young women just under age 20 who were attending the Open University and were not yet married (though both engaged) represented a sharp generational change in the previous norms of women's low education and early marriage in the community – a small but growing trend commented on by male and female community members.

In **al Zaim**, all of the women in the focus group were married, ranging in ages from 30 to 70. None had finished secondary school and all had married at around age 18. Two women had daughters now attending university, but a third said the transportation costs of putting her daughters through university were too high so they were engaged or married by the time they were 20.

Women said early marriage is still the norm in **al Fasayil**, with many girls marrying at 16 or 17 while young men marry in their early twenties. Despite emerging signs that some girls are finishing *tawjihi* and even continuing higher education resulting in later marriage, other community-specific characteristics likely strengthen tendencies for girls to marry early. These include a high preference for marriage to relatives (as one woman said, "the Taamreh here marry Taamreh, the *Bedu* [Bedouin] marry *Bedu*"), in addition young males' entry into the labor force (here specifically in nearby Israeli settlements). And finally, according to men from the community, wedding, housing, and dowry expenses have been kept low in Fasayil in recognition of community members' low income levels. All of these phenomena have been recently linked to patterns of female early marriage in the recent past.



Cousin/Relative Marriage

Cousin and other first-degree relative marriage is more common in Area C households than across the West Bank. In 2010 (the closest available reference year), the PCBS found 26% of married women in the West Bank were married to first-degree relatives, while 58% of couples had no familial relationship. This survey found that in 2014, 33% of married women in Area C households were married to first-degree relatives. This was significantly higher 38% in hamlet/encampments. By region, it was highest in the Jordan Valley at 44%, followed by the South West Bank at 31%. It was also a high of 36% in communities located completely in Area C. The 2017 resurvey found the same overall degree of relatedness between spouses, although a higher degree of cousin marriage in hamlet/encampments and in the Jordan Valley than in 2014.¹⁷

Married Females Degree of Consanguinity by Selected Indicators, 2014

	First degree relative	Second degree relative	None Relative	Total
All West Bank*	26.0%	16.0%	58.0%	100.0%
All Area C	33.0%	23.1%	44.0%	100.0%
Urban	22.0%	21.1%	56.9%	100.0%
Village	32.0%	22.4%	45.6%	100.0%
Encampment/ Hamlet	37.7%	24.8%	37.5%	100.0%
South West Bank	30.8%	28.1%	41.1%	100.0%
Jordan Valley	43.6%	23.5%	32.8%	100.0%

*PCBS West Bank data is for 2010

The survey also found high levels of women married to spouses from within the same community (61%). Along with cousin marriage, this may reflect the localization of marital and social relations due to restrictions of movement, including the political violence that occurs at checkpoint crossings, as well as residency restrictions in some communities. For one, women in more isolated communities had a higher tendency to marry within the community. Sixty-seven percent of women in the Jordan Valley, 76% of women in South West Bank Area C communities and 71% of women in hamlet encampments married within their own communities. Likewise, 66% of women married locally among those whose communities were completely located in Area C. There were no significant differences found in the 2017 resurvey.

¹⁷ And lesser levels of cousin marriage in villages compared to 2014. Again, due to the small sample the data needs to be treated carefully.



CHAPTER 2: EDUCATION

Educational attainment among both males and females in Area C households is significantly lower than across the West Bank. In addition, females in Area C communities show even greater educational disadvantage than males. The lowest levels of educational attainment for both sexes were found in hamlet/encampments, communities fully located in Area C, and in the Jordan Valley – all contexts in which Israeli obstacles to educational access are most acute.

Educational achievement levels are significantly lower in Area C households than those across the West Bank. The 2014 survey found that close to 60% of Area C households had male and/or female members who had left school before completing compulsory education (10th grade) compared to 45% of the West Bank population surveyed by PCBS in the same year (2014). In Area C, 59% of households had females who left school before completing compulsory education, compared to 39% of females across the West Bank. Among males, the same figure was 59% of Area C households compared with 43% across the West Bank.¹⁸ In Area C, the proportion of households where multiple male members left school before completing 10th grade (14% of households) was greater in comparison with households where multiple females left school early (in 9% of households).

When breaking down school completion levels by sex and community type, the lowest school completion levels for both sexes are in hamlets/encampments and communities completely located in Area C; these are both community contexts that often face severe obstacles to education due to Israeli restrictions. Almost two-thirds (68%) of households in both community types had females who left school without completing compulsory education. The proportion (two-thirds) was similar among males in communities completely located in Area C, but rose to almost three-fourths (74%) among households in hamlets/encampments.

Households with Male and/or Female Members Who Left School Before Completing 10th Grade, 2014

	Urban	Village	Hamlet/ Encampments	Jordan Valley	South West Bank	Community Completely in Area C	Area C Total
Female	52%	55%	68%	63%	59%	67%	58%
Male	58%	51%	74%	79%	61%	68%	58%

¹⁸ In both the PCBS and Area C data above, education completion levels only includes individuals who entered school but did not continue.



By region, the Jordan Valley had the greatest proportion of households with males who had not completed compulsory education (79%). Households in the Middle West Bank had the greatest proportion of females who had not completed compulsory education (65%), followed by those in the Jordan Valley (63%). Both males and females in the North West Bank had the best rates of educational completion, with a lower 41% of households having males who left school before 10th grade and 48% with females who left school before 10th grade.

1/4 of those living in Area C have attained secondary school, compared to 1/3 of residents in the entire West Bank.

In comparing specific levels of educational attainment among males and females, a more detailed picture emerges of educational disparities between individuals in Area C versus the wider West Bank.¹⁹ Almost one-third (32%) of individuals of either sex in Area C had the lowest educational attainment levels (less than preparatory school) compared to slightly more than one-fifth (22%) of individuals across the West Bank. A full 35% of females in Area C had this low level of educational attainment (compared to only 25% of West Bank females and 28% of Area C males).

Educational Achievement 2014					
Region	Primary or below	Preparatory	Secondary	Post-secondary	Total
Males					
West Bank (PCBS)	19.7%	26.1%	33.9%	20.3%	100.0%
Area C	27.9%	32.1%	23.9%	16.1%	100.0%
Females					
West Bank (PCBS)	24.7%	21.9%	31.0%	22.4%	100.0%
Area C	35.5%	27.3%	24.0%	13.3%	100.0%
Both Sexes					
West Bank (PCBS)	22.1%	24.0%	32.6%	21.3%	100.0%
Area C	31.6%	29.7%	23.9%	14.7%	100.0%

Across the West Bank, one-third of individuals have attained secondary school compared to less than one-fourth of those living in Area C. Similarly, while more than one-fifth (21%) of individuals across the West Bank have achieved higher education, only about one-seventh (15%) of individuals in Area C have continued their education (and including only 13% of females and 16% males, compared with 21% of both sexes across the West Bank).

¹⁹ All data used for what is termed here “the wider West Bank” or “across the West Bank” is from the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics.



Breaking down educational attainment levels by Area C community type and region, the disparities in education with the wider West Bank become even starker. More than half (53%) of females in hamlets/encampments have the lowest (less than preparatory) levels of educational attainment compared to one-fourth of females in the wider West Bank. While 31% of females across the West Bank have completed secondary school, this drops by almost half to 16% among females in hamlets/encampments. More than one-fifth (22%) of females across the West Bank had completed some level of higher education but this drops to only 5% among females in hamlet/encampments.

Female Educational Attainment by Community Type (2014)

Attainment Level	Urban	Village	Hamlet/Encampment	All Area C	Total West Bank (PCBS)
Primary or less	27.4%	28.1%	53.0%	35.5%	24.7%
Preparatory	31.6%	27.4%	25.9%	27.3%	21.9%
Secondary	23.0%	27.8%	16.0%	24.0%	31.0%
Post-secondary	17.9%	16.7%	5.0%	13.3%	22.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

By region, Area C households in the Jordan Valley had the lowest levels of female educational attainment (50% of females had less than preparatory school, 17% had secondary and only 5% had post-secondary schooling). Females in the South West Bank had the next lowest education levels (36% with less than preparatory attainment, 18% with secondary and 8% with post-secondary educational attainment).

This pattern of the lowest educational attainment in hamlets/encampments also holds true for males: almost half (48%) of males in these communities have less than preparatory levels of education compared to only 20% of males across the West Bank. While more than one-third of males across the West Bank (34%) have secondary education, only 15% in hamlets/encampments have the same. And while one-fifth of males across the West Bank have post-secondary education, this proportion drops to 6% in hamlets/encampments.



Male Educational Attainment by Community Type (2014)

Attainment Level	Urban	Village	Hamlet/ Encampment	All Area C	Total West Bank
Primary or less	23.8%	19.9%	48.0%	27.9%	19.7%
Preparatory	40.7%	31.8%	30.6%	32.1%	26.1%
Secondary	16.4%	28.7%	15.4%	23.9%	33.9%
Post-secondary	19.2%	20.5%	6.0%	16.1%	20.3%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The regional disparities for males are strikingly similar to those among females, with males in the Jordan Valley (40%) and then the South West Bank (35%) with the lowest levels of educational attainment, i.e. less than preparatory education.

The 2017 resurvey of Area C found some slight changes in attainment levels for both sexes compared to 2014. Among males, there was a slight negative trend, with 33% (versus 28% in 2014) having less than a preparatory education. While the proportion of males attaining preparatory and secondary schools remained relatively stable with the earlier findings, there was a 3% decline in the already low levels of males with higher education (from 16% to 13%). Among females, low educational attainment levels remained the same (at 35% of females with less than preparatory), as did preparatory attainment. Secondary levels of attainment slightly declined (from 24% to 22%) while post-secondary levels slightly increased (from 13% to 15%).

Qualitative Research Links: Education

“Two years ago, the girls secondary school was close, now [after they built the wall] the girls have to walk along Route 6 [a seven-kilometer walk]. It’s dangerous... I’m on pins and needles until they get home.” —housewife, al Walajeh

Walajeh’s men and women have relatively high levels of educational achievement, which is clearly linked to the historic ease with which they accessed nearby educational institutions. The community has long had a primary school run by UNRWA, while proximity to the towns of Beit Jala and Bethlehem made post-primary education accessible. Residents were also able to build a kindergarten in the community with donor support in 2014. However, after construction of the Separation Wall closed off a closer and safer route to Beit Jala (through Cremisan Monastery), reaching secondary school in Beit Jala now means passing through the single gated entry of the community at the entrance to Har Gilo settlement, and walking seven kilometers along a settler road artery. Parents are in a constant state of worry about the vulnerability of children to car accidents and settler harassment. As in the other three Area C communities, there is very limited access to public transportation that might mitigate the dangers of the route to school.



“Access to school for the students is full of suffering... students have to go Yabad. It’s a long distance, it’s strenuous for a small child and they have to repeat it daily. Then add the difficulties and dangers: they face cars on the road, soldiers, settlers, heat in summer and cold and rain in winter. Students end up reacting negatively towards education because of all these burdens and suffering. They end up dropping out.”
—male schoolteacher, Imreiha

“My son was hit by a car walking to school. His leg was crushed and he ended up missing a year of school. There’s no public transport and we can’t afford to pay for taxis every day.” —female, Imreiha

“Look, a guy does not finish school; he just goes on with his life. But for a girl, it’s really in her interest to succeed in her education. Now we have six or seven girls in the community studying at university and we have female schoolteachers among us. There’s three or four guys in the village at university, but everyone says that the guys who study accounting and engineering at university just end up as laborers in Israel.” —male youth, Imreiha

In **Imreiha**, the linkages between the community’s very low overall educational levels and historic and continuing lack of access to educational facilities are very clear. Today, there is not a single preschool or school in the village and current attempts to even build a preschool have been stopped by Israeli military authorities that control Area C. There is only one route to a school in nearby Yabad, forcing even small primary-aged schoolchildren to walk along a settler road and pass through a military checkpoint. Safer and easier routes to school have been sealed off by the Israeli military and there is no public transportation, while taxis are too expensive and often won’t come to the village. In the Second Intifada, the walk became perilous: there was much harassment by soldiers and long searches at the checkpoint. These difficulties impacted the community in numerous ways. Students often struggled to keep up with their peers in Yabad. Male students dropped out early to join the workforce rather than continuing to struggle for an education whose long-term benefits were not guaranteed. Fearing for daughter’s physical security, more conservative families often pulled their daughters out of school and married them off at young ages. However, reflecting wider trends across the West Bank, there was a small but growing number of primarily young women going on to higher education (at the Open University in Jenin) among less conservative sectors of the community. The pursuit of higher education among young men seems to have lagged behind, and even slowed. As accounts above illustrate, in both cases there are differential gender links between higher education and employment. A college degree represents young women’s access to “good employment” (decent waged work), while higher education for young males does not translate into salaried employment and wage labor in Israel has been established as the path to a living wage.

“The worst thing is the siege and isolation of Zaim, cutting us off from all other areas as if we are an island. Let me tell you, my daughters didn’t finish school because of this. It was that period when they cut us off with the Wall, and a hero couldn’t do that walk to get to school. And I don’t have the resources to get them there and back by car to Izzariya everyday.” —male engineer, Zaim



“Because of the difficulties, we made a priority of building the secondary school for girls first. For boys there’s only school until sixth grade [in Zaim], then he has no choice but to transfer to school in Izzariya. To get there, he walks through hills and valleys and jeeps and soldiers and they’re saying, ‘Hey come here, where are you coming from, where are you going?’ Humiliation. There’s no public transport and we can’t afford to send them by taxi to Izzariya.” — male municipal council member, Zaim

Al Zaim residents’ overall educational attainment is lower than that of residents of al Walajeh on average, but higher than those in Imreiha, attesting to its changing access to educational facilities due to the building of the Wall, and the effects of being enclaved and severed from the nearby education –of Jerusalem. These changes impacted al Zaim residents differently, depending on whether they had West Bank I.D cards or Jerusalem ones, each allowing different levels of access. Following the First Intifada, the previous one-kilometer walk to school in Izzariya became a perilous several-kilometers-walk through the hills with constant harassment by soldiers. Once the Wall was completed, the route became a 30-kilometer circuitous drive through congested Abu Dis to Izzariya. Israel subsequently created an access gate in the Wall, open only during school hours to facilitate children’s access to Izzariya, but it has a history of random closure (sometimes for months), resulting in many lost school days and generating constant anxiety for children and their parents. The Second Intifada period led to many West Bank al Zaim families pulling their daughters out of school because of the dangerous walk to Izzariya, while young men who in the past might have continued on to secondary school simply dropped out. During that period, the community responded by building schools within al Zaim, with initial priority put on the first six primary grades and then, post-2016, building a secondary school for girls, again underscoring fears for girls’ physical safety. Unlike Imreiha, al Zaim was able to build its own educational infrastructure since part of the community lies in Area B. A number of young women are pursuing higher education but al Zaim’s distance from centers of higher education, as well as the lack of transport, translates into much higher costs. Similar to Imreiha, young men often seem to opt out of completing secondary school to join the labor force.

“Our tawjihi [matriculation] class began with about 40 [boys and girls], and ended with only 10 girls finishing.” — female university student, al Fasayil

In the focus group with different generations of women in al Fasayil, the changing access to education over time was very clear. Women over 50 were illiterate, women between 30 and 50 only had some primary school, but young women below 30 had received a secondary school degree and a small handful had gone on to university. Improvement in educational levels began in the 1990s. The community now has male and female primary schools and much more recently a mixed secondary school, greatly facilitating access to education for the younger generations. However, the outcome has been uneven by gender. As the quote above attests, it is young women in the community who are finishing higher grades, while boys tend to drop out early and work in the nearby Israeli settlements.





CHAPTER 3: HOUSING, LIVING CONDITIONS & STANDARDS OF LIVING

More than one-fourth of households in Area C live in inadequate housing lacking basic infrastructure such as piped water. Households with the worst housing conditions were in hamlets/encampments, in communities completely located in Area C, and in the Jordan Valley. These were also the locations where crowding levels in homes were at their highest, and where households had the lowest standards of living.

Area C families are much more likely to live in independent houses (at 68%) in comparison to those living in the wider West Bank (56%). While less than one percent of households across the West Bank live in tents, sheds, or caves, in Area C, 16% of households live in these types of dwellings. In hamlets/encampments, almost half of households (48%) live in tents/sheds/caves.

Housing by Community Type, 2014

	House	Apartment	Tent/Shack/Cave or Combo	Total
Total Area C	68%	16%	16%	100%
Urban	48%	52%	0%	100%
Village	81%	17%	1%	100%
Hamlet/Encampments	47%	4%	48%	100%
All West Bank*	56%	44%	0.1%	100%

Regionally, the proportion of households living in tents/sheds/caves is higher in the Jordan Valley at 36%, followed by 13–14% of households in the South and Middle West Bank, and only 2% of households in the North West Bank. Tents/sheds/caves were significantly higher among households in communities entirely located in Area C (at 30%) compared to 6%–9% of households located in communities with their area less than half in Area C. All of these locations with higher proportions of housing in tents and shacks are where Israeli building and other restrictions in Area C are at their most harsh; the use of these types of dwelling is due to a lack of alternatives, according to the qualitative research (see below).



In Area C, the vast majority of households (83%) own their home, 12% live in dwellings free of charge and a low 5% live in rented dwellings (the latter concentrated in urban Area C communities).

Household Crowding

The average number of rooms in Area C homes is three, significantly smaller than the average of 3.4 across the West Bank. Two-thirds (69%) of Area C households live in homes with three rooms or less: 9% live in a one-room home; 27% in two-room homes; 33% in three-room homes and only 11% live in homes with five or more rooms.

Household density and crowding is calculated by dividing the numbers of rooms in the home by the number of individuals living there. Household density is higher in Area C at an average of 2.1 versus 1.6 across the entire West Bank. Household crowding (as per PCBS, more than three persons to a room) is also higher, at 16% in Area C versus 10% across the West Bank in the same year.

Household Crowding by Select Indicators, 2014					
	# of persons per/room				100%
	0 to 1	1.01-2	2.01-3	Crowded= 3+	
Total Area C	23.6%	38.4%	22.1%	15.9%	100%
Urban	28.9%	46.9%	18.0%	6.3%	100%
Village	29.3%	44.0%	19.5%	7.3%	100.0%
Hamlet/Encampments	11.5%	26.0%	28.1%	34.4%	100.0%
Jordan Valley	13.3%	30.5%	27.8%	28.5%	100%
South West Bank	20.5%	36.5%	20.0%	23.0%	100%
Community completely in Area C	15.9%	31.9%	26.4%	25.9%	100%

In Area C, Household crowding is significantly higher in hamlet/encampments (at 34%), in the Jordan Valley at 28%, the South West Bank at 23%, and among households in communities entirely located in Area C at 26%. As can be seen in the section on demography, these are communities that tend have larger family size and higher numbers of small children.

Housing Infrastructure

Housing infrastructure and services in Area C reflect varying degrees of disadvantage when compared to those across the West Bank. Across the West



Bank, 99% of homes in 2014²⁰ were connected to the public electricity network (versus only 93% in Area C); 93% were connected to public water networks (compared to only 75% of homes in Area C); 54% were connected to public sewage networks (compared to only 18% in Area C); 99% had a toilet connected to water (versus 82% in Area C) and 88% had a separate kitchen (compared to 82% in Area C).

These indicators worsen further when examined by region and community type. On almost every indicator, homes in hamlets/encampments and those located in the Jordan Valley have infrastructure and service gaps. Almost 50% of households in the Jordan Valley and in hamlets/encampments are not linked to water networks, resulting in high numbers of households relying on more expensive tanked water (at 41% in the former and 31% in the latter) while a full one-fourth of homes in hamlets/encampments and one-fifth of Area C households in the Jordan Valley have no electricity.

Home Infrastructure/ Poor Housing Conditions by Select Indicators (2014)

	Total Area C	Community Completely in Area C	Hamlet/ Encampment	Jordan Valley	South West Bank
Access to Potable Water					
Home connected to a public water network	75%	62%	52%	53%	71%
Rely on tanked water	16%	17%	31%	41%	12%
Rely on spring or cistern	9%	21%	17%	5%	17%
Electrical Power					
Home connected to a public electricity network	93%	89%	74%	80%	89%
No electricity	7%	4%	24%	19%	11%
Home Sanitation					
Kitchen with piped water	82%	67%	45%	63%	70%
No independent kitchen	5%	13%	16%	7%	12%
Separate toilet connected to piped water	82%	68%	47%	64%	70%
No toilet	3%	8%	11%	4%	3%
Cooking Fuel					
Gas is main cooking fuel	85%	72%	56%	74%	74%
Firewood is main cooking fuel	14%	27%	43%	22%	25%

²⁰ Data for the whole West Bank is based on the PCBS Housing Conditions 2015 Report.



Homes in hamlets/encampments have the lowest levels of sanitation infrastructure: only 45% have a kitchen and 47% a toilet connected to piped water while 16% have no independent kitchen and 11% have no independent toilets at all. In addition, a high 43% of these households depend on firewood for their main cooking fuel (as does over one-fourth of households in communities completely located in Area C, and those located in the South West Bank). Households located in communities completely located in Area C also have markedly poor housing conditions and infrastructure, with more than one-fourth dependent on firewood for cooking fuel and one-third with no access to piped water.

By combining a number of these indicators into a housing conditions scale, a clear relationship emerges between households with poor/inadequate housing infrastructure and their locations in contexts where Israeli restrictions in Area C are at their most severe. A total of 25% of Area C households live in inadequate housing conditions; this rises to 70% among households in hamlets/encampments and almost half (48%) of households in the Jordan Valley.

Housing Conditions Scale by Select Indicators, 2014		
	Inadequate	Adequate
Total Area C	29%	75%
Urban	5%	95%
Village	5%	95%
Hamlet/Encampment	70%	30%
South West Bank	33%	67%
Jordan Valley	48%	52%
Middle West Bank	13%	87%
North West Bank	5%	95%
Community Completely in Area C	45%	55%

Inadequate housing is also high among households in communities completely in Area C (45%) followed by those in the South West Bank at 33%.

Standards of Living

Almost one-fourth of Area C households rated “poor” on the standard of living scale, with their share increasing to more than half of households in hamlet/encampments and more than 40% in the Jordan Valley. These are the same contexts and locations where households were found to have the worst housing conditions.



The Standard of Living (STL) Scale assesses living conditions by measuring household amenities, which reflects affordability combined with way of life as well as exposure to the outside world. Examining overall household ownership of amenities in Area C into categories, we find the following. In terms of those that relate to domestic life and housework: 90% of households own a refrigerator, 87% an electrical or gas cooker, 87% a washing machine, 29% a microwave, and 50% a solar heater. In terms of education and social connection: 15% of households have a family library, 41% a computer, and 27% internet service at home, while 95% own a mobile phone (Palestinian or Israeli). In terms of culture and entertainment: 94% report having a television, 15% a DVD player, and 89% a satellite dish. Concerning transportation, only 25% own a car, while another 9% own a tractor. Given the distance to many Area C communities and the fact that they are often not served by public transport, the very low number of households owning cars is highly significant and was underscored by respondents in the qualitative research.

Qualitative Research Links: Housing Conditions

“Previously, we all used to live in tents. My mother-in-law still lives in one now; others live in tin sheds. People started building houses a decade or more ago... We built our house and they demolished it, so we built a new house in the same place as the first - What can we do? Should we keep living in sheds?” —female agricultural worker Imreiha

“The houses here are all built on private land but there is not a single one with a permit [Israeli military building permit]. We’ve worked many years with lawyers to get a plan approved, and two years ago the planning office in Beit El said we had verbal approval. Then, after [U.S. President Donald] Trump [was elected], they act and talk as if there was no approval.” —schoolteacher, Imreiha

“When I got to university, I didn’t know how to use a computer. That’s how it is when you don’t have electricity. I had to work hard to catch up.” —female university student

“Before we got [piped] water, we had to buy it in tanks at 200 shekels a tank. It used to take a lot of what we earned... Last summer, they cut the water for three months and we were back to buying [tanked water] again.” —male herder

Only in 2006 did the community of **Imreiha**, after many years of struggle with the Israeli civil administration, finally get connected to the electricity grid. And only in 2009, also after many years of protracted struggle with military authorities, did villagers get access to piped water. In both cases, the community was included in donor-supported regional infrastructure plans, but the Israeli civil administration refused to allow the residents to be connected. Many in the community still live in tents or tin shacks. Women in the focus group explained that the process of creating needed housing in defiance of the “no build orders” is one of evolution, where households first live in a tent or a shed, and then try to build a home. As the quote above suggests, housing demolitions (the typical response to unpermitted con-



struction) means that many families return to their former housing once their homes have been demolished.

“In Zaim, we can only build up [i.e. apartments on top of existing homes]. There’s no land to build –and even then [the military] has come and destroyed them.”
—village council member, Zaim

“We divided up our property and gave our son his [inheritance], but he can’t build out of fear that it will be demolished. Even if he had money and started to build, they’d come and destroy it.” —female, Walajeh

Having been connected to the water and electricity networks for a few decades, **Al Walajeh** and **Al Zaim communities** have not struggled with the infrastructural deprivation faced by herding communities. In addition, with much better standards of living (see index below), they also have much improved housing conditions based on the index used above (save for a small community of Bedouin herders that lives in al Zaim and contradicts the overall norms for housing in the community). The main problem of housing in these communities is the lack of land, especially secure land, on which to build. In al Walajeh, where Israeli restrictions on building permits are their most severe, the inability of the younger generation to build homes in the community was discussed by all respondents as the most critical crisis they face. In al-Zaim, despite a recent spate of home demolitions, the Israeli authorities are generally less relentless in pursuing “unlicensed” building. Due to land shortages and an assumption that existing buildings are less likely to be demolished, housing in the community is increasingly taking the form of apartment blocks.

“I keep telling the governor in Jericho about the electricity [problem]. Sometimes we only have electricity for three hours a day – can you imagine? In temperatures about 40 degrees?[...] Last summer, there was no electricity for weeks.” —head of village council, Al Fasayil

“We were studying for tawjihi [the high school matriculation exam] by candle light – like back in the days of our grandparents.” —female university student, Fasayil

In **Fasayil**, better housing is grouped in the sector of the village that lies in Area B; in one of the Area C quarters, homes are basic one-story cement brick shelters. These basic homes are, however, linked to the electric and water networks, albeit being too small for the families that live there. In the other Area C zone in the community, families continue to live in tents. While they have access to the electricity grid, they do not have access to piped water. In the summer months, however, even households connected to the water network, like households across the West Bank, often have to buy tanked water during the dry summer months. A more persistent problem in al Fasayil is electrical power cuts – a major issue given the searing heat in the Valley. Land is available for building in the more secure Area B zone; respondents say the problem they face is poverty and lack of financial resources to build. The lack of resources to build may also explain why demolitions were more of a problem raised concerning outbuildings and sheds for livestock, rather than the demolition of homes.

Standard of Living				
	Poor	Medium	High	Total
Total Area C	23%	58%	19%	100%
Urban	9%	41%	49%	
Village	9%	67%	24%	
Hamlet/Encampment	53%	44%	3%	
Jordan Valley	41%	56%	3%	
South West Bank	28%	60%	11%	
Middle	12%	51%	37%	
North West Bank	9%	65	26	
Community completely in Area C	37%	53%	10%	100%

Combining some of these variables together into a relative scale, 23% of the households have a low standard of living, 58% a medium one, and 19% a good one.

Standard of Living				
	Poor	Medium	High	Total
Total Area C	23%	58%	19%	100%
Urban	9%	41%	49%	
Village	9%	67%	24%	
Hamlet/Encampment	53%	44%	3%	
Jordan Valley	41%	56%	3%	
South West Bank	28%	60%	11%	
Middle	12%	51%	37%	
North West Bank	9%	65	26	
Community completely in Area C	37%	53%	10%	100%

However, examining STL by region and community type, the locations in which households have poor/ inadequate housing are the same ones where they have low standards of living—i.e. those locations most affected by Israeli restrictions. More than half (53%) of households in hamlets/encampments have poor standards of living, followed by 41% of households in the Jordan Valley and 37% of households located in communities completely in Area C.



2017 Resurvey Findings: Housing Conditions and Standard of Living

The 2017 resurvey found an increase in households with better housing and living conditions, including a drop from 16% to 9% of households living in tents/ shacks between the two periods and a rise of 14% living in independent houses (from 68% in 2014 to 82% in 2017). Relatedly housing density levels improved (from 2.1 person per/room in 2014 to 1.8 persons/per/room in 2017) as did overall crowding levels, showing a decline from 16% in 2014 to 9% in 2017. These differences were reflected in a drop from 25% to 17% of Area C households in 2017 having inadequate housing conditions. Having said that, these findings should be treated with great caution due to the high margin of error and small sample size in the 2017 resurvey. Specific improvements between the two periods included: an increase in the use of gas for cooking fuel and a related decline in the use of firewood, plus a slight increase in households with separate kitchens, including those connected to water. The continuities between the two periods included: 25% of households not having access to piped water, and the same levels not connected to electricity. These last two findings (added to a 5% increase of households depending on tanked water in 2017) suggest that infrastructural deprivation linked to Israeli policies in Area C continued, while relative improvements that occurred (for instance, rise in use of cooking gas instead of wood) concerned household infrastructure not linked to Israeli restrictions.

There were slight changes in the patterning of standards of living between the two periods. The level of households with low STL was the same (at 22%), but there was a decline in those with high STL from 19% in 2014 to 13% in 2017 and a related increase in the number of households with medium STL (from 58% in 2014 to 65% in 2017). However, these small changes (not greater than 7% on any indicator) might be accounted for by the margin of error of the 2017 sample.

Land Ownership

Regardless of their location in Area C, households are most likely to only own the land on which their home is built. Urban Area C households are least likely to own any land, while village Area C households have the highest levels of land ownership, including ownership of more secure land that falls within municipal borders. Households in hamlets/encampments show the greatest ownership of land in insecure locations, in other words land that falls outside municipal boundaries. Land ownership was most limited among households in the Middle West Bank, followed by those in the Jordan Valley. The low levels of land ownership among Jordan Valley households (with only 32% owning land other than that their house is built on) contrasts dramatically with high dependence of these households on agriculture for their livelihoods.

Ownership of Domicile Land

Around two-thirds (65%) of the surveyed households own the land on which their dwellings are situated. In villages, 72% of households surveyed own the land on which their home is built, compared to 58% of hamlets/encampments and 32% of urban households. The low levels of ownership among urban households may be due to the inclusion of a refugee camp in the sample or reflect the high numbers of apartment dwellers in urban locations. By region, Area C households in Middle West Bank had the lowest level of domicile land ownership at 38%²¹; followed by less than half (49%) of households in the Jordan Valley; and highs of 84% in the North West Bank and 88% in the South West Bank owning the land beneath their home.

Land Ownership in Area C by Community Type, 2014			
	Yes	No	Total
Own the land on which the house is built			
Urban	33%	67%	100%
Village	72%	28%	100%
Hamlet/Encampment	58%	42%	100%
Total Area C	65%	35%	100%
Own land within the boundaries of the municipality			
Urban	12%	87%	100%
Village	29%	70%	100%
Hamlet/Encampment	25%	75%	100%
Total Area C	27%	73%	100%
Own land outside the municipal boundaries			
Urban	6%	94%	100%
Village	13%	88%	100%
Hamlet/Encampment	17%	87%	100%
Total Area C	14%	86%	100%



²¹ In the sample, Area C households in a refugee camp were located in the Middle West Bank, possibly accounting for these findings.

Ownership of Other Land

Forty-one per cent of the respondents in the survey reported that they own land other than that where their dwelling is located. Again, village households had the highest level of ownership of other lands (at 46%), followed by households in hamlet/encampments (at 42%) and the lowest levels among urban households (at 18%). By region, the highest rate of ownership of land other than the family home was found in the South West Bank (at 61%) followed by the North West Bank (at 44%). Households in the Middle West Bank and Jordan Valley households were *least* likely to own land other than that on which their homes were built (at 25% and 32% respectively).

Respondents were asked whether the land they owned (other than that on which their home was built) was within or outside municipal borders, given that this has major implications for both the security of ownership, the value of the land as an asset, and the ability to make use of the land under the Israeli legal regime. A total of 27% of households said they owned land within the municipal borders while 14% said the land was outside the municipal borders. Village households (at 29%) were most likely to own land within municipal borders, compared to only 25% of households in hamlets/encampments and 13% of households in urban communities. In contrast, hamlet/encampment households were most likely (at 18%) to own land outside of municipal boundaries, compared to 13% of village and 6% of urban households.

In terms of the size of landholdings among households who owned any type of land: 46% owned less than a dunum; 38% owned 1 to 5 dunums and 16% held more than 5 dunums. The average size of holdings among all Area C landholders was 1.8 dunums. In almost all regions and community types, close to half of all households that owned any land on average owned less than a dunum (with a range of 55% owning land in the North West Bank to 44% among households in hamlets/encampments). Households in the South West Bank were the positive exception: of those who owned land almost half (47%) owned 1 to 5 dunums and another 18% owned more than 5 dunums. The size of landholdings in hamlet/encampments was also relatively better than other locations and community types: among households who owned any land, 35% owned 1 to 5 dunums and 20% owned more than 5 dunums. Among those who owned any land in the Jordan Valley, only 36% owned 1 to 5 dunums and 17% held more than 5 dunums.

The 2017 resurvey found some small improvements in land ownership levels, showing a rise of 8% among Area C households owning the land they live on; a rise by 3% of households owning lands within the municipal boundaries; and a rise of 4% in those owning lands outside the municipal boundaries. The average land size was slightly higher at 1.86 (versus 1.8 in 2014), although the level of those owning less than a dunum was constant between the two periods (at 47%), while there was a slight (6%) rise in those owning more than 5 dunums in 2017. The absence of refugee camp Area C households in the 2017 sample might explain the recorded increase in ownership of domicile land, while the remaining changes over time were less than 5% and not statistically significant.



Qualitative Research Links: Land Ownership

“What’s been done to al Walajeh, you can’t call it occupation – it’s rape.” —village council member, al Walajeh

“My father, when the bulldozers [for the building of the Wall] reached our land and started to destroy our olive trees, he walked home and didn’t speak or leave the house for weeks.” —Female, al Walajeh

In all four communities interviewed in the qualitative research, the majority of households did not own land beyond that on which their homes were built. Only in **al Walajeh** was this a more recent phenomenon, since the majority of households continued to have some agricultural land post-1948. These lands had been decimated by multiple waves of large-scale land expropriations to build the settlements and the Wall that now imprison the community. **Al Fasayil** and **Imreiha** are refugee Bedouin who lost their original lands and homes in 1948. The former were resettled during the Jordanian period in the Jordan Valley, while the latter were displaced twice, first in 1948 to the West Bank before they were relocated to their current site by the Israeli authorities in the early 1980s. While a significant tract of land was allocated to build up al Fasayil as a village municipality, Imreiha was given an extremely limited area of land and no municipal status at all – thus only some families own municipal land in al Fasayil, and none own agricultural land outside the municipal boundaries. There is a critical shortage of land there and, similar to Walajeh, respondents cited lack of land to build on as the primary issue facing the community’s viability. **Al Zaim** has a similar history to al Fasayil: the original inhabitants were refugee Bedouins who post-1948 were given lands in their current location, under Jordanian control. However, due to its proximity to Jerusalem, land speculation and in-migration over the last two decades has led to al Zaim becoming a dense semi-urban community. What little unbuilt land remains in al Zaim is strictly prohibited for construction by Israeli authorities.

Women’s Economic Assets

Similar to the findings of the few available studies on women’s asset ownership in the OPT, women in Area C communities also own minimal personal assets.

Gold jewelry was the main form of women’s personal asset ownership reported by 43% of respondents. This is also the most common form of assets owned by women across the OPT, traditionally received by women as part of their dowry upon marriage. Not surprisingly therefore, more than 88% of currently married women claimed to own gold jewelry, as compared to less than 4% of surveyed single, widowed, and divorced women. Other type of asset ownership was dramatically low, with only 8% of women owning a bank account; 3% owning land; 2.5% a home or portion of one; 2.4% owning livestock; and less

than 0.5% an income-generating project. Except for gold jewelry, ownership of every other asset type was even in lower among Area C women than the already low levels found among women across the OPT.

Women Owning Personal Assets by Type of Asset, 2014 and 2017		
	2014	2017
Gold/Jewelry	42.8%	39.3%
Land/Share of land	3.4%	4.3%
House/Share of house	1.6%	2.5%
Livestock	2.0%	2.4%
Personal income-generating project	0.8%	0.4%
Bank account	8.0%	11.4%

Asset ownership was lowest among women living in hamlet/encampments and regionally, among women in the South West Bank. Only 35% of women in hamlet/encampments had assets in gold jewelry (compared to 43% of all women in Area C), and only 1% or less owned land, a house/portion of a house or an income-generating project. Although only 4% of women hamlets/encampments said they owned livestock, this was the highest ownership of that particular asset among women in Area C.

By region, women in the South West Bank are the most asset-deprived with only 31% owning assets in gold jewelry (compared to 43% of all women or a high of 50% of women in the Jordan Valley). They score the lowest regionally in terms of ownership of land (at 1%); a house or part of one (0.5%); and income-generating projects (at 0.3%). However, they score relatively higher in terms of having bank accounts (at 9% compared to the highest of 12% among women in the North).

Only two-thirds of women (60%) who do own some form of asset said they were free to dispose of their property freely. Again, women in hamlets/encampments were the least likely to be able to freely dispose of their assets (at a low of 42%). By region, women in the Jordan Valley were least likely to dispose of the assets they have freely (with 60% stating they could not dispose of their assets as they saw fit).

As elsewhere in the OPT, immovable and productive assets are most likely to be held by widowed rather than married or single women. Although still relatively uncommon, in hamlet/encampments widowed women are three times as likely to hold assets in livestock compared to single and married women. In villages, they are three times more likely to own a home (or part of one) and twice as likely to own land as women of other marital statuses. In urban communities, they make up 90% of the women who own a home or part of one, as well as being the most likely to have a bank account or income generation project.



Similar to the findings on household decision-making power (see later section), in Area C communities there is no correlation between women's asset ownership and their labor force participation. Instead, as mentioned above, marital status (where married women tend to have assets in gold that they received as dowry, and widowed women gain access to landed and other assets) is a more significant determinant.

The 2017 resurvey found overall continuity in the levels and patterning of women's asset ownership in Area C. Slight (but not statistically significant) changes could be seen in a small 3% decline in the proportion of women reporting they own gold jewelry and a 3% rise in women having personal bank accounts.

Qualitative Research Links: Women's Assets

"There's no land, so there's no inheritance." —young woman, Imreiha

"We don't have land like other villages, so there's nothing to inherit." —respondent, al Zaim

In all four communities, women commented repeatedly that the dearth of remaining land left none for women to inherit. In Palestine, personal inheritance law secures women's right to inherit a portion of family property. Historically, however many women waived their inheritance rights, deferring to brothers assumed to be future breadwinner/heads of households. Recent studies have shown that increasingly this is no longer the norm and the percent of women waiving their inheritance rights in the West Bank and Gaza Strip dropped by two-thirds over the past two decades. However, with the scarcity of land available to Area C communities, the study found that few women have been able or willing to secure their inheritance rights. In **Walajeh**, women remembered a woman who inherited land before the building of the Wall, but after so much land had been confiscated for its construction, women said that, even if they had the opportunity, they would not ask for their share. So many young men, they said, (presumably including brothers) were unable to set up a family because of the severe land and housing shortage. In **Imreiha**, which also has a severe land shortage, women made similar statements, but one older unmarried female participant, alongside her brother, had inherited part of the family home, which was subsequently demolished by the Israeli authorities. She proudly explained how together they worked to rebuild it, although it remains vulnerable to demolition. In **Fasayil**, younger women were vocal about their right to inherit and one older unmarried woman in the focus group had inherited some land from her family. While previous norms in women's inheritance were unclear, women generally said that, like elsewhere, land shortages made them hesitant to ask for their share.



Mohamed Hataleen lives in the Bedouin community of Ma'azi Jaba in the Central West Bank. Like his father, a community leader, Mohamed opposes an Israeli plan to relocate the Bedouin into urban areas. Photo credit: Simon Trépanier/Oxfam 2016



CHAPTER 4: LIVELIHOOD & EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES

Sources of Household Income

The main sources of income for the majority of households in Area C are unstable and insecure. Almost one-fourth of households rely on herding or agriculture for their primary income and another approximately 40% rely primarily on irregular daily wages. Less than one-fourth of households in Area C can rely on the stable income of a regular salary. Households in hamlets/encampments and the Jordan Valley offer the least stability in their primary sources of income.

Respondents were asked to identify all sources of household income over the past year and then to identify the first and second most important sources of household income. Fifty percent of households cited more than one household income source.

Primary Sources of Income

The three main sources of primary household income for Area C households are irregular/daily wages (at 38%); regular salaries (at 25%) and agriculture and herding (at 12% for the former and 12% for the latter or a combined 24% for these activities). In every community type and region, irregular/daily wages was the most prominent source of primary income, however, beyond this there was much variability.

Primary Source of Household Income by Community Type, 2014

Source of Income	Total Area C	Urban	Village	Hamlet/Encampment
Agriculture	12.1%	0%	15%	9.5%
Herding	11.9%	1.6%	3.2%	31.7%
Non-agricultural self-employment	5.6%	15.6%	6.6%	1%
Salary	24.6%	37.5%	31%	8.7%
Daily wage	38.2%	40.6%	35%	43.8%
Family transfers	3.0%	3.9%	3.5%	1.8%
Social Welfare	4.2%	0.8%	5%	3.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%



In urban communities, the two dominant sources of primary household income were irregular wages (at 41%), followed by salaries (at 36%). Non-agricultural self-employment followed at 14%.

In village communities, the two dominant sources of primary household income were irregular wages (at 35%), followed by salaries (at 31%). Fifteen percent of households depended on agriculture for their primary income.

In hamlets/encampments, the two dominant sources of primary household income were irregular wages (at 44%), followed by herding at 32%. These were followed by agriculture and regular salaries (at an equal 9% each) as the primary sources of income.

A small 4% of respondents said their households depended on social assistance as their primary source of income, predominantly those households in villages and hamlets.

Regionally, daily/irregular wages were also the dominant source of household income in all regions (with a high of 44% of households in the South and a low of 32% in the Jordan Valley). Regular salaries ranked second as the prime income source in the North, Central and South West Bank (cited by 28%, 35% and 22% of respondents in each respectively). In the Jordan Valley, on the other hand, after daily/irregular wages, agriculture was the second highest source of primary income (at 26%).

The proportion of households citing agriculture as their primary source of income was thus highest in the Jordan Valley (at 26%), followed by the North (16%), versus only 3% of households in both the South and Middle West Bank. Herding as the main source of family income was cited by 22% of households in the Jordan Valley, 18% of households in the South, but only 5% of those in the Middle West Bank, and 2% of those in the North.

Secondary Sources of Income

Half of the households said they relied on secondary sources of income, mainly social welfare at 28% of households. However, agriculture (at 17%) and herding (at 20%) combined provide secondary income for one-third (37%) of households, and increases to 41% if poultry raising is included. Irregular wages provide secondary income to 16% of households, while regular wages, non-agricultural self-employment, and family transfers provide secondary income to only 5% of households each.

More than 3/4 of Area C households depend on agriculture and animal husbandry. Households in hamlet/encampments and in the Jordan Valley are those most dependent upon agriculture.



Main Secondary Source of Household Income by Community Type in Area C, 2014

Source of Income	Total	Urban	Village	Hamlet/ Encampment
Agriculture	16.9%	0.0%	21.5%	14.4%
Herding	19.9	14.5%	14.9%	26.4%
Non-agriculture self employed	4%	20.0%	4.5%	0.9%
Regular Salary	5.5	5.5%	7.8%	2.9%
Irregular/Daily wage	16.4	14.5%	21.2%	11.2%
Family transfers	5.4	14.5%	7.6%	1.4%
Social welfare	28.3	27.3%	17.9%	40.2%
Total	100%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Again, in different community types, the secondary sources of income were highly varied. In urban communities, social welfare was cited as the main source of secondary income (at 27%), followed by non-agricultural self-employment (20% of households). Family transfers, irregular daily wages and herding were each cited by 14% of urban households as their main secondary source of income.

In villages, agriculture and irregular wages were the dominant sources of secondary income (both among 21% of households), followed by 18% of households that cited social assistance as their secondary source of income.

In hamlet/encampments, social assistance was the main form of secondary income (at 40% of households), followed by 27% that rely on herding, and 14% that rely on agriculture as their secondary source of income.

Sources of Irregular (Daily) Wages and Regular Salaries

In Area C, irregular/daily wages primarily come from work for Palestinian private sector employers followed by work in Israel or the settlements. Income from salaries was mainly derived from the Palestinian public sector.

More than half (51%) of the surveyed households depend on irregular wages for some part of their household income (with 38% depending on them as the primary source, and 16% as the secondary source). Of these households, 53% said the source of irregular wages came from Palestinian private sector employers; 38% said they came from working in Israel or Israeli settlements. For less than 2%, the source of irregular wages was municipalities, while for less than 1% they were UNRWA or international organizations. Seven per cent of respondents said household irregular wages came from working for multiple employers.

Among the 28% of households who reported income from regular salaries, more than half (54%) said the source was the Palestinian Authority public sector, followed by another one-fourth who said the source was the Palestinian private sector or a local non-governmental organization, followed by a low



10% who receive regular salaries from Israeli employers. By region, the highest proportion of households who can depend on a regular salary are found in the Central and North West Bank (39% and 31%, respectively), where the majority of public sector institutions are located, as compared to 24% in the South West Bank and only 18% in the Jordan Valley.

Work in Israel or Israeli Settlements

Dependence on income from work in Israel or Israeli settlements is high but characterized by irregular/ unstable employment. Village households in Area C are most likely to depend on income from work in Israel/settlements, followed by households in hamlet/encampments.

Forty percent of households surveyed depend on daily wages from work in Israel or settlements as a source of income, while only 25% of households depend on *salaries* from Israel or settlements for income.

Households who depend on daily/irregular wages from Israel/settlements for any income are found predominantly in villages (56% of those who depend on this income source; compared to 35% among hamlet/encampments and only 9% of urban dwellers). Regionally, South West Bank households rely slightly more on daily wages in Israel/settlements for income (accounting for 28% of households who rely on this income source) compared to one-fourth of North and Central households, and 23% of Jordan Valley households.

Village households are also more likely to depend on more stable salaries from Israel/settlements for any part of their income (accounting for a high of 78% of households who receive salaries from Israel/settlements; compared to a much lower 13% of households in urban and 10% of hamlet/encampment communities. Regionally, households who rely on salaries from Israel/settlements are predominantly found in the Middle West Bank (36% compared to 29% in the North, 22% in the South, and only 13% in the Jordan Valley).

Farm Activities as Sources of Household Income

More than three-fourths of Area C households depend on agriculture and animal husbandry for some part of their household income. But the highest proportion of dependence on farm activities is among households in hamlet/encampments and in the Jordan Valley.

A total of 78% of households in the survey rely on agriculture (35%), herding (27%) or poultry farming (16%) as a source of livelihood. Nearly half of households (44%) whose income derives to any degree from agriculture are from hamlet/encampment communities, compared to 34% from villages and only 10% in urban areas. And of those who derive any income from herding, two-thirds (67%) are from hamlets/encampments compared to only 29% from villages and 3% in urban areas.

Livelihoods are brought into greater focus by looking at households' "main" source of income (i.e., their primary or secondary source). In Area C, 29% of households are highly dependent on agriculture and 22% highly dependent on



herding for their main income. Agriculture is the dominant source of income among 17% of households and the second main source among another 12%, while herding is evenly distributed between those who depend on it for their dominant income (at 19%) and those who depend on it for the secondary income (at 20%).²²

Reliance on Agriculture or Herding Main Community Types and Regions, 2014							
	Level of Dependence	Village	Hamlet/ Encampments	North West Bank	Jordan Valley	South West Bank	Total Area C
Agriculture	Primary	15%	10%	16%	26%	3%	12%
	Secondary	22%	15%	22%	14%	26%	17%
	Subtotal	27%	25%	38%	40%	29%	29%
Herding	Primary	4%	33%	2%	22%	18%	12%
	Secondary	15%	27%	13%	26%	25%	20%
	Subtotal	19%	60%	15%	48%	33%	22%

Hamlet/encampments have the highest dependence on farm activities among community types, with almost two-thirds (60%) of households in these communities reliant on herding and one-fourth reliant on agriculture for their main income source. By region, Jordan Valley households report the greatest dependence on farm activities, with 40% highly reliant on agriculture and 48% highly reliant on herding for their main income. Households in the South and North West Bank also show high levels of dependence on farm activities: 29% of South West Bank households rely on agriculture and 33% on herding for their main income source, while 38% of North West Bank households rely on agriculture and 15% on herding for their main income sources.

Family Farming versus Agricultural Wage Labor

The majority (78%) of households who depend to any degree on agriculture or herding are self-employed and work on family farms; another 27% report being agricultural workers on Israeli settlements or in Israel; and 18% do agricultural labor for a Palestinian employer.

In all regions except the Jordan Valley, self-employment on family farms is the dominant framework for households who depend to any degree on agriculture/herding for income. More than 90% of households relying on agricultural income in the Middle and South, and 85% from the North (but only 39% of agriculture-dependent households in the Jordan Valley) are self-employed on family farms. Family farm frameworks are also predominant in villages (74%), followed by hamlet/encampments (58%), and in urban communities (43%).

²² Poultry farming occupied the lower rungs, with less than 1% relying on it as the primary source of income, 4% relying on it as the secondary source, and the rest relying on it as a third tier or less significant source of income.





Saqout village is one of numerous villages in Area C that are located in a firing range or military testing ground. Photo credit: Oxfam

However, the size of land cultivated by self-employed farming families is relatively small, with 82% of households reliant on agriculture cultivating less than five dunums and only 18% cultivating five or more.

Of households who rely on agricultural wage labor in Israel (25%) or the settlements (26%) for either primary or secondary income, the vast majority are from hamlet/encampments and villages (nearly equivalent to the 50% of those working in Israeli agriculture, as well as those working in settlement agriculture from these two types of communities). By region, the Jordan Valley is most reliant on agricultural labor in Israel and on settlements (accounting for 51% of all households surveyed whose main prime or secondary income came from agricultural labor in Israel and 54% of those whose prime or secondary income came from agricultural labor in settlements). In comparison, rates for reliance on agricultural labor in Israel are only 21% in the South, 20% in the North, and 9% in the Middle West Bank. Agricultural labor in settlements comprises prime or secondary income for 20% of households from the South, 18% from the North, and 8% from the Middle.

The Jordan Valley is therefore the region most dependent on agriculture and/or herding for household income, with the worst set of conditions. Jordan Valley agricultural households tend to be agricultural wage laborers versus the norm across other regions of Area C where households are predominantly self-employed family farmers. More than half of the households that depend primarily on agriculture wage labor in settlements, as well as half of those who depend primarily on agricultural wage labor in Israel are from the Jordan Valley. In addition, poorer forms of land tenureship predominate in the Jordan Valley, with 30% of agriculture-dependent households there renting or share-cropping land (compared to 8% in the Middle West Bank and 4% in the South).



Qualitative Links: Livelihoods

“Our youth are educated, but they can’t find work. If they want to work in Israel, they have to be married, over 30 years old and must pay the [high] price for the permits. If they work in Bethlehem, they make 70 shekels/day – you can’t build a family with that.” –female, Walajeh

Walajeh households are highly dependent on wage labor in Israel with the majority of married older men having relatively stable access to permits. However, there is high unemployment among younger men who cannot access the Israeli labor market. Although many younger women have completed university, there is very high unemployment among them – as is the case throughout the West Bank.

Agriculture and herding as a primary and secondary source of income has been wiped out through multiple waves of land and water confiscation.

“We don’t have unemployment; whoever is unemployed here, can only blame themselves. Here work starts with being born – we were born in the tents and pastures, our bodies are even different than others. Our bodies are born for work.” –young man, Imreiha

“The majority of families still raise sheep, but it’s now a secondary source of income. You can’t live off it alone anymore.... Most work in Israel and raise sheep. Sometimes they leave herding for a few years because it requires all your time, then when they’ve finished with Israel they come back to it. But people also stick to herding because it’s part of our identity, it’s how we were raised and are used to living.” –male schoolteacher, Imreiha

“Some work in the settlement but the pay is lower, so if young men can’t get a permit they prefer to smuggle themselves into Israel.... Since 2008, during the olive and cucumber seasons [in Israel], my whole family goes every year to stay there and work for the season... We stay in a tent – my mother and sisters, too. Many families work the season in Israel.” –young man, Imreiha

“We don’t own land, and also there’s no water. So agriculture has never been something we do here except for sowing some wheat and barley for the sheep. I rented land in Israel and grew cucumbers; others sharecrop or rent land here. Some grow tobacco for merchants in Yabad.” –schoolteacher, Imreiha

“Herding is in our blood; livestock is our wealth. It used to be there was enough pasture to rely on all year, but now with the settlements and the army and the settlers, we are suffocated. Water was always a problem but now half the year, I have to buy feed. It’s much harder.” –older male herder Imreiha

Imreiha households have the most varied livelihood strategies, combining agricultural and other wage labor in Israel and in settlements, herding, share-cropping or renting land for agriculture from nearby villages. All remarked that unemployment is not an issue in Imreiha – though this is linked to the fit between the community’s low education profile and the predominantly agricultural work that is available to them. As the above



quotes suggest, over the past two decades herding – originally the primary livelihood of households – has become a secondary source of income, though an important one. High costs of living greatly compounded by restricted access to pasture lands imposed by the military have increasingly made herding a secondary source of income, behind wage labor in Israel. The situation became drastically worse about five years ago when, for the first time, Imreiha shepherds were confronted with settler violence similar to that usually found in the south Hebron hills. With the support of the military, a settler herder violently restricted Palestinians’ access to large expanses of pastureland that he now uses for his own livestock. Male breadwinners, women, families and young men at various times all work in Israel but under different circumstances. Older men work with permits year-round, young men without permits work illegally and with less continuity and security, and women and whole families work seasonally in Israeli agriculture. With little of their own agricultural land, households also sharecrop or rent land from neighboring communities.

Women in the community play critical roles in animal husbandry and family agriculture, as well as work as agricultural wage laborers in Israel.

“Jerusalem ID holders work normally [in Israel], but West Bank ID holders have a more difficult situation finding work. I have three young sons who are unemployed.” –male, Zaim

“My husband used to have a permit, but the checkpoint delayed him, so they hired another employee in his place. Now he is working as a chef [in Ramallah]. He earns a daily wage of 90 NIS, but he has a big family.” –female, Zaim

“My son lives in Ramallah – most of the young men escape from here. You have to pay 12 NIS for the bus from Izzariya to Ramallah. What can he do? He is obliged to live in Ramallah.” –female, Zaim

“There is no land that you can plant in order to have money. And there are no institutions or organizations to work in ...even in Izzariya, there aren’t.” –female, Zaim

In **al-Zaim**, which is located in the Jerusalem governorate, there are sharp differences between households of Jerusalem ID carriers who can easily access the Israeli labor market, and those with West Bank ID cards who cannot. In the former households, there is a high proportion of breadwinners who have stable salaried work in Israel, while young men in these households often leave school early to work as day laborers in Israel. Among West Bank ID-holders, even older male breadwinners face difficulties obtaining permits to work in Israel – the permits are nearly impossible for young men to acquire. There are only two small industrial workshops within the community, providing only a handful of jobs. The result is high youth unemployment among West Bank ID holders, who are then forced to migrate to West Bank towns in Area A for employment. A small herder Bedouin community continues to exist on the edges of al-Zaim, but herding as a source of livelihood is only a historical memory among older residents of the community, while remaining land for agriculture is almost non-existent.



“You could say 50 – 70% of the men here work in the settlement. What other work is there in the Jordan Valley? Eighty shekels a day, 2000 shekels a month – that’s in the settlements, so if you can you try and work in Israel.”—village council member, Fasayil

“Anyone who gets an education leaves; they move to Jericho or other towns in the West Bank because there’s no work here except for the settlement. You can’t even get employed as a schoolteacher here because the [Palestinian] Ministry of Education brings us schoolteachers from outside. We have university graduates, but no, they bring people from outside because it’s all based on personal connections. You struggle to finish university and then you end up like everyone else working in the settlement, so family’s say, “why pay for university? What’s the point?”—male youth, Fasayil

“In my parent’s generation, everyone had a large herd of sheep. Now you can barely find a chicken... They [the military] closed off the land on both sides, you go out with the sheep and the army comes after you, you get fined, they take your sheep... The numbers of sheep are much lower than they were 20 years ago. And then there’s the effects of the drought, too.”—male youth, Fasayil

Similar to Imreiha, **al Fasayil** in the Jordan Valley was originally a herder community and herding was the main source of livelihood up until about two decades ago. Then, with the loss of access to pasturage and water due to settlement construction, military restrictions on access to vast areas of land, and the more recent impact of drought, it has primarily become a secondary source of livelihood and one concentrated among sub-sections of the community. Farming – due to limited water access and land ownership – has never been a prominent activity in the community (save for growing rain-fed forage for livestock). As the quotes above make clear, wage labor in the nearby settlements has become the primary source of income for most households, but is very low paid compared to work in Israel proper. Like in al Walajeh and Imreiha, older men are at an advantage in that they can access Israeli permits, while young men, though not unemployed like those in Zaim, only have access to the low paid work in nearby settlements. As in other communities, youth unemployment or sub-par employment is most critical among those who have a (hard-won) university education. The total lack of opportunities for the educated within the community leads to out-migration to West Bank towns.



Social Assistance

More than one-fourth of households in Area C rely on social assistance, but it is overwhelmingly a secondary source of income. Reliance on income from social assistance is highest in hamlet/encampments and the Jordan Valley.

The same proportion of households who rely on regular salaries for any part of their household income is equal to the proportion that rely on social assistance for any part of their household income, at 28% each. However, social

assistance constitutes the primary source of household income for only 4% of households but a high secondary source of income for 28% of households surveyed. As a secondary source of income, it is highest in hamlet/encampments (at 40%) followed by urban (18%) and village communities (at 18%).

The Jordan Valley has the highest proportion of households who report receiving social assistance at 39%, followed by the South (35%), the Middle (21.5%) and the North (14.8%). The two main providers of social assistance cited by respondents are UNRWA at 45% and the Palestinian Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA) at 40%. The contribution of other welfare and aid organizations is relatively low with only 10% of households reporting receiving direct aid from international organizations/NGOs other than UNRWA and 6% reporting receiving aid from local organizations/NGOs.

Family transfers/ financial support from relatives play a minor role in the lives of the surveyed communities in Area C; only 8% reported that they rely on the transfers from relatives inside and outside OPT as any household source of income. This is a relatively low compared to the general West Bank population, in which the PCBS reported 18% of the households depending on family financial transfers in 2014. Hamlets/encampments had the least access to family financial transfers.²³

Overall Comparisons with 2017

Comparing between primary and secondary sources of income between 2014 and 2017, differences were slight (less than 5%) and can be accounted for by the margin of error due to the small sample in 2017.

Sources of Primary and Secondary Income 2014 and 2017				
Source of Income	Primary 2014	Primary 2017	Secondary 2014	Secondary 2017
Agriculture	12.1%	13.7%	16.9%	27.2
Herding	11.9%	8.7%	19.9	16.0
Non-agriculture self employed	5.6%	3.7%	4%	7.5
Salary	24.6%	26.6%	5.5	2.8
Daily wage	38.2%	36.6%	16.4	11.2
Family transfers	3.0%	7.1%	5.4	7.4
Social Welfare	4.2%	3.4%	28.3	25.9
Total	100%	100%	100%	100

23 See PCBS. Percentage of Households in the Palestine by Sources of Income on Which They Depend and the Region, January 2013. http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/Con%202013-11AnE.htm



The one discernible change in 2017 was a 10% increase in households relying on agriculture as a secondary source of income, although this may be due to differences in the agricultural seasons during which the two surveys were undertaken.

Employment Levels and Profiles

In Area C, more men, women and individuals in the same household are engaged in work than is the case across the West Bank. Rather than being a positive indicator, however, more working household members represents a strategy to deal with inadequate and unstable work and livelihoods.

Comparing male and female labor force participation, employment levels, and profiles in Area C to those across the West Bank, some clear patterns emerge. On the positive side, participation in the labor force is higher for both sexes in Area C communities and unemployment levels are lower: more men and women in Area C communities are engaged in some level of employment. On the negative side, both male and female labor force participants in Area C are much less likely to have stable full employment than their counterparts across the West Bank.

Men's Employment

In 2014, slightly more (76% versus 73%) of males 15 years and older in Area C communities were in the labor force than were their counterparts across the West Bank. Their unemployment level was significantly lower as a result compared to males across the West Bank (9% versus 15%), meaning a greater 69% of males 15 years and above in Area C, compared to 62% of males across the West Bank, were in some form of employment. But they were four times as likely to be only partially employed (28%) in comparison to males across the West Bank (at 7%).

Males 15 years and Older Labor Force Participation/Employment in Area C and All West Bank, 2014

MALES	Labor Force Status			Employment Status			
	Outside the LF	Inside the LF	Total	Fully employed	Partially employed	Unemployed	Total
Area C	24.1%	75.9%	100%	63.1%	28.1%	8.8%	100%
All West Bank*	26.6%	73.4%	100%	77.9%	6.9%	15.2%	100%

*PCBS Labor Force Survey 2014

The pattern is similar but more pronounced among females in Area C. Females 15 years and above in these communities are even more likely to be in the labor force than are their female counterparts across the West Bank (at 26%



versus 19%). Similarly, their unemployment levels are much lower at 11% than the 27% unemployment among females across the West Bank in the same year. These numbers mean that a higher 22% of women in Area C (15 years and above) were in some form of employment, compared to only 14% of women across the West Bank in 2014.

Females 15 Years and Older Labor Force Participation/Employment in Area C and All West Bank, 2014							
FEMALES	Labor Force Status			Employment Status			
	Outside the LF	Inside the LF	Total	Full employed	Partially employed	Unemployed	Total
Area C	73.5%	26.5%	100%	41.9%	41.9%	11.1%	100%
All West Bank	80.9%	19.1%	100%	69.3%	3.3%	27.4%	100%

Women in the labor force in Area C are much more likely to be partially employed (at 42%) than their West Bank counterparts (at 3%).

Analyzing these patterns by Area C regions and community types shows that both women and men in the most deprived communities (hamlet/encampments) and regions (South West Bank and Jordan Valley) are where one finds higher proportions of both sexes in the labor force. It also tends to be in these communities that work for women in particular is partial and unstable (at 57% of women employed in hamlets/encampments and 68% of women in the Jordan Valley).

Males and Females Inside the Labor Force by Area C Region and Community Type, 2014								
	Urban	Village	Hamlet/Encampment	North	Middle	South	Jordan Valley	Total
Male	78.0%	71.8%	84.1%	73.7%	70.7%	74.6%	84.4%	75.9%
Female	14.3%	21.3%	40.7%	23.4%	13.5%	24.1%	43.9%	26.5%

It is also in these more vulnerable regions and community types that one finds greater numbers of working family members in the same household: 52% of households in hamlet/encampments had two or more working household members, as did 43% of households in the South West Bank and 40% in the Jordan Valley. In comparison, each of the other regions and community types only had between 17–24% of households with two working members. Moreover, a significant proportion of households in the Jordan Valley had three or more working members (29%), as did households in hamlets/encampments (21%)

Women in the surveyed communities have high productive work burdens in addition to domestic ones, yet few of them earn any direct income

compared to a range of only 9–13% of households in other community types and regions.

In terms of greater levels of unstable, partial employment, the link with more deprived regions and communities is less clear. The South West Bank had the highest levels of partial employment for both sexes (32% among males and 68% among females). However, for males the second highest levels of partial employment was in the North West Bank (31%) and in villages (30%). Among women, after the South West Bank, greater levels of partial employment are found in hamlet/encampments (57%) followed by the Middle West Bank.

In the 2017 resurvey, male labor force participation rates remained exactly the same as their 2014 levels in Area C (at 75.9%) while female participation rates declined slightly from 26.5% to 24.1%. Unemployment levels for both sexes were stable between the two periods but there was a noticeable decline in levels of full employment among men from 63.1% to 56.4%, and a significant drop in full employment for women from 41.9% to 28.4% over the same period. It is unclear what may explain these findings, but perhaps they were impacted by seasonal labor differences in agriculture or herding; the 2014 survey was undertaken in June, while the 2017 survey was undertaken in December.

Qualitative Links: Inadequate/Unstable Employment Among Males

Many households rely on employment in Israel or the settlements for some part of their income, as shown above. Older married males are often at an advantage in terms of Israeli demographic requirements for accessing permits; as can be seen in **al Walajeh**, older males who have worked for many years in Israel have a greater chance of becoming more stable salaried employees than do the majority who work in Israel, wage laborers in intermittent jobs. However, various examples were mentioned in focus groups where checkpoint closures and other impediments to movement led to Israeli employers substituting “unreliable” workers with men able to reach the workplace more regularly. Work in settlements appears to be as, if not more, unstable than work in Israel – it also seems to provide only daily wages (as suggested by the men in **al Fasayil**). Given that herding and agricultural wage labor is a predominant secondary source of livelihoods, and one that often is seasonally dependent as well as vulnerable to the vagaries of both military restrictions and nature (i.e. drought), there is ample reason to understand why the employment profile of males in Area C is predominantly unstable and insecure. Unemployment among males (and as we will see below, among females) is primarily an issue for university-educated youth. While this is a phenomenon across the OPT, it is exacerbated in Area C because of the lack of semi-professional work opportunities within these communities, as well as their distance and isolation from urban centers where jobs for the highly educated are more available.



Women's Employment

The low levels of educational attainment of working women in Area C contrast significantly with those among employed women across the West Bank. Women in the surveyed communities have high productive work burdens along with domestic ones, yet few of them earn any direct income.

The survey found that 22% of females in Area C households were working full- or part-time, significantly higher levels than the 14% female employment across the West Bank in the same year (2014). Employment was higher among married women (29%) than among those separated, widowed or divorced (23%) or single (20%).

Given the generally low educational levels of women in Area C, it is not surprising that the educational profiles of working women in these communities stands in stark contrast to working women across the West Bank.

Women's Educational Attainment and Employment, 2014

Education Level	Percent in Employment	
	Area C	All West Bank (PCBS)
Primary or less	33%	15.5%
Preparatory	25%	13.1%
Secondary	18%	21.2%
Post-Secondary	30%	50.2%

Across the West Bank, the PCBS has consistently found it is women with post-secondary education who are most likely to be employed (at 50% of women with 13+ years of education in 2014). In contrast, in Area C, it is women with the lowest educational attainment (0-6 years of schooling) who are most engaged in employment at 33%, compared to only 15% in this educational category across the West Bank. It is also significant that across the occupied West Bank, women's access to employment is strongly linked to higher educational achievement. In Area C, a significantly smaller proportion of women with higher education (30%) is employed compared to 50% of their West Bank counterparts. These findings suggest that employment opportunities for women in Area C are significantly different – with greater opportunities for unwaged/low waged work (most likely in herding/agricultural activities, including in Israeli settlements), while employment opportunities for highly educated women are much more limited and constricted than in areas A and B.

Women's Productive Work vs. Employment

Directly asking female respondents a series of questions about their own daily routines shows the highly gendered nature and circumstances of



women’s work in Area C households. While 22% of women had some level of employment, only 7% said they worked for pay. This is congruent with wider findings on women in agricultural households across the OPT, in which the majority work under the category of “unpaid family labor.”

Moreover, when asked about specific labor activities they undertook in the course of a normal day, a much greater number than the 22% of women who reported working were actually undertaking productive activities. Nearly half of surveyed women (45%) reported that they spend time daily doing home-based productive work such as handicrafts and food processing, 25% reported undertaking animal husbandry, and 18% were engaged in agricultural production. As such, a total of 57% of surveyed women in Area C households engage in one or more productive activities, reaching a high of 72% among women in hamlet/encampments.

Women in hamlet/encampments had the greatest productive workloads with more than half undertaking craft production/food processing (57%) and animal husbandry (58%), and one-fourth of them undertaking agricultural activities, but less than 4% of them receiving pay. Craft production/ food processing was also undertaken by a substantial number of women in urban and village Area C households (at 40% in both), while in villages almost 30% were involved in agriculture and/or animal husbandry. Paid work was overall low but not surprisingly greater among women in urban communities (at 12%).

Women Undertaking Productive Activities, 2014

Type of Activity	Urban	Village	Hamlet/ Encampment	Total Area C, 2014
Craft/ food processing	39.8%	40.0%	56.9%	45.2%
Agricultural activities	0.8%	17.1%	25.0%	18.3%
Animal husbandry	7.8%	11.1%	58.1%	25.4%
Paid work	11.7%	7.2%	3.8%	6.5%
Total % women undertaking productive activities	50.8%	50.7%	71.6%	57.2%

Regionally, women in the Jordan Valley and South West Bank had the highest engagement in productive activities with 59% of the former and 48% of the latter undertaking craft/food processing; 24% of the former and 26% of the latter undertaking agriculture; and 43% of the former and 37% of the latter undertaking animal husbandry. In total, 69% of women in the Jordan Valley and 60% in the South West Bank were engaged in one or more of these produc-



tive activities, followed by 54% of women in the Middle West Bank and 44% in the North West Bank. In these latter two regions, women's involvement was highest in craft/food processing (at 47% of women in the North West Bank and 27% in the Middle West Bank). A fifth of women in the North West Bank were also engaged in agriculture (compared to only 4% of women in the Middle West Bank) and 9% in animal husbandry compared to 13% in the Middle West Bank. Women in the Jordan Valley were slightly more likely to receive pay (at 9%) compared to a range of 5–7% of women across other regions.

A comparison between the above 2014 data to that found in the 2017 resurvey shows a 5% overall decline in the proportion of women engaging in productive activities (from 57% to 52%). In terms of specific activities, women engaging in craft/food processing dropped from 45% to 39%; agriculture dropped from 18% to 13%; and herding-related activities dropping from 25 to 19%. As stated before, the different seasons in which the two surveys were undertaken may partly explain the differences, in addition to the small sample size (and subsequent wide margin of error) in the 2017 survey. Important however, is that the general patterning of the 2014 findings on the degree and type of productive activities undertaken by women generally as well as by region and community type are extremely similar, with only a small decline in the proportions of women engaged in these activities.

Women's agricultural and herding labor is significantly higher in households that depend on those activities for their livelihoods.

Women's Work in Households with Agricultural & Herding Livelihoods

Women's agricultural and herding labor was significantly higher in households that depend on them for their livelihoods, attesting to the fact that women's engagement in these activities take place in the context of, and are critical to, household livelihoods.

For instance, in households that depend on herding or agriculture for any part of their income, 91% of women undertake these activities on a daily basis (75% of women in agriculture households undertake agricultural activities and 91% of women in herding households undertake herding activities). Moreover, in community types and regions where households are more dependent on herding or agricultural activities, there are greater numbers of women engaged in these activities. For instance, in hamlets/encampments with the greatest proportion of households dependent on herding, 97% of women in these households are involved in herding-related activities (compared to 79% of women in herding-dependent households in villages). In the Jordan Valley and South West Bank, which have higher levels of dependence on agriculture, there are the highest proportions of women undertaking these activities within the context of household livelihoods (83% of women in these households in the South West Bank, and 81% in the Jordan Valley) compared to 65% of women in agrarian households in the North West Bank and 53% in the Middle West Bank.



Qualitative Research Links: Women's Employment and Productive Work

“There are few jobs for young men – and even fewer for young women.”—female university graduate, al Walajeh

In **al Walajeh**, where women had the highest educational attainment on average, very few were employed and there was high unemployment among unmarried female university graduates. There were a few self-employed women in the community doing sewing, or running salons from their homes, while others helped run small family grocery shops. Few if any women were engaged in agriculture or herding activities, which are very minor players in the village economy. The women's center in the community runs craft production courses, although these did not seem to translate into income generation for women. The few jobs for educated women within the community were largely created by the community, in the form of employment for a nurse at the local clinic and jobs for two daycare workers at the kindergarten.

In **al Zaim**, similar remarks were made about joblessness among female youth, i.e., given that there are few opportunities for males, there are even less for females. Again, lack of agriculture and herding livelihoods in the community meant that women and girls were not active in these activities.

If the family has sheep and goats, [the woman] is making yogurt and cheese... There are the women who work for the tobacco farmers in Yabad; they sort the tobacco at home and can make 200 shekels a week during the season... Then there's the ones who work in Israel, on plums, cucumbers – only the older women, not the young ones. The young ones are in school.”—older woman, Imreiha

The highly varied livelihoods in **Imreiha** were reflected in the very varied and active lives of women in productive work. Besides playing central roles in caring for the family's livestock as well as being principal producers of dairy products, women did an array of seasonal agricultural work. This included being workers in Israel, either individually or as parts of family units staying for long harvest seasons in Israel or working with family members on share-cropped or rented agricultural land. In addition, many women were engaged in piecework for tobacco farmers in nearby Yabad – being paid by the piece for sorting and boxing raw tobacco at home. Given that many men were working in Israel, women carried out much of the day-to-day work within the community, not only in terms of livestock. For example, the focus group was held in the only shop in the village, one run by the wife of a laborer who spends five days a week in Israel. Given that the first generation of young women to attend university in the village has yet to graduate, as yet there were no comments about female unemployment.

In **al Fasayil**, no matter their age, all of the women in the focus group claimed that none of them were working, and indeed it was “*ayb*” or a “shame” for women to work. They also insisted that women who work in the nearby settlements were not from the community but came from Jericho. However, the field supervisor who set up the meetings and knows the community well said that it's well-known that women from al Fasayil work in the settlements (albeit not young unmarried women) and that any of the women whose fam-



ilies raise livestock do a great deal of related daily labor and production work. Moreover, even though, the group labeled women's employment shameful, it became clear that some forms of employment were acceptable. The young women at university hoped to become employed as schoolteachers, and a number of women mentioned participating in an NGO-run training course in sewing machine repair (one that did not, however, lead to income-generation opportunities).

Women's Domestic Work

Along with undertaking multiple – and usually unpaid productive activities – women in Area C also have high domestic work burdens.

In the course of an ordinary day, 96% of women reported doing cleaning and 96% cooking and 22% spent time collecting wood or water. In terms of home-care, 64% undertook childcare on a daily basis while 17% spent time taking care of elderly, ill or disabled family members. More than half of women in hamlets/encampments (57%) spent time in a normal day gathering water or wood for fuel versus 7% of women in villages (and less than 1% in urban areas). Women whose communities were completely in Area C were much more likely to spend time on a daily basis gathering wood or water (at 44% of them compared to between 7-12% of women whose communities were partially in Area C). Regionally, a third of women in the Jordan Valley (31%) and the South (33%) report spending time in a normal day gathering water or wood for fuel, compared to approximately 10% of women in the other regions.

The only task that a significant number of women (24%) undertook outside their immediate home environment was shopping, while another 11% said they undertook tasks of dealing with official institutions on behalf of the family. The 6% of women who do paid work also usually do so outside their immediate home environment. A high 77% of women said they spent time socializing with their neighbors and relatives as part of their daily routine.

More than half (52%) of women surveyed said that they felt stressed from having too many daily duties. Higher levels of stress were expressed by women in encampments (58%) as well as among women whose households rely on herding (65%), agriculture (57%), and poultry farming (59%) for any portion of their income. Women were then asked which single daily task they would prefer to spend less time on, with the highest response being a desire to spend *less* time in household cleaning duties (at 35%). However, nearly a third of women who undertake animal husbandry, including dairy processing activities (31%), said they prefer to spend less time on these activities, while 21% of women who undertake farming activities would like to spend less time on them. When all women were asked which single task they would prefer to spend *more* time on, the highest response was "recreation and relaxation" (at 35% of all women).

Last, married women were asked who would take on childcare duties in circumstances when they themselves could not do them (due to illness, etc.).



More than half responded that another woman from the household would take care of the children, while only 17% reported that their spouse would.

Household Decision-making

Women in Area C households report having little decision-making power, particularly in relation to economic decisions. Women in hamlets/encampments and in the Jordan Valley express the most limited household decision-making power in comparison to other women across Area C.

Approximately half of surveyed women said they were free to decide whether to visit friends or relatives (49%) or to seek medical treatment for themselves (52%), but only 40% said they had the power to decide on daily household spending. In hamlets/encampments, the freedom to make decisions within the household dropped dramatically, with only 23% of women saying they were free to decide to visit friends or relatives, 31% to seek medical treatment, and only 17% on daily household spending. By region, women in the Jordan Valley reported the most constrained household decision-making, with 28% free to decide on visits to relatives or friends, 30% to seek medical care, and 22% to decide on daily spending. Of all three community types, women in village Area C households had the relatively highest household decision-making power.

Percent of Women Free to Make Everyday Household Decisions by Community Type, 2014

	Free to visit relatives	Free to spend on daily household needs	Free to seek medical treatment
Total Area C	49	40	52
Urban	50	47	53
Village	62	51	63
Hamlet/Encampment	23	17	31
Jordan Valley	28	22	30

Married women were also asked about whether they had the final say on a number of important life decisions, and if not, who did. Only on the issue of selecting whom they married did a substantial number (51%) of women say they held the final decision. In comparison, only 22% of women said they held the final decision on whether to work outside the home; 10% had the final say on their daughter's education or buying an expensive household item; and 15% had the final say on whether a child got medical treatment. On all these indicators, final decision-making was overwhelmingly in the hands of husbands or – in the case of marriage decisions – fathers.

Married women in hamlets/encampments also had the least decision-making power on these significant life issues. Only 35% (compared to 51% of all respon-





Residents of Area C are often forced to buy bottled or tanked water for their daily needs, while the Israeli government collects water in the environment (see water tank below) for use in Israeli settlements. Photo credits: (top) Oxfam and (bottom) Giovannella Pezzuto



dents) had the final say on who to marry; 11% (versus 22% of all respondents) on whether to work outside the home; 7% (versus 10%) on whether to educate daughters; and 9% (versus 15%) in getting a child medical treatment.

Area C women's involvement in the labor force does not seem to impact their decision-making power. Only 22% of surveyed women who are in the labor force said they had the final say on whether to work outside the home or not – i.e., the same as Area C women overall. In terms of the freedom to visit friends/relatives, employed women had the least freedom to decide (at 42%) compared to 52% of women outside the labor force. When determining spending on daily needs, there was no difference between the decision-making power of working women and women outside the labor force. Women in the Jordan Valley, who were the most economically active women by region in Area C had the least decision-making power in terms of choosing to work outside the home (at 9% having the final say on this decision versus 22% for all women).

Similar to the findings on women's freedom of movement, greater decision-making power on daily issues increased with women's age – especially among women over 50. In addition, it increased among women with secondary and post-secondary education, as well as among widows.

The 2017 resurvey found few changes over time in women's decision-making, with only one significant difference. Women's ability to decide on daily spending or seeking medical treatment was similar between the two studies. However, there was a significant increase in the proportion of women who said that they were free to decide on visiting friends/relatives, from 49% in 2014 to 65% in 2017. This may have to do with the slighter older overall age of the women in the 2017 sample or may simply be an outcome of the smaller, less representative sample. In relation to women's decision-making power on significant life decisions, the overall responses were the same, with the only a small difference being a slight rise (from 15% to 21%) in women who had the final say on a child receiving medical treatment.

Qualitative Research Links: Household Decision-Making

“Everything is in my hands. My husband comes home from [work in] Israel exhausted, and all the family responsibilities are mine. I don’t need permission from him to leave the house or for anything.”—female, Walajeh

“We have rights – we have too many rights!”—female, Walajeh

“My husband works every day in Israel – from work to home, from home to work. Five days a week, he leaves to work at four or five in the morning and gets home at sunset. He’s exhausted and never leaves the house unless he has to. And that makes him neutral in everything; I’m the one who has to make the decisions.”—female shopkeeper, Imreiha

Decision-making roles were raised in the focus groups only indirectly and – as can be seen above – by women whose husbands work in Israel. These women commented that the long commutes and extremely long working hours led to husbands depending heavily on their wives to carry out many of the daily decision-making burdens. In **Walajeh**, they also remarked that the shared roles of women in defending the community over the years of struggle against land confiscation by the Wall, as well as their active participation (and often leadership) in all of the civic activities in the community had led to men in the community recognizing women as equals in many spheres of life. In **Imreiha**, with many men working in Israel, a “housewife” also remarked that this meant many decisions were left in her hands. In her case, what is different is women’s much greater roles in productive activities compared to al Walajeh. How that affects women’s decision-making powers is not clear, although the emergence of a new generation of young women attending university suggests a positive trend.

Though not directly emerging from the focus groups in **al Fasayil** or **al Zaim**, there were some indications in those villages that decision-making power among women in both communities was weak. Clearly, in al Fasayil, the relatively higher incidence of polygamy tends to suggest women’s overall low decision-making powers within marriage. In al-Zaim, women’s lack of access to productive work, as well as their isolation from other communities (including from supportive kin) suggests that women may have limited decision-making power within marriage.



CHAPTER 5: INDICATORS OF HUMAN INSECURITY & DISTRESS

Almost half of respondents in Area C households exhibit high levels of human insecurity, and these levels are even higher among respondents living in households in the Jordan Valley or in hamlet/encampments.

The concept of “human security” was developed to address the fact that impacts of violent conflict and insecurity are not limited to material loss and bodily harm. The survey used a Human Security scale developed by the Institute of Community and Public Health (ICPH) at Birzeit University to assess the impacts of long-term conflict and insecurity on respondents’ emotional security and sense of wellbeing in the present and towards the future. The ICPH scale contains ten questions about individuals’ level of fear about threats to personal safety; the safety of their families and their ability to support their families; fear about loss of income, homes and land; and fear about their future and the future of their families (see appendix).

High levels of human insecurity are found in Area C: 47% of the respondents exhibited high levels of insecurity, 42% showed moderate insecurity, and 11% had low levels of insecurity.

Insecurity Scale: Levels of Insecurity Based on Ten Items, 2014



Human Insecurity Scale Indicators, 2014

	All the time	Most of the time
Fear for yourself in your daily life	27.7%	20.7%
Fear for your family in your daily life	42.6%	26.1%
Feel worry/fear not being able to provide your family with daily life necessities	34.8%	26%
Worry/fear about losing your source of income or your family's source of income	36.5%	24.8%
Worry/fear losing your home (demolition, evacuation)	30%	20%
Worry/fear losing your land (confiscation & expansion of Israeli settlements)	28.4%	18.6%
Fear/worry for family education	29%	21.8%
Feel worry/fear from displacement or uprooting	30.3%	18.2%
Worry/fear for your future and your family's future	39.1%	26.1%

When broken down by individual indicators, respondents' most common fears and worries were about the family: 43% of respondents said they were in constant fear for their family in the present and 39% constantly feared for their family's future. The next most common response was about ensuring the family's economic wellbeing with 36% always worried about losing their source of income, and 35% always worried about providing for their daily necessities. Fears related to Israeli state violence were next, with approximately 30% constantly worried about both displacement from their homes or losing their home to demolition or expulsion. Finally, 29% of respondents reported being in constant fear for their own wellbeing.

By region, the highest rates of insecurity were present in households in the Jordan Valley (66%), followed by the South West Bank (51%), compared with (44%) in the North West Bank, and (29%) in the Middle. By community type, the highest levels of human insecurity among all categories were in hamlets/encampments at (70% highly insecure), compared with villages at (40%) and urban areas at (23%).



Respondents Expressing High Level of Insecurity, by Region, Community Type & Degree in Area C


Region/Community type/ Degree in Area C	Percent of Respondents
Total Area C	47%
Region	
Jordan Valley	66%
South West Bank	51%
North West Bank	44%
Middle West Bank	29%
Community type	
Hamlets / encampments	70%
Village	40%
Urban	23%
Degree to which community in Area C	
100% in Area C	63%
50%+ in Area C	35%

Higher levels of insecurity were also found among households in communities entirely located in Area C, at 63%, compared to 35% in those communities that are halfway in Area C. In addition, 70% of households located in a nature reserve reported high insecurity levels, compared to 45% among those not located in reserves. Finally, 83% of households located in military zones reported high levels of insecurity compared to 67% living in communities affected by military zones, and only 39% among those not affected by military zones.

Households with low living standards expressed higher levels of human insecurity. As shown in the section on standards of living and housing conditions, patterns of infrastructure deprivation and poverty in Area C strongly correlate with areas and communities where Israeli restrictions are at their most severe and where homes are most vulnerable to Israeli violence. Thus it is not surprising that higher levels of insecurity also correlated with low standards of living and inadequate housing conditions. High levels of human insecurity (70%) were found among women who live in inadequate housing versus only 40% among those who had adequate housing. Similarly, more than two-thirds (67%) of households with the lowest living standards (STL, based on the index) exhibited high levels of human insecurity, compared to only 47% of those with medium STL and 26% of those with high STL. Higher levels of insecurity also correlated with more crowded households: 67% of highly crowded households exhibited high levels of insecurity, compared to only 33% among the least crowded households.



Insecurity Scale Resurvey: Levels of Insecurity Based on Ten Items, 2017



An additional question was asked to gauge respondents' feelings about whether they will be able to continue living in their homes.

Women in communities most exposed or vulnerable to Israeli military violence express the highest levels of uncertainty about their households' ability to continue living in their homes. Eighty percent of women whose households are located in Israeli firing/military zones, 70% of women whose households are located in Israeli nature reserves, 67% whose households are affected by military zones, 70% of women in hamlet/encampments, and 66% of women in the Jordan Valley. Sixty-eight percent of women whose homes had been exposed to at least one incidence of Israeli military violence over the past three expressed high degrees of human insecurity.

In addition, 43% of all interviewed women expressed uncertainty about the continued ability of their households to continue living in their home. This proportion rose to 78% among women whose households are located in Israeli military/firing zones, 74% in households affected by Israeli military zones, and 74% among women whose households had been exposed to any instance of Israeli military violence over the preceding three years. Two-thirds of women whose households are in hamlet/encampments and in the Jordan Valley expressed uncertainty about the ability of their households to continue living in their homes.

The 2017 resurvey found that respondents expressed still high but lower levels of human insecurity. The proportion expressing high levels of insecurity in 2014 dropped from 47% to 36% of respondents in 2017, levels expressing

Women in communities most exposed to Israeli military violence are most likely to express uncertainty about their households' ability to continue living in their homes.





Sumud Freedom Camp was established on the lands of Sarura to protest the village's displacement by Israeli settlement and call for the villagers to return to their homes, empty since 1998. Photo credit: Marcella Schirosa

moderate insecurity were stable (at 42%), while there was a doubling (from 11% in 2014 to 21% in 2017) of respondents expressing low levels of insecurity. Hamlets/ encampments continued to exhibit the highest levels of insecurity at 43% but in 2017 this was equally high in urban Area c communities, while it dropped 9% in village communities. The regional patterning also differed significantly, with higher levels of insecurity found in households in the South West Bank 57%, followed by 47% in the North West Bank, compared to 31% in Jordan Valley and 14% in the Middle. In other words, levels of insecurity dropped significantly in the Jordan Valley by more than 50% over the two periods, while they slightly rose by 7% in the South West Bank. However, the qualitative research findings in the Jordan Valley in 2018 completely contradict these latter findings.

Levels of Individual Distress


Levels of distress were measured using a scale comprised of 12 questions that assessed individuals' fears, frustration and anxieties about incapacitation and displacement, as well as fears of not being in control over their lives (see appendix).²⁴

Among the women surveyed, 31.6% exhibited low levels of distress, 44.9% moderate levels, and 23.5%, high levels of distress.

²⁴ The scale has also been used and validated in multiple studies of the West Bank and Gaza Strip by Institute of Community and Public Health/Birzeit University.



Distress Scale, 2014 Survey



By region, the greatest proportion of women with high levels of distress lived in the Jordan Valley (33%), followed by women from the South West Bank (24%), the Middle (18%), and North West Bank (19%). Higher distress levels were voiced by women in hamlets/encampments (at 38%) compared to a significantly lower proportion of 18% of women in village communities, and 17% in urban areas.

Females Voicing High Levels of Distress by Various Indicators, 2014

Total Area C	24%
Jordan Valley	33%
South West Bank	24%
North West Bank	19%
Middle West Bank	18%
Hamlets/encampments	38%
Villages	18%
Urban areas	17%

Women whose households have inadequate housing conditions reported high levels of distress (41%), compared to (18%) among those with adequate housing conditions. Similarly, 45% of those in households with a low standard of living reported high levels of distress compared to only 19% among those with a medium STL, and 12%) among those with a high STL.

High levels of distress were also most common among female-headed households, at (36%) compared to (22%) among women in households headed by men. They were also higher among women in polygamous marriages (at 36%)



compared to 23% of women in monogamous marriages—suggesting that distress may also be related to family relations.

The findings of the 2017 resurvey show a significant decline in overall levels of distress. The proportion of women expressing high levels of distress dropped by half (from 24% to 12% in 2017) with a resultant rise of (from 45 to 49%) of women expressing moderate levels, and an increase (from 32% to 39%) in the proportion of those with low levels of distress. Similar to changing patterns on insecurity between the two periods, greater levels of high distress in 2017 were voiced by women in the South West Bank, while previous high levels found among women in the Jordan Valley dropped dramatically. Again, it is not clear whether these findings represent real changes on the ground, or whether they are related to factors associated with the 2017 sample.

Qualitative Research Links: Human Insecurity

“Demolition of the house has an effect on the whole family – the woman is affected and the man is affected. The house is your safety and security... the young cry and keep asking ‘Why did they demolish our house?’... After our house was demolished, my mother-in-law began to have diabetes.”—female, survivor of home demolition, al-Walajeh

“I can never stop thinking about the house being destroyed. It’s like you can never feel secure ever again.”—female survivor of home demolition, Imreiha

“You feel like you’re in a cage...”—female, al Walajeh

“You feel like you can’t breathe. There’s only one entrance, [and] you don’t feel secure. They can close the entire village just like a house.”—female, al Walajeh

“Imagine, my father died three or four months ago. He lived at my brother’s in Tur [on the other side of the Wall, 1 km away]... He asked to see us but I could not visit him, and he died before he could see me because I couldn’t get a permit. They suffocated us in everything – in education, in health, in work...”—female, Zaim

“The biggest fear for our sons is from the army, everything from the occupation.”—female, Fasayil

“Every time they (the army) comes into the village, they come to my house.”—Mother of two male prisoners aged 14 and 16, al Fasayil

When asked for whom they feared more, their daughters or sons, responses in the **four communities** were very similar and highly gendered. Fears for daughters were linked with ever-present worries for their physical safety from the Israeli military in and around the community (al Fasayil & Imreiha), from settlers (al Walajeh), from checkpoints (al Fasayil, Imreiha, al Walajeh and al Zaim) or from internal violence such as criminals and male youth (al Zaim). In most of these cases, these fears were voiced strongly in relation to girls traveling to school. Fears for young men were much more about their immediate future – the ability to find employment and set up a home and



family. These fears translated into worries in the present about young men's ability to cope with frustration and joblessness, and thus, their vulnerability to "getting into trouble."

Fears for the future of the home were strongly expressed in communities where home demolition was a lived experience for many respondents and a constant looming threat such as in al Walajeh and Imreiha and to a much lesser extent in the other two communities. Experiences of home demolition were described by those who had been through them as completely devastating in their emotional impacts and as having long-term traumatic effects, as suggested by the quotes above. In both communities, just the sighting of an Israeli civil administration planning officer in the community (who seem to enter frequently) would set off major panic and anxiety.

But there were also expressions of fear and insecurity in the focus groups that were not covered by the questions in the quantitative survey. Most stark were continual expressions of fear and anxiety in al Walajeh and al Zaim due to being "caged", "imprisoned" or "strangled". Both communities had been completely physically encircled and surrounded by settlements/the Wall/checkpoints, with only one remaining entrance (fully controlled by Israel) in and out of the community. There were numerous examples of the material effects of being caged on access to medical care, education or how this affected family ties, but in the discussions, the traumatic psychological effects were made very powerfully clear. Although there is no physical wall around **al Fasayil**, past experiences of being locked in by checkpoints continues to provoke anxiety and fear in the present and projected into the future, with statements such as: "at any moment they can imprison us." Additionally, in al Fasayil the issue of vulnerability was linked to the community's physical isolation and invisibility. While some male respondents attempted to emotionally diminish the experience of constant home raids in the middle of the night by the Israeli military, a more dominant expression was that the Israeli military could do whatever it wanted because no one was watching and no one was there to protect the community.





CHAPTER 6: EXPOSURE TO ISRAELI STATE & SETTLER VIOLENCE

The survey assessed Area C households' and their household members exposure to various types and levels of Israeli military and settler violence. Exposure of the home to Israeli state violence was experienced by slightly less than one-third of households over the preceding five years. Women's individual experiences of moderate forms of military violence over the preceding three years was similar, while one-fifth of households reported that family members had experienced more severe forms of state violence over a five-year period.

Violence Against the Home

Exposure to Israeli state/settler violence against the home was significantly higher in the Jordan Valley and hamlet/encampments, as well as among households located in communities completely in Area C. Households in areas most exposed to Israeli military and settler violence also exhibited the highest levels of economic and infrastructural deprivation.

Exposure to Israeli State & Settler Violence Against the Home

Slightly less than one-third (29%) of women reported that their homes had been exposed to from one to six types of state violence over the past five years. Almost 18% said they had received military orders to evacuate their homes that had not yet been implemented; 10% said they received evacuation orders that had resulted in them leaving their home; 15% said they had received a stop-work order against their home; 13% had an outbuilding destroyed by the military; and a total of 11% stated that their home had been fully or partially demolished by the military. Among the respondents who experienced violence against the home, almost two-thirds (61%) had experienced multiple incidents and one-third (39%) experienced a single incident.


Households located in hamlets/ encampments and in the Jordan Valley had significantly higher incidences of violence against the home.



Israeli Violence Against the Home by Type of Violence over Previous 5 Years by Region and Community Type, 2014

Type of Incident	Jordan Valley	South West Bank	North West Bank	Middle West Bank	Hamlets/ Encampments	Village	Urban	Total 2014
Evicted from the home by military order	4%	2%	2%	1%	5%	4%	0.3%	10%
Home totally demolished by the military	3%	1%	.5%	1%	4%	1%	0%	5.1%
Home partially demolished by the military	4%	1%	.5%	1%	5%	1%	0%	5.9%
Outbuilding(s) demolished	9%	1%	1%	1%	9%	3%	.5%	12.6%
Received stop work or demolition order - not yet implemented	8%	3%	3%	3%	10%	5%	.5%	15.5%
Received military eviction order - not yet implemented	9%	3%	2%	3%	13%	4%	.5%	17.6%
Total households reporting from 1-6 incidents	37%	11%	9%	10%	46%	18%	2%	29%

Exposure of Home to Israeli Violence Based on Six Types



20% of households had an individual exposed to at least one incidence of direct political violence from the military or settlers over the preceding five years.

Among households located in hamlets/encampments, a high of 46% reported any incidence over the past five years (compared to 18% among village and only 2% in urban Area C locations). While regionally, Jordan Valley households reported the greatest incidences of home exposure to violence at 37% compared to a much lesser range of 9–11% among households in the North West Bank, Middle and South West Bank.


Households in communities completely located in Area C also reported greater levels of violence against their homes, with 41% reporting one or more incidents over the previous five years compared to (15%) among communities' located half in Area C and 27% that were less than half in Area C.

The highest levels of home exposure to political violence were found in military zones, with 63% of women in these communities reporting that their homes were exposed to between one to six types of such violence in the past five years, as did 52% of women who live in communities affected by nearby military zones (versus only 19% of women whose communities are not affected by military zones).


There are also clear links between homes' greater vulnerability to military violence, and households' economic and structural deprivation. More than two-thirds (64%) of households living in inadequate housing experienced from one to six incidents of state violence against their home, compared to only 16% of those with adequate housing. Likewise, 57% of respondents with a low standard of living (STL) reported incidents of violence against their home, compared to only 22% of households with medium STL, and 13% with a high

Exposure of Home to Israeli Violence Based on Six Types by Housing Conditions

Inadequate Housing Conditions



Adequate Housing Conditions



STL. Likewise, over half (53%) of those living in very crowded homes reported having been exposed to such violence, compared to (32%) in moderately crowded homes, and approximately 20% in the least crowded homes.

Exposure of Homes to Israeli Violence by Type of Violence over Preceding 5 Years, 2014 and 2017

Type of incident	Total 2014	Total 2017
Evicted from home by military order	9.5%	4.4%
Home totally demolished by the military	5.1%	2%
Home partially demolished by military	5.9%	2.6%
Outbuilding(s) demolished	12.6%	13%
Received stop work or demolition order not yet implemented	15.5%	15.6%
Received eviction order not yet implemented	17.6%	10%
Total % of households reporting from 1-6 incidents	29%	21%

Insecurity and the home's exposure to political violence were also correlated, with more than two-thirds (68%) of those who were exposed to two to six types of violence by the Israel army also reporting high levels of insecurity, compared to 40% among those who had no incidence of violence against their homes.

The 2017 resurvey found an overall decline from (29% in 2014 to 21%) in the numbers of households that had experienced one to six incidents of military violence against the home over the preceding five years. Continuity in the levels of exposure were found in two forms of violence against the home: 16% of respondents in both surveys said that they received a stop-work or demolition order on their home over the past five years and 13% reported that an outbuilding had been destroyed by the Israeli military over the same period. What declined in 2017 were the levels of those reporting they had been evicted from their home (down by 5%); those reporting a non-implemented eviction order (down by 8%); and those reporting that their home was totally or partially demolished by the Israel army (down by 2-3%). However, given the high margin of error in the 2017 sample size, the decline in levels of incidents of violence against the home should be treated with caution.

What is worth noting in the 2017 resurvey was the distribution of violent incidence against the home by region and community type. In 2017, the highest level of exposure to political violence against homes was in the South West Bank followed by the Jordan Valley and the Middle West Bank (versus, in 2014, higher incidence levels in the Jordan Valley followed by the South West Bank).

By community type, the highest levels of violence against the home was reported in village Area C households, followed by hamlets/encampments, and then urban areas (in 2014, higher levels were found in hamlet/encampments). Again, due to the very small 2017 sample, these findings need to be treated with caution.




Exposure of Household Members to Political Violence

Twenty percent of respondents reported that household members had been exposed to at least one incidence of direct political violence from the military or settlers over the preceding five years, in response to four questions asked. Specifically, 15% of women reported that a family member had been arrested (with 3% reporting more than one person arrested); another 8.% reported a family member's injury by the Israeli military; 7% reported that a family member was injured by Israeli settlers; and 7% reported that a family member was killed/martyred (presumably by an Israeli soldier or settler). Except for arrest, all other types of violence reported were concerning individuals rather than multiple family members.

Combining the four variables into one variable, "exposure of household members to direct political violence," we find that 80.3% of women reported not being exposed to such violence at all, 8.5% reported exposure to one type, and 11.2% from two to six types of Israeli military violence.

Exposure of Household Members to Political Violence over Past 5 Years



Analysis by region showed that 40% of respondents in the Middle West Bank reported being exposed to one to four types of direct political violence against a member of the household, 17% from the Jordan Valley, 15% in the North, and 8% in the South. By community, 58.7% of women in villages reported a member of the household experiencing one to four types of political violence, while 32% in hamlets/encampments reported the same, followed by 9.2% in urban areas. A possible explanation for these greater violence incidence levels against individual household members in the Middle West Bank is the inclusion of Area C refugee camp households in the sample in that region.

The 2017 resurvey found overall stability in levels of direct violence experienced by family members over the preceding five years with one significant decline: the level of households reporting a family member had been killed/martyred declined from 7% in 2014 to 1% in 2017. Otherwise, levels of arrest over the period were similar (at 17% and 15% consecutively), while injury by military and settlers were at the same levels of 2014 (at 7% each). Also con-




sistent with 2014 were the locations where there were higher levels of direct violence against family members. The Middle West Bank followed by North West Bank, as well as continuing to be higher in villages, followed by hamlets/encampment and then in urban areas.

Women's Individual Exposure to Moderate Political Violence

Nine variables assessed women's individual and direct exposure to moderate political violence by the Israeli army or settlers over the preceding three years. More than a quarter of women in Area C (29%) responded that they had experienced at least one type of moderate political violence. Of these, 22% reported being held for a long time at an Israeli army checkpoint; 13% had undergone a body search by military personnel; 18% had been exposed to tear gas/sound bombs; 7% interrogated by the military; and 3% were under a travel ban. In terms of settler violence, 6% had been detained by settlers; 4% searched by settlers; and 3% physically attacked by settlers.

Women's Individual Exposure to Moderate Political Violence



37% of women who live in a community entirely in Area C reported exposure to moderate political violence, compared with 19% in communities halfway in Area C and 27% less than halfway in Area C.

Similar to the findings above on more severe violence, the highest rates of personal experience of moderate violence among women were found in the Middle West Bank (34%), compared to 31% in the Jordan Valley, 29% in the North and 21% in the South. Analysis showed that 35% of women from hamlets/encampments reported having been exposed to moderate political violence, compared to 27% from villages and 26% from urban areas.

Women whose households are in a community completely located in Area C reported more exposure to moderate political violence than others, with 37% of such women reporting one or several incidents compared to a low of 19% for communities located half in Area C, and 27% for communities less than half in Area C. More than half (52%) of women who were exposed to individual moderate political violence reported high levels of human insecurity.

The 2017 resurvey found levels of exposure to moderate political violence among women remained stable with slight differences. Violence from the military was similar except that there was an increase in women's exposure to teargas/sound bombs from 18% to 25% in 2017. Exposure to various forms of violence from settlers also declined slightly (1-3%) for all indicators in 2017. Again, these slight differences must be treated with caution given the wider margin of error in the 2017 sample.

By region, higher levels of moderate individual violence continued among women in the Middle West Bank, followed by the South West Bank. Also, similar to 2014, higher incidents of moderate political violence were experienced by women in Area C village communities followed by women in hamlet/encampments.

Qualitative Research Links: Israeli State and Settler Violence

Women from the four communities where focus groups were conducted spoke of how state and settler violence impacted their daily lives. Experiences of and vulnerability to **home demolition** has already been discussed in previous sections and, as noted, is most acute in al Walajeh and Imreiha, while also present in al Fasayil and al Zaim. Most demolition experiences reported were of entire homes rather than partial demolitions. In Imreiha and al Fasayil, there were also cases of demolition of agricultural outbuildings – usually sheds for protecting livestock.

Stop work orders were also mentioned as being used to halt civic projects. In al Fasayil, land clearing in front of the municipality for a boys' football field was frozen. In Imreiha, a multi-use building (housing a clinic and elementary school) that was donor-supported and initially received (verbal) approval from the civil administration was also stopped (people in the community



saw the timing as linked to the election of U.S. President Donald Trump, whose policies have favored Israel). Al Walajeh, through major legal battles, had overcome stop work orders previously imposed on their day-care center/clinic, but the village council continued to receive them concerning a number of other needed infrastructure projects (the repaving of roads and a retaining wall next to the school).

In al Fasayil, the entire community was constantly vulnerable to the Israeli military **invasion of homes in the middle of the night**. Indeed, the military had come in the night prior to the study team's first field visit to the community. Rather than this being an extraordinary operation in search of a specific suspect, it appears to be a military "exercise" (what informants from the Israeli protest group "Breaking the Silence" say the military calls "showing presence"). Women in al Fasayil said the routine is always the same: the army breaks into a home in the middle of the night, sometimes with dogs, and tells the whole family to gather outside the home and wait to have their ID cards checked. Sometimes the contents of the home are upturned. Young children are woken up and completely traumatized by the presence of heavily armed soldiers and large dogs in their home in the middle of the night. Respondents said that over the preceding seven months, except for during the month of Ramadan, the army invaded regularly once or twice a month.

In Imreiha, **soldiers also entered the community** and homes recurrently, though not in the middle of the night and – it seems – somewhat more randomly, with respondents saying things like "they even show up to our weddings."

In al Fasayil and Imreiha, the main sources of violence are from the army, not settlers per se. Violence reported from settlers was more indirect, such as cases in Imreiha, al Fasayil and Walajeh of **schoolchildren being injured by settler cars** while they were walking back or forth to school along settler road arteries.

Arrests of household members were mentioned in al Walajeh, al Fasayil, and Imreiha. In al Walajeh, these seem to have occurred predominantly during the period when the community undertook organized non-violent protests against land confiscation and the building of the Wall. In Imreiha, where respondents said they had a tradition of non-involvement with political resistance to the occupation, a number of older men had served time in prison most likely during the first Intifada. But in al Fasayil, there was a mother whose two young sons (ages 14 and 16) were currently in Israeli prison. She said that added to her worry and fear; it seems that her family home had become a specific target in Israeli military night raids and were marked for harsher treatment.



Israeli Restrictions and Violence: Challenges and Obstacles Faced by Households Dependent on Agriculture or Herding

Approximately half of households dependent on agriculture or herding for their livelihoods in Area C experienced one or more obstacles in undertaking these activities due to Israeli policies and actions. Nearly a quarter of households depending on agriculture or herding reported that Israeli obstacles had led to a substantial decline in their productive output.

Households who depend to any degree on agriculture or herding for their livelihoods were asked whether they had faced obstacles linked to the occupation in undertaking these activities over the preceding three years. Close to half (44%) reported experiencing difficulties in accessing lands due to Israeli military policies or actions (such as the area being declared a closed military area or used as a firing zone). Close to half (44%) experienced these obstacles continuously, while 56% said only occasionally.

Close to half (44%) said they had experienced direct violence from the military or settlers (with 42% stating this was constant, and 48% saying it was occasional over the previous three years). A third (30%) had experienced destruction of crops; 24% had experienced confiscation of agricultural lands; 21% had faced forced eviction from productive lands; 22% experienced destruction of crops; 24% experienced confiscation/theft of livestock or agricultural infrastructure; and 15% had experienced poisoning of livestock. Lack of access to water for agriculture/livestock emerged as a dominant obstacle, faced by 38% of these households over the previous three years. An overwhelming majority (92%) of households who had faced any of these obstacles over the previous three years said that a decline in productivity had resulted. More than half (56%) stated the obstacles they faced resulted in a substantial decline in productivity; a third (34%) said they resulted in a moderate decline, while among 8% experienced only a slight decline in productivity.

Obstacles Faced by Area C Households Dependent on Agriculture and Herding by Community Type, 2014

Difficulties	Urban	Village	Hamlet/Encampment	Total
Access restrictions due to military closure/firing zone	28%	30%	69%	44%
Direct military or settler violence	24%	30%	67%	44%
Forced eviction from lands	9%	11%	36%	21%
Confiscation/theft of livestock or agricultural equipment	12%	13%	29%	24%
Lack of access to water for crops or livestock	18%	25%	59%	38%
Destruction of crops	18%	21%	25%	22%
Poisoning of livestock	21%	11%	21%	15%
Confiscation of agricultural lands	22%	21%	27%	24%



Households in hamlets/encampments engaged in agriculture or herding were most likely to report obstacles on each indicator. More than two-thirds (69%) reported facing military obstacles (firing zones or closed military areas) in accessing lands, and a similar two-third (67%) reported experiencing direct military or settler violence as an impediment to accessing agricultural lands. Though still unacceptably high, a much less one-third of households dependent on agriculture/herding in urban and village Area C communities reported military obstacles and one-fourth of each reported facing direct violence. In hamlets/encampments, households engaged in farm activities experienced forced eviction from productive lands and confiscation of livestock/agricultural infrastructure at three times the level (36% and 27%) reported by similar households in urban and village area C communities (where the range was 9% to 13% of agriculture dependent households in these contexts having experienced these obstacles). Lack of water for livestock/farming was also cited at a much higher level by farming/herding dependent households in hamlets/encampments at 59%, compared to one-fourth of these households in villages, and 18% of them in urban Area C locations. The pattern persists, though to a lesser degree, for hamlet/encampment households who have experienced land confiscation (27% versus 22% and 21% of urban and village Area C households, respectively); destruction of crops (at 25% versus 18% and 22% of urban and village Area C households, respectively); and poisoning of livestock (21% versus 21% and 11% of urban and village Area C households, respectively).

Approximately two-thirds (66%) of households in hamlet/encampments who faced any of these obstacles said that they led to a substantial drop in productivity (compared to 53% of households in urban areas and 47% in village communities who experienced any of these obstacles).

Comparisons with 2017

The 2017 resurvey found much continuity and some change in the incidence of obstacles experienced by households across Area C who are dependent on farm activities for household income. In terms of continuities, access restrictions to lands designated as being firing zones or closed military areas were the same over the two periods (at approximately 44% of these households experiencing them). Also similar were the proportions of households who experienced crop destruction or livestock poisoning – the former dropping by 4% and the latter rising by 2% (both statistically insignificant changes given the small 2017 sample). Also given the margin of error in the 2017 sample, the 6% decline in the proportion of households who experienced forced evictions and confiscation of lands, as well as the rise by 6% of households experiencing problems with water for livestock or crops represents at most a slight change from 2014 levels.

38% of households dependent upon agriculture or herding had been unable to access water for their livelihood over the previous three years



Comparisons Between 2014 and 2017 Findings

Difficulties	2014	2017
Access restrictions due to military closure/ firing zone	44%	43%
Direct military or settler violence	44%	33%
Forced eviction from lands	21%	15%
Confiscation/ theft of livestock or agricultural equipment	24%	15%
Lack of access to water for crops or livestock	38%	44%
Destruction of crops	22%	18%
Poisoning of livestock	15%	17%
Confiscation of agricultural lands	24%	18%

Where changes in levels of responses do show some actual change is in the 10% decline in experiences reported of direct military/settler violence, and the 9% decline in households reporting confiscation of livestock or agricultural equipment between the two surveys.

Qualitative Research Links: Obstacles Specific to Households Dependent on Herding or Agriculture

As already discussed, herding-dependent households experience obstacles in accessing pastures for their sheep. In **Imreiha** and **al Fasayil**, the military had severely limited access to previous pasturelands over the past two decades. In both cases, however, respondents had difficulty trying to quantify to what extent access had been lost or flock size had diminished – but from overall discussions, it seems clear that there had been a very significant diminution of herding in both communities as a result of loss of pasturage. In **Imreiha**, the loss was compounded more recently by a settler who violently prohibited access to a large area of pastureland, reserving it for his own use. In both communities, respondents said that herders were regularly harassed by the military – with “no-go” areas often declared at the whim of the soldiers on duty.

Al Walajeh is perhaps the most tragic case, with large numbers of households owning olive and fruit trees just a decade ago with access to multiple water springs. These have now all been confiscated and segregated off behind the Wall and transformed into an Israeli municipal park.



*A herder heads over the hillside.
Photo credit: Marcella Schirosa*





CHAPTER 7: ACCESS & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

Access to Medical Care

Households in Area C who have experienced a medical emergency faced multi-layered challenges in accessing urgent treatment. While cost of treatment is cited as a predominant difficulty, in hamlet/encampments and communities completely located in Area C, high numbers additionally cite obstacles of distance, lack of transport, and obstruction due to checkpoints, soldiers and/or settlers.

Women were asked if anyone in the household had experienced a medical emergency in the previous year and needed urgent treatment; about a third (32%) replied “yes”. Of the households who did have a medical emergency, when asked to cite the array of obstacles they encountered (if any) in accessing medical services, 72% of them cited the high costs of treatment; 65% cited the distance to health care services; 56% said they faced a lack of transportation; and 39% said they experienced difficulties due to the Israeli military or settlers (including checkpoints).

Households that Faced Medical Emergency in Preceding Year by Obstacles in Accessing Medical Treatment and Community Type, 2014

	Urban	Village	Hamlet/ Encampment	Community Completely in Area C	Total
Soldiers/ Settlers/ Checkpoint	26%	36%	49%	47%	39%
Lack of transport	15%	46%	84%	69%	56%
Distance to medical services	22%	55%	92%	78%	65%
Cost of Treatment	48%	67%	86%	84%	72%

Households in hamlet/encampments, followed by those in communities completely located in Area C, were most often to cite multiple obstacles to treatment. In hamlet/encampments, 92% who experienced a medical emergency



cited the problem of distance to services, 86% the cost of treatment, 84% lack of transport and nearly 50% cited obstacles by the Israeli military or settlers. For households in communities fully in Area C, 84% cited cost of treatment followed by distance to services (78%), lack of transport (69%) and blockages due to the Israeli military or settlers (at 47%).

Regional variations were also notable. Households in the Middle West Bank and Jordan Valley experienced the highest proportion of multiple obstacles to accessing emergency medical treatment. In the Jordan Valley, “distance” was the obstacle most cited at 86%, followed by cost (at 82%), lack of transport (at 72%) and blockages by the Israeli military or settlers at 41%. In the Middle West Bank, while distance to services (67%) followed by lack of transport (at 64%) were the prime obstacles cited, 57% of households with a medical emergency cited obstacles due to Israeli settlers and military – by region, the highest for any Area C region. While the cost of treatment was an obstacle for 57% of households with a medical emergency in the Middle West Bank, it was cited as an obstacle by 83% of households in South West Bank.

Qualitative Research Links: Medical Access

“There are no hospitals and there is no treatment. Whoever gets sick in Zaim dies before he/she reaches the hospital. There’s no one to take you to the hospital. The taxi driver will tell you that he is not ready to go on remote roads after midnight.”—female, Zaim

“I was pregnant and began to bleed. I had to walk to meet the ambulance at the checkpoint because they wouldn’t let it through.”—female, Imreiha

After a long struggle to get permission from the Israeli authorities, the community in **al Walajeh** was finally able to build a health clinic in 2014 (funded by ANERA). Since its completion however, sewage from the settlement of Har Gilo continues to seep into the entrance of the building housing the clinic (and a kindergarten). The Israel civil administration has to date refused to respond to complaints from the village council. Until a few years ago, the one-gated entrance into the community (at the entrance to the settlement) was closed from 7pm until 6am. As a community member says, “If you were outside you had to stay out, if you got sick you couldn’t leave...”. The experience of being what community members called “being caged” and unable to access emergency medical treatment continues as a source of worry and anxiety. The community’s response was to mobilize to build the clinic, as well as organize a civil defense team trained in first aid.

In **al Zaim** there is a government clinic, a private dentist, and a private pharmacy. Prior to the community’s enclosure by the Wall, emergency healthcare in East Jerusalem’s main hospitals (Maqassed and Augusta Victoria) was close by and easily accessible – and regular patients could even reach them on foot. Now, for West Bank ID holders in the community, the closest hospitals for regular or emergency care are 30 to 40 minutes away, in Jericho or Ramallah. Soldiers at the checkpoint into Al Zaim regularly hold



up ambulances, and there are no private taxi offices within the community. Outside taxi services often refuse to come into the community at night.

Imreiha has no medical facilities at all within the community and the closest access for medical care is beyond two checkpoints in the town of Yabad. The manned checkpoint on the main artery running through the community continues to block regular movement between the community and its closest service center, including for emergency medical treatment. Similar to al Zaim, the lack of taxis and their refusal to make the difficult trip to the community compounds the problem of emergency medical access.

In **al Fasayil**, there is one clinic but the doctor (from outside the community) is present only once a week. For urgent or more advanced medical care community members have to go to Jericho, and with few community members owning a car, the NIS 80 taxi ride is a major obstacle – equal to one day of wages earned in the nearby settlement. Besides this added expense, residents said that in the past checkpoints on the way to Jericho were a major problem, albeit but less so now.

Women’s Freedom of Movement

Women’s freedom of movement is dramatically more restricted for those living in hamlet/ encampments compared to that among women in urban and village communities in Area C. Regionally, women in the Jordan Valley exhibit the most restricted freedom of movement. The most restricted freedom of movement was reported by women in agricultural/herding households seeking to access family lands/herding areas.

Approximately two-thirds of all surveyed women stated they felt completely free to move at will in the immediate vicinity of their homes (68%) or their surrounding neighborhoods (67%). But a smaller 56% stated they were completely free to move at will to the closest shop or service center.

Women Responding that They are Free to Move at Will to Various Locations, by Community Type, 2014

	Immediate vicinity of my home	In surrounding neighborhood	To closest shop, service center	Inside family agricultural area or herding area*
Total	68%	67	56	49
Urban	87%	84	83	62
Village	76	76	70	68
Hamlet/Encampment	47	46	20	26
Jordan Valley	49	54	33	33

*Includes only women whose households engage in agriculture or herding



Among women whose households engaged in farming or herding, less than half (49%) said they were completely free to move to the areas where those activities take place. Women in urban Area C communities reported the greatest freedom of movement, followed by women in village communities. But there was a sharp drop in women's freedom of movement on each indicator among women living in hamlet/encampments.

Among urban women, more than 80% were free to move at will in the vicinity of the home, community or to the closest service center. Among village women, however, the responses declined to fewer than 70% of women stating that they were free to move in or to these locations. In comparison, less than 50% of women in hamlet/encampments said they were free to move at will in the vicinity of the home (47%) or in the surrounding neighborhood (46%). This declined to only 20% stating they were free to move at will to the closest shop/service center. Given the lack of market and other services in most hamlet/encampments the latter finding is likely due to the need to travel outside their community to reach these services.

Among women in urban and village communities, freedom of movement was most constrained in visiting family agriculture or herding lands. This was especially so among urban women, where the high levels of freedom of movement they reported in travel to locations within the community dropped from above 80% to only 62% as they sought to move to family agricultural or herding lands. In village communities, the comparable decline in freedom of movement between inside the community and travel to family agricultural or herding lands was much less (from above 70% to 68%). A possible explanation for these findings is that the agricultural/herding areas belonging to villages are more likely to be close by, while urban women usually travel further away outside the community to get to agricultural/herding areas. This explanation is supported by the higher numbers of women from hamlets/encampments who stated that they were free to move at will to their family herding agricultural lands (at 68%). Given that most of these communities are located close by or within the agricultural or grazing areas that they depend on, women do not have to move far beyond their immediate household or community to access them. However, a much higher percent of households within hamlet/encampments depend on herding/agricultural activities than do urban or village communities. Thus, the almost one-third of women in hamlets/encampments who depend on these activities but do not feel free to access the locations where they take place is much more substantial in terms of actual numbers and potential impact.

Besides community type, age strongly correlates with differences in women's freedom of movement. The most restricted freedom of movement is among the youngest age cohort of women (18 to 29), with freedom of movement improving approximately 10% on each indicator for each subsequent ten-year age cohort.

Regionally, women in the Jordan Valley reported the most restricted freedom of movement, with less than half (49%) of them free to move in the area immediately around their homes (compared to 68% of all women); slightly more than half (54%) free to move in their neighborhood (compared to 67% among all women); and only a third (33%) able to go freely to the nearest shop/service



center (compared to 56% of all women). In contrast to low levels of rights and freedoms found through other indicators, women in the South West Bank reported the easiest freedom of movement compared to women in other regions (with the exception of freedom to move to the closest shop/ service center where they came second to women in the Middle West Bank).

The most restricted freedom of movement was expressed by women in agricultural/herding dependent households towards their ability to access family lands/herding areas. Less than half (49%) of women in these types of households stated they were free to go these locations, dropping to 33% of women from these types of households in the Jordan Valley and an extremely low 12% of women from these types of households in hamlets/encampments.

Reasons women provided for their inability to move freely in/to *most locations* were primarily social (family constraints, local norms). However, fear of military/settler violence was the primary reason women cited for their lack of freedom to move in or to *family fields/herding areas*, with 67% of women citing this as the reason they were restricted. Three-quarters (75%) of women in the Jordan Valley who said they could not go freely to family herding/farming lands cited fear of military/settler violence as the reason, as did 59% of women in hamlets/encampments and 45% of these women in the South West Bank. Fear from settler/military violence was cited as the main reason by 15% of women who felt restricted in the immediate area of their home, and by 10% who did not feel free to move in their community or to the nearest market center.

Comparisons between the two survey periods show a general increase in women's freedom of movement, with freedom to move in the immediate vicinity of the home increasing from 68% in 2014 to 76% among women surveyed in 2017. Freedom of movement within their neighborhood rose from 68% to 83%, while freedom of movement to the closest shop/service center rose from 56% to 71% of women in 2017. The most minor increase in freedom of movement was among women from agriculture/herding dependent households, with 58% in 2017 saying they were free to go family lands versus 49% in 2014.

However, there were significant changes in women's freedom of movement in visiting family herding lands among women in the South West Bank in 2017. Only 2% of women in these households said they were free to go to these locations, compared to a very high 73% in 2014. This latter finding may suggest a rise in military and settler restrictions in the South West Bank affecting herder/farmer households over the two periods.

The slightly higher average age of women in the 2017 sample (38 years of age) compared to the 2014 sample (36.7) may also be a contributing factor to greater freedom of movement found in 2017. However, the general pattern of urban women expressing the greatest freedom of movement, village women reporting less freedom of movement, and women in hamlet/encampments reporting even less freedom of movement was the same in the 2017 resurvey.



Qualitative Research Links: Women's Freedom of Movement

Issues about women's movement arose predominantly in the focus groups in relation to **girls' access to school**. In Imreiha, worries about girls crossing the manned checkpoint blocking access to the nearby education center in Yabad was an ongoing anxiety that led some families to pull their girls out of school before they had completed. In al Zaim, similar worries and family reactions occurred when access to school was a dangerous trek through the mountains, but was resolved once the community was able to provide schooling to girls at all levels locally. In al Walajeh, fears continued to be expressed about girls and boys journeying to secondary school in a seven-kilometer trek along a settler road artery. In al Fasayil, similar to al Zaim, the existence of all school levels inside the community meant that fear for their movement was no longer an impediment to girls' (or boys' education).

In al Zaim and al Walajeh, **women expressed fears about movement within their communities**. In the former, this was because of internal conflict and insecurity (al Zaim is a zone without policing, as Israeli police are not present and the Palestinian police can only enter on a case-by-case basis with Israeli coordination). The community had become a lawless haven for criminals from Jerusalem and Area A. Street fights between frustrated male youth fed into the lawless atmosphere. Women said they feel unsafe walking around the community and expressed particular fears for their daughters. In Walajeh, although there was a strong level of community solidarity and no signs of internal conflict or crime, fear of being alone on the streets – particularly at the deserted entrance to the community close to the settlement – were raised by many women who said they usually return home before nightfall from visits outside the community as a result. In addition, the community youth center had been created so that male and female youth would have access to after-school activities. Still, fearful parents had not allowed children, especially their daughters, to take part in after-school activities in neighboring Beit Jala.

Only in al Fasayil did women mention fear of going out to herding areas due to harassment by the Israeli military. In Imreiha, it was male herders who mentioned having been systematically harassed by a settler.

A shared concern with direct implications for women's freedom of movement mentioned in each community was the lack of public transportation. Only Walajeh had minimal bus service (twice a day) that dropped people off near the settlement entrance in the zone that women find most frightening. All three other communities are not served by public transport. Due to being enclaved or isolated, taxis from far away often refuse to come to the communities (and in any case are extremely expensive). For al Fasayil, the closest service center is Jericho, at the cost of an 80-shekel private taxi ride (equal to one day's wages men receive working in Israeli settlements). As shown in the data box on each community, private car ownership is very low in all communities except for in Zaim, compounding the problem of women's (and most men's) access outside the community.





CHAPTER 8: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

Women in Area C households reported lower incidents of domestic violence compared to prevalence rates across the West Bank. However, findings do indicate links between higher levels of household exposure to military violence, and domestic violence in Area C.

Using the same indicators used by PCBS to measure women's experiences of psychological and physical violence within the family, the Area C surveys found an overall lower prevalence of domestic violence compared to the wider West Bank, with the exception of single women in Area C who more commonly reported psychological violence than single females across the West Bank.²⁵ The survey did not ask about sexual violence due to the inquiry's highly sensitive nature.

In 2014, a total of 37% of women across the surveyed communities said they had experienced any instance of psychological or physical violence in the household over the past year. More than a quarter, (27%) experienced any instance of psychological violence, while 10% reported any instance of physical violence.²⁶

Comparing prevalence rates with those found among females across the West Bank necessitates breaking the data down by ever married versus single women.

Women Who Experienced Any Instance of Domestic Violence by Type of Violence and Marital Status in Area C versus Total West Bank

Marital Status	Psychological Violence		Physical Violence	
	Area C (2014)	All West Bank (2010)	Area C (2014)	All West Bank (2010)
Single	24%	17%	13%	17%
Ever married	27%	49%	11%	20%

²⁵ Given that only 12% of the sample in 2014 were single (never married) females, the finding on greater levels of psychological violence should be treated with caution.

²⁶ PCBS was only able to present outcomes of its survey according to marital status.



Findings from the most recent (2010) survey from PCBS show that 17% of single and 20% of married women had experienced any instance of physical violence, compared to a lower 13% of single and 11% of married women in Area C households. PCBS also found that 17% of single and 49% of married women experienced any instance of psychological in 2010, compared to 36% of single and 39% of married women found in the 2014 Area C survey. However, it is important to note that the sample size of single women in both Area C surveys was very small (at 10–11% of the total women interviewed) thus these findings need to be treated with care.

Possible explanations for the overall lower levels of domestic violence found in Area C may be due to underreporting by female respondents. Context-specific support for this explanation came from fieldworkers (all females with long experience in household surveys) who said it was often impossible to interview women alone in Area C households – especially in hamlet/encampments. However, it could also be the case that domestic violence is actually lower in these communities.

Women in hamlets/encampments are more likely to suffer abuse, with 46% of them suffering any instance of domestic abuse, compared to 34% of women in urban and 34% village communities. By type of violence, 14% of women in hamlets/encampments said they had suffered any instance of physical abuse within the household over the previous year, compared to 10% of women in villages and 6% of women in urban areas. Almost half of women in hamlets/encampments (46%) stated they had suffered any instance of psychological abuse within the household over the past year, compared to 33% of village and 35% of urban Area C women.

By region, it is women in South West Bank Area C communities who suffer the greatest domestic abuse compared to women in other regions, with 51% suffering any instance of any abuse, 51% of them suffering from psychological abuse and 15% having suffered any instance of physical abuse over the past year. Physical abuse is lower in the other regions (cited by 11% of women in Middle West Bank, 10% in North West Bank, and 6% of women in the Jordan Valley over the past year).

Age also seems to be a factor, with 41% of young women 16–29 years old reporting having been exposed to any type or instance of domestic violence compared to 38% among those 30–49 and 29% among those 50 years or more. In these communities, younger women are at greater risk (which is consistent with the finding on greater psychological abuse experienced by single women).

In terms of recurrence, of the more than one-third of women in the sample who had suffered any type of psychological violence over the past year, more than 50% (at a range of 51–56% for various acts of psychological abuse) said the abuse had taken place three or more times. But of the 11% of women who had suffered from any type of physical violence, recurrence rates were low in relation to life-threatening acts (such as being attacked with a knife or attempts

The surveys provide numerous indications of a link between greater exposure to military/political violence with heightened rates of domestic violence.





Five-year-old Sila lives in the Bedouin community of Al Ka'abneh, near Jericho. She is watching her father rebuild their home after its third demolition. Photo credit: Suhaib Jarrar/Oxfam 2016

to strangle) and 40-50% of women stating the incident had happened only once. Less life-threatening forms of abuse (slapping, pushing, hair-pulling) had much higher recurrence rates (at 44 to 51% of women who had suffered from these, stating the abuse had happened three or more times.

Notably, the surveys provide numerous indications of a link between greater exposure to military/political violence with heightened rates of domestic violence.

A greater proportion of 43% of women living in communities completely located in Area C report exposure to any type or instance of domestic violence (with 31% citing instances of psychological violence and 12% of physical violence). Also, 47% of women whose homes were exposed to Israeli violence two to six times reported any instance of domestic violence, compared to 43% among households experiencing Israeli violence one time and a significantly lower 35% of women whose homes had not experienced Israeli violence at all. The results on severe exposure of family members to Israeli army violence are also consistent, with 41% of those reporting two to six types of severe exposure by family members to Israeli army violence reporting any exposure to domestic violence, compared to 32% for those exposed to one type of Israeli army violence and 38% for no exposure to Israeli army violence.

By marital status, widowed/divorced women report suffering lower instances of domestic abuse than currently married or single women; 26% of divorced/widowed women report suffering any instance of any type of abuse over the past year, compared to 39% of married and 37% of single women in Area C



communities. However, married women within polygamous unions have the highest reported levels of physical abuse among all women (at 18% of them reporting at least one instance of physical abuse over the past year) compared to 11% of all women in Area C and 10% among women in non-polygamous unions. They also report the highest incidence of psychological abuse, with 53% suffering any incident over the past year compared to 37% among all women.

Married women overwhelmingly cite husbands as the perpetrators in instances of physical abuse, while single women tend to report brothers as the perpetrators. In cases of psychological abuse, the pattern is similar, with the important difference that the range of possible perpetrators increases to include mothers, fathers, other women in the family and family members outside the household.

The 2017 resurvey found almost exactly the same levels of domestic violence overall, with 36% of women reporting any incident of domestic violence, a slightly higher 13% citing any incidence of physical violence, and 23% citing any incidence of psychological violence.





CHAPTER 9: HUMANITARIAN AID

Aid Received by Communities

The pattern of types of humanitarian aid distributed across Area C communities seems to conform to what is allowed by Israeli authorities rather than the specific needs of communities.

Aid Received by Community over Previous Year, 2014/ 2017

Type of Aid	2014	2017
Water	25.9	14.0
Roads	26.0	31.4
Electricity	16.4	5.9
Education	13.8	25.5
Health	18.8	12.1
Agriculture	19.3	21.1
Housing	8.8	8.4
Food aid	30.1	32.4
Legal aid	4.1	3.4
Income generation	0.0	11.1

Women were asked whether their community had received specific categories of humanitarian aid over the previous year. In both survey years, the main form of aid received by Area C communities had been food aid (at 30% in 2014 and a slightly higher 32% in 2017). Except for the continuing dominance of food aid, the types of aid received changed significantly between the two survey years. In 2014, after food aid, the two highest forms of aid received were water and road infrastructure or support (at 26% each), while in 2017, following food aid was road infrastructure (at 31%) and education (at 25%). In other words,



there was a significant decline in water support to communities, a slight rise in the provision of road infrastructure, and a significant rise (10%) in educational support between 2014 and 2017. In addition, projects for electric/solar power declined from 16% to 6%, while there was a surge in support for income generation projects – from none reported in 2014 to 11% of women reporting this form of aid in 2017. Reasons for the changing profile of aid distributed between the two periods are hard to assess from the data.

However, the impact of Israeli restrictions on types of aid distributed becomes clear when comparing across community types, with a much narrower range of aid being received in hamlets/encampments.

Top Four Aid Types Received, 2014

Hamlet/ encampment	Food aid	Agriculture	Health	Water
	46%	19%	17%	17%

In 2014, the dominant form of aid for their communities over the past year, according to women in hamlet/encampments, was food aid (at 46%) followed by agricultural support (at 19%), then health and electric/ solar projects (17%).²⁷ Aid in these communities was also the least differentiated: while almost 50% had received food aid, less than 20% said the community had received agricultural, health or water projects and less than 10% stated they had received any of the other seven forms of aid (such as roads, electric/solar, education, legal aid, and income generation). It is notable that in these communities with the most severe deprivation in terms of fundamental infrastructure and services such as education, roads and electricity that these forms of aid were largely absent. Clearly food aid is the overwhelming type of support distributed in these communities because it does not lead to direct conflict between the donor/humanitarian community and the Israeli authorities. By comparison, women in Area C urban and village locations cited a much wider range of aid and development projects being undertaken in their communities, including crucial infrastructure support that is absent from hamlet/encampments.

Top Four Aid Types Received, 2014

Urban	Road Infrastructure	Water	Electric/ Solar	Food Aid
	42%	28%	25%	24%

In urban Area C communities, road infrastructure was cited as the dominant form of aid received (at 42%), followed by water-related projects (at 28%), then electric/solar support 25% while food aid came in fourth (at 24%).

²⁷ In 2017, 36% of women in a smaller sample of these communities reported having received food aid over the previous year, suggesting a possible decline, although one needs to treat these findings with care due to the small sample.



Top Four Aid Types Received, 2014

Village	Road Infrastructure	Water	Food Aid	Agriculture
	32%	30%	23%	22%

Similarly, in village communities road infrastructure (at 32%) followed by water-related projects at (30%) were the two primary forms of aid received, while food aid came in third (at 23%) followed by agricultural support (at 22%). Both urban and village Area C communities received a more varied range of aid; with five types of aid being cited by more than 20% of women in these communities and between 10-20% of them saying they had received another three types of aid.

Regionally, the greatest bias towards food aid was reported in the South West Bank, with more than half of women stating their community had received it the previous year, while in the Jordan Valley, food aid (at 27%) was second to health projects (at 32% of women citing them).

Assessments of Household Benefit from Aid

Women were asked if their households had directly benefited from the general aid received by their community; 37% stated, “not at all”; 28% said “a little; 26% stated “somewhat” and only 8% said their household benefited “a lot”.²⁸ Village women were most negative in assessing the benefit of aid projects to their household, with 47% saying they had not benefited at all. The predominant response among women in hamlet/ encampments was that their households had benefited “a little” (47%) while in urban communities, the highest response was that they had benefited “somewhat” (at 45%).

Knowledge of/Inclusion in Aid Decisions

Women had a great deal knowledge about types of aid distributed in their communities, but very few of them had been consulted about that aid. Only approximately 6% of women surveyed said they did not know about various types of aid distributed in their community, however only 10% of women in 2014 (and 11% in 2017) said they had been consulted about humanitarian aid provided to their communities, with slightly higher numbers of women (14%) in both South West Bank communities and in hamlet/encampments claiming they had been consulted about aid.

²⁸ No direct correlation can be made between specific kinds of aid and the degree to which women felt their household benefited due to the question being a summary assessment of all aid received by the community.



Aid Priorities

Only in the 2017 resurvey were respondents asked what specific aid was the priority for their households. The results show a highly varied set of priorities when examined by community type. Area C households in urban locations put an overwhelming priority on educational support, with almost 52% saying this was their priority, followed by electrical infrastructure (at 17%) and income generation at almost 14%. In village communities, health infrastructure was the number one priority cited by almost one-fourth of women, followed by approximately 15% citing roads, water and agricultural support each.

What Type of Aid is the Priority for Your Household?				
2017	Urban	Village	Hamlet/encampment	Total
Water	6.9	15.0	17.1	15.0
Roads	10.3	15.0	12.0	13.7
Electricity	17.2	3.0	10.3	6.3
Education	51.7	10.3	7.7	12.6
Health	--	23.9	17.1	20.0
Agriculture	--	14.1	10.3	11.8
Housing	--	2.1	1.7	1.8
Food aid	--	6.0	18.8	11.8
Legal aid	--	0.9	0.9	0.8
Income generation	13.8	6.0	4.3	6.1

In contrast to urban areas, educational support and income generation were much lower priorities in village households (at 10% and 6%, respectively). Households in hamlet/encampments had yet another series of priorities, with food aid at the top of the list (at 19%), followed by water and healthcare (both at 17%), roads at 12%, and electricity and agricultural support (each a priority among 10% of women surveyed).

Clear gaps are apparent between the types of aid that donors prioritize for Area C and those that households in these communities prioritize, most obviously in relation to food aid. This was the dominant form of aid to villages in Area C in both 2014 and 2017, while only 6% of women there saw it as a priority. In hamlet/encampments, while almost half of women in 2014 (one-third in 2017) said their community had received food aid, only one-fifth of them cited it as their main aid priority. However, hamlet/encampments were consistent between community priorities and aid received in two areas: health services and water-related projects, and only a small gap existed between health as a priority (at 24%) and health services received (at 21%) in villages.



Qualitative Research Links: Aid

Everyone talks and no one helps. — male university graduate, al Fasayil

The young men need an alternative. Give us a factory, for tomatoes, for pickles, for anything. — head of village council, al Fasayil

Al Fasayil is divided, with some lands in Area C and some in Area B. This latter section of the village was provided with funds from the Ministry of Local Government and international donors for critical community infrastructure (schools at all levels, a clinic and a multi-purpose building housing a day care and women's center). There is also a sports club for male youth within the municipal building, although the Israeli military halted construction on an adjacent sports field. The head of the council says that the few times the village received feed for livestock, it came from international solidarity organizations as opposed to international aid organizations. Men interviewed put a priority on aid in the form of job creation schemes – particularly for young men. While surrounded by Israeli settlements engaged in advanced agroindustry for export, al Fasayil has a stark absence of economic projects (including on Palestinian-owned agricultural land) due to lack of investment, water and the ability to obtain Israeli permits. Community leaders prioritized such projects, for the development and long-term sustainability of the community. Women tended to put a priority on more immediate needs with gendered implications; specifically, the need for affordable and dependable public transportation that would enable their travel beyond the community – especially the main urban service center. As elsewhere, where there are very few cars in a community (as is the case in al Fasayil), they are used mainly for men to access the workplace, with women only having access in cases of emergency (if at all).

Some international organizations said they were going to give us [food for livestock]. What did we get? Five bushels. My father left them where they were, they weren't enough for anything. — male school teacher, Imreiha

There's no one who will support us with grain or medicines [for the livestock]. — male herder, Imreiha

Two years we were working on the village master plan – I think with the support of the government of Denmark – and then they gave us money to build the multi-purpose center. And once work started the civil administration showed up, confiscated the materials and equipment and put a stop work order on it. And we'd already been celebrating and passed around sweets. — Male school teacher, Imreiha

As in al Fasayil, as the above quotes attest, respondents in **Imreiha** also said they had rarely, if ever, received livestock feed as aid. While included in electricity and water projects through larger donor-supported regional infrastructural aid, it was only through the community's own dogged tactical maneuvers around the Israeli authorities that they were actually able to take advantage of the support. Among males and females of all generations in the village, the main priority was an elementary school. In lieu of a school, they had hoped that the Danish-supported project to build a multi-purpose center – stopped altogether by Israeli authorities – would have produced a preschool. Among women and girls, also as in al Fasayil, cheap, dependable



public transportation allowing them access to nearby Yabad was also mentioned as a priority.

The community of **al Walajeh** has been relatively successful in getting aid from international organizations for civic services such as a clinic and day-care center. However, municipal infrastructure (such as roads, retaining walls and water infrastructure) is severely constrained by Israeli authorities. The aid priorities of the community include creating a safe playground/recreation area for children. And once again, among women, a main priority cited was cheap and dependable public transportation to allow greater access to service centers outside the community.

We're paying 22,000 shekels a year to rent the building [for the health center]. You don't know how much of our budget it eats up – all we need is a building and we've tried to find support but no one will help us. The Japanese said they might help. We gave them the entire project plan and they have yet to respond. Zaim is no one's priority. — male council member, al Zaim

The people here, they don't pay for the water they drink. We have a debt of seven million shekels for water – so we have been prohibited from being part of projects. Our situation isn't to be envied. Don't get me wrong, but this is the reality. — male council member, al Zaim

No one helps. If you are desperate you have to go to Izzariya and you go from one organization to another. If you have boys, they say make them work. No one helps. — woman, al Zaim

As mentioned earlier, **al Zaim** had been able to get support for school infrastructure within that part of the community that was located in Area B, as well as support for staffing a community clinic with health workers. As described by the council member above, the center remains a huge financial burden on the village council because it operates from rented premises, since the village was unable to get support to build its premises. The aid profile in al Zaim has been made considerably more complex by the lack of internal cohesion in the community. High numbers of residents live there as a refuge of last resort. Large numbers of Jerusalem identity card holders looking for housing close to the city, as well as individuals escaping legal or social problems in other areas of the West Bank have turned al Zaim into something akin to a fugitive zone. Both of these populations prefer to conceal their habitation in al Zaim to outside authorities, with implications for planning, services and public safety. In addition, the community lacks internal security or policing. The village council talks about its community, in the words of one member, as being “heavily populated by phantoms” and impossible to police, including the enforcement of municipal and utility bill penalties. As mentioned, the entire community is penalized for the very situation that has been created by Israeli policies. While male village council members focused on the finite immediate priority of a dedicated building for the health center, the infinite problems overwhelming the community made it impossible for female respondents to agree upon a specific priority.

Of all of the communities, only women in al Walajeh, with its strong participation of women in civic activism and self-help, said they had been consulted about aid projects to the community.



APPENDIX I

I. Methodology of Area C 2014 Survey and 2017 Households Resurvey

This report is a product of two surveys undertaken among households located in communities across Area C. The first survey in June 2014 was the most comprehensive and representative, based on a large sample size of 1,600 households in 40 selected Area C communities. The 2017 resurvey implemented the same survey instrument with a 25% sub-sample of 400 households from ten Area C communities (selected from the 2014 sample) with the aim of assessing changes in overall trends between the two periods. Given the difference in sample size, the report relies primarily on the data produced in the 2014 survey while the 2017 data is used to track changes to the profiles and trends identified there years earlier.

II. Methodology of the 2014 Area C Survey

In comparison to the existing data that exists on Area C communities, the 2014 Birzeit Institute of Women's Studies/Oxfam/Novib survey is significant because:

- It is a statistically representative comprehensive household survey of the total Palestinian population living in Area C.
- Its sample size and design also enables comparisons to be made between Area C households located in the four main regions of the West Bank (North, Middle, South and Jordan Valley), as well as allowing comparisons between households located in different Area C community types (villages, hamlet/ encampments, and urban areas).
- As a dedicated survey, it puts a focus on issues specifically relevant to households located in Area C communities while also measuring core demographic and socio-economic indicators.
- As a gender-aware survey, it consistently integrates gender concerns as a central dimension of study
- Given these characteristics, it serves as a base-line survey for future household surveys in Area C

Pilot Survey

An initial pilot survey of 100 Area C households was undertaken in April 2014 in order to test the questionnaire and probe conceptual and procedural issues – a step that proved crucial to bettering the overall research design.

Definitions

- Area C communities includes formal and informal localities in which all or any of their municipal area is located in Area C
- Area C households includes only households who are situated on land designated as Area C regardless of whether the locale they belong to also contains zones designated Area A or B

What Can the Survey Say? Sample Design and Statistical Representation of Area C Households

The sample design had two main goals:

- To have a large enough sample size to be able to represent all Area C households (to be able to make scientifically valid statements about the circumstances of Area C households generally).
- To distribute that sample geographically so as to be able to represent main differences between Area C households located in different regions of the West Bank.

2014 Survey Design: Sample Size and Distribution

Total sample:

Total # of Households surveyed: 1,600

Total # of individuals encompassed in surveyed households: 8,813

Total # of Communities surveyed: 40

Regions:

Distribution of Communities by Region: 10 communities x 4 regions

North West Bank: 10 communities/ 400 households (40 hh per/community)

Middle West Bank: 10 communities/400 households (40 hh per/community)

South West Bank: 10 communities/400 households (40 hh per/community)

Jordan Valley: 10 communities/ 400 households (40 hh per/community)

Outcome of random selection:

Total Household Sample by Community Type:

Villages: 61%

Hamlet/Encampments 31% (20.5 encampments/ 10.5 hamlets)

Urban: 8% (5.7% town/ 2.3 refugee camp)

Margin of Error: less than 2%

* Based on Population Estimate for Area C:

PCBS 2012: 117,000 individuals = 19,500 households

Representation of total Area C Communities: In deciding on sample size, the survey team relied on PCBS's data on the most recent estimate of total population of Area C communities, since it was the most reliable.²⁹ They estimated that in 2012 the population of Area C communities would be 117,000 individuals (for an approximate total of 19,5000 households). As such, the 1,600 household size provided a very low margin of error in representing all households located in Area C, at less than 2%.

Representation by Region:

By distributing the sample of households equally across all regions (and having a large enough sample for each region), the survey was able to reliably represent the different circumstances of households by regional locations.

Representation by Community Type:

The sample by community type was not pre-determined, but arose from the random selection of communities within each region. Given the overall sample design, the outcome of the distribution of the households across community types has a strong likelihood of reflecting their actual distribution across Area C (i.e., the majority of households located in Area C are in villages, followed by hamlet/encampments, while a much smaller number of households in Area C are in urban areas). Once some related community types were amalgamated (Bedouin encampments with hamlets; and towns with refugee camps) there was large enough sample size to make comparisons by community type.

Limitations:

Due to the limited sample of households in Urban Area C locations, it was not possible to do in-depth analysis of them by region.

Field Methodology and Secondary Sampling:

Ten communities were randomly selected by the research team for each region. Fieldwork supervisors organized fieldworkers by four regional groups. On arriving in a selected community, supervisors first contacted community officials (village council or municipality where they existed, local leaders where they did not) in order to ascertain which parts of the community were indeed located in Area C and thus to ensure that only households located in C would be surveyed. Once households were confirmed as being in Area C,

²⁹ There is a huge disparity in estimated population of Area C communities with numbers as high as 300,000 individuals estimated by UNOCHA in 2013 and 180,000 by Bimkon in 2011. PCBS was considered most reliable because, unlike the other two sources, it was based on population projections from the 2007 Palestinian National Census (i.e. based on an actual household survey in the field). As well, the PCBS definition of Area C communities most closely reflected that used by this survey.

fieldworkers would walk to get an overview of the probable number of households from which to randomly select from. Depending on the approximate number of potential households that could be interviewed, researchers would randomly select an interval (for instance, 2-3 if only a small number of households existed; 10-15 for a much larger community). Then depending on the layout of communities, fieldworkers would select 40 households according to the interval chosen while walking in a specific line (a grid, circle, from right to left depending on the physical context).³⁰

Household Level Sampling:

At the household level, fieldworkers were to randomly select a female household member 18 years or older to be interviewed. This was done by first ascertaining the age and sex of all members of the household (by filling in a family grid with anyone present in the household) and then using a Kish table to randomly select one female 18 years or older from among them to be interviewed.

The decision to only select females 18 years or older to be interviewed was based on the following:

- The time and monetary costs that would ensue if multiple members of the household were interviewed (with fieldworkers likely having to make multiple visits to households to capture multiple household members).
- Males are more often absent from the household during the day (again leading to a need for multiple visits).
- Mature (18 plus years of age) women generally can be found at home, at the same time that they tend to have a wider overview of the issues and circumstances of all household members (due to their normative gender roles).

All of these practical and financial considerations in survey design are relevant for any household survey in the OPT, but were much more significant in the difficult circumstances of surveying households in Area C.

II. Methodology of the 2017 Resurvey

The 2017 resurvey used the same definitions, sample framework, survey instrument and selection method in the field, as the 2014 survey. What differed was the smaller sample (25% of the original) size in which a total of 400 households would be surveyed across the four main regions of Area C.

³⁰ In a number of cases in hamlet/encampments where the total number of households was less than 40, field researchers completed the quota by surveying households in the next immediate community.

Total Sample 2017:

Total # of Households surveyed: 400

Total # of individuals encompassed in surveyed households: 2,046

Total # of Communities surveyed: 16

Regions:

Distribution of Communities by Region: 4 communities x 4 regions

North West Bank: 4 communities/ 10 households each (total =40hh)

Middle West Bank: 4 communities/10 households each (total=40hh)

South West Bank: 4 communities/10 households each (total=40hh)

Jordan Valley: 4 communities/ 10 households each (total=40hh)

Sample by Community Type:

Villages: 52.5%

Hamlet/Encampments 40% 31% (20.5 encampments/ 10.5 hamlets)

Urban:7.5%

[The above were re-weighted in the analysis to reflect the 2014 distribution of 61% Village; 31% Hamlet/Encampment; 8% Urban]

Margin of Error: 5+

** Population Estimate for Area C:*

PCBS 2012: 117,000 individuals (=19,500 households)

Changes in Selection Strategy

Priority was given to an equal regional distribution of households to reflect the main architecture of 2014 sample. However, given the small sample, simple random selection of communities in each region (as was done in 2014) would not have ensured a representative distribution of community types. As such, selection of community types was purposive with two main goals: to distribute community types equally by region, as well as achieve an overall sample of community types that mimicked their final distribution in the 2014 survey. However, given the inflexibility of the small sample – and the actual distribution of community types in each region – compensating for differences in the

final distribution of community types between the two surveys was ultimately achieved by re-weighting the data.

Data Limitations

Given the small overall sample, the 2017 data could only be used to chart overall trends using main indicators such as by region, community type, or individual indicators for all Area C. More complex levels of analysis would not be statistically reliable.

III. Methodology Qualitative Research 2017-2018

The 2017 resurvey was followed by an in-depth qualitative research component in order to deepen or explain specific findings as well as gain an understanding of contextual issues. Four communities from the quantitative sample representative of main dimensions of the sample framework were selected.

Qualitative Research Sites by Main Sample Characteristics				
Community	Imreiha	Al Zaim	Al Walajeh	Fasayil
Region	North West Bank	Middle West Bank	South West Bank	Jordan Valley
Community type	Hamlet/Encampment	Urban	Village	Village +Hamlet/Encampment
Internal land zones	Completely C	B & C	B & C	B & C
External zone	Enclaved by Area C	Enclaved by Area C	Enclaved by Area C	Enclaved by Area C

Research Strategy:

Background data: Prior to fieldwork background reports on the community were reviewed to understand their specific issues and contexts. In addition, data frequencies for the community were generated from both survey data sets to guide questions in the field. Findings from the survey data meant research questions could be focused on explaining specific trends identified in each community (such as: low educational completion levels; particular livelihood strategies; or experiences of violence).

Community Level Sample:

The sample of research participants in each community aimed to cover both gender and generation, as well as balance between community level and individual experiences. In order to do this the research strategy included the following participants and interview types:

Research Interviews and Participants, 2018

	Imreiha	Al Zaim	Al Walajeh	Fasayil
Interview Type	Number and Type of participants interviewed			
Group Interview with local Council/ informal leaders	2 (one male/ one female)	3 male council members	2 male council members	2 male council members
Focus Group with Females	Total 10 Age range (19 to 70) Education range (0 to 13+years) Mixed marital status	Total 5 Age range (30-68) Education range (3 to 10 years) All married	Total 20+ Age range (19-80) Education range (0 to 13+ years) Mixed marital status	Total 7 Age range (18 to 65) Education range 0 to 13+ years Mixed marital status
Individual interview married males	Total 1 Age 54 years Education primary	Total 2 Age range (27 to 55) Education range (10 to 13+)	Total 2 Age range (32 to 36) Education 13+	Total 2 Age range (60 to 65) Education range (10 to 12 years)
Individual Interviews unmarried males	Total 2 Age range (21 to 56) Education (13 to 13+)	None	Total 2 Age range (21 to 25) Education 13+	Total 1 Age 24 Education 13+
Total participants	15	10	26+	12

Individual or group interviews with members of village council or informal community leaders where the former did not exist. With one exception, all these participants were male community members. Questions focused on the overall challenges and obstacles faced by the community history, issues of infrastructure and services, as well as perceptions of social problems and community priorities. In addition, they provided data on humanitarian and other support received by the community.

Focus group interviews with demographically mixed group of female community members. Questions were focused on explaining demographic findings (education, marriage age, etc.), women's engagement in work, fears about family members and the future, experiences of violence, problems of movement and access, as well as processes of social and gender change in the community. Questions asked about experiences of domestic violence were perhaps the least successful in focus group interview settings. Focus group interviews aimed to include a minimum of five female participants with different demographic profiles. As is the case with focus groups, their make-up

and number of participants varied according to who showed up. In al Walajeh, too many participants showed up while in al Zaim, all of the participating females were married women.

Individual interviews with married males. Questions aimed to understand the difficulties faced by male breadwinners, their livelihood strategies, and challenges as well as concerns and priorities regarding family members and the future of their household and community. In addition, questions aimed to understand perceptions of social and gender change in the community from the perspective of older males. Although the aim was to interview at least two married male breadwinners per community, in Imreiha only one participant was able to leave their work in order to participate.

Individual Interviews with unmarried males. Questions aimed to understand the specific challenges and experiences of young males in terms of education, employment and strategies and impediments towards marriage and setting up households. In addition, they aimed to assess attitudes towards female education and formal employment and social and gender change more generally, as well as young men's age and gender specific experiences of military violence. Two interviews with unmarried males were aimed for in each community. In Zaim, the young man identified by the field team turned out to be married so was interviewed within the breadwinner category; in Fasayil although two young unmarried men showed up for the interview, one dominated and took the time of both interviewees. While in Imreiha, one of the unmarried men turned out to be of a much older age category.

The Research Team

The research team was composed of a field supervisor from the household survey who had prior contact and knowledge with the community whose role was to identify the participants and organize the interview schedule. In addition, was the senior IWS researcher from the main survey team, another senior researcher from IWS and a graduate student research assistant.

The Interview Data

All interviews were taped with the consent of research participants. On completion, they were turned over to a specialist for transcription. The research team subsequently coded the data by themes to be used in the analysis.

APPENDIX II: SCALES USED IN THE STUDY

Standard of living scale variables (range of scores 0-9)

1. Currently available Electrical fridge to the household
2. Currently available Solar Heater to the household
3. Currently available Clothes washing machine to the household
4. Currently available Microwave to the household
5. Currently available Hoover to the household
6. Currently available House library to the household
7. Currently available Telephone line to the household
8. Currently available Computer to the household
9. Currently available Internet service to the household

Individual distress scale variables (range of scores 1-5)

1. To what extent did you feel unable to control the important things in your life?
2. To what extent did you feel unable to cope with all the things that you had to do?
3. To what extent did you feel worried?
4. To what extent did you feel frustrated?
5. To what extent did you feel incapacitated?
6. To what extent did you feel humiliated?
7. To what extent did you feel lonely?
8. To what extent did you feel anxious?
9. To what extent did you feel sad?
10. To what extent did you feel angry?
11. To what extent did you feel fed up with life?
12. To what extent did you feel unable to cope with all the things that you had to do?

Human insecurity scale variables: (range of scores 1-5)

1. To what extent do you fear for yourself in your daily life?
2. To what extent do you fear for your family in your daily life?
3. To what extent do you feel worry/fear not being able to provide your family with daily life necessities?
4. To what extent do you worry/fear about losing your source of income or your family's source of income?
5. To what extent do you worry/fear losing your home?
6. To what extent do you feel worry/fear from displacement or uprooting?
7. To what extent do you worry/fear for your future and your family's future?
8. To what extent do you feel fear on your safety?
9. To what extent do you feel fear on the safety of your family?
10. To what extent does your family feel fear on your safety?



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